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Abstract 
This thesis examines the cross-sectional relationships between insider ownership, 
ownership concentration, ownership composition and corporate value in Korean 
publicly listed companies (PLCs). These relationships are tested using piecewise 
ordinary least squares linear regressions and two-stage least squares linear 
regressions applied to equations which include a number of ownership variables to 
explain variations in corporate value, alongside capital structure variables and · 
industrial dummy variables. The evidence suggests that there is a significant non-
monotonous relation between the level of insider ownership and corporate value 
for the Korean PLCs and that insider ownership affects corporate value, but not 
vice versa. The findings here raise questions regarding the assumption that 
ownership structure is endogenously determined, but they support the theories that 
corporate value is affected by levels of insider ownership. 
't 
Since the crisis in 1997, economic reform including restructuring of the corporate 
governance system of the Korean corporate sector has been advanced under IMF 
guidelines. Many commentators, however, are still concerned about the ownership 
structure of the Korean PLCs. Ownership structure is often asserted to be one of 
the most important factors contributing to the highly indebted financial structure, 
excessive diversifications, inadequate monitoring and failure in accounting 
transparency and monitoring mechanisms in Korean corporations. In this regard, 
the question of whether or not ownership structure of the Korean PLCs still affects 
their value is the main interest to this study. 
The level of corporate value declines as insider ownership increases up to 15 per 
cent. It rises as insider ownership increases up to 35 per cent and then declines 
again after 35 per cent. In the case of the Korean PLCs, around 35 per cent of 
insider ownership might be recommended to contribute to higher corporate value, 
and so the current average of 50 per cent insider ownership should be reduced. 
The evidence also suggests that for the Korean PLCs there is no reverse causality 
from corporate value to insider ownership. There is no significant relationship 
Vll 
between the concentration of ownership and corporate value. There is, however, a 
relationship between ownership composition and corporate value. The evidence 
suggests that a situation in which top management holds only small share of a 
corporation is also associated with a lower value of the firm. The share controlled 
by insiders and management positively affects corporate value, while the share 
controlled by outsiders of firms such as the foreigners' share, has a negative effect 
on firm value. Foreigners choose to hold more shares when firms perform well, 
and also prefer to hold shares in larger manufacturing companies rather than in 
smaller finance and information technology companies in Korea. 
It also has been suggested that there are significant differences between the results 
for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms in Korea. The results here support 
this proposition. The government, therefore, should differentiate between the 
corporate reform policies that could be applied respectively to the chaebol and 
non-chaebol firms. 
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1 
Introduction 
Background and motivation 
After the financial crisis in Korea of 1997, the key to the eventual success of 
Korea's economic reform has been the restructuring of the Korean corporate 
sector. The Korean corporate sector, mostly publicly listed private companies _ 
(PLCs), led and contributed substantially to the national economy over the last 
four decades. During those times, the big conglomerates of firms, the so-called 
chaebols, were formed by the previous governments' industrial development 
policy, which was focusing on heavy-chemical industrial development. 1 In fact, 
this development policy made most chaebols dominate the previous tremendous 
economic growth in Korea. On the other hand, however, it brought about an 
t . 
economic concentration problem and led to insolvent management under 
government protection.2 Ironically, therefore, the chaebols and the governments ' 
corporate sector policy, the so-called 'conglomerates policy', are often criticised 
for contributing to the financial crisis of 1997, thus becoming one of the main 
sectors in need of reform (Yoo, 1998). Among the critical debates, the failure in 
corporate governance of the Korean corporate sector is most often cited. The 
structural, systematic or institutional nature of firms has evolved behind the 
unprecedented economic growth. The financial crisis, however, exposed defects in 
the corporate governance system of the Korean corporate sector. One such defect 
discussed is the structural characteristics of most Korean PLCs, such as the highly 
indebted financial structures and extremely diversified business portfolios. 
Another is the inadequate monitoring and lack of checking as a result of a failure 
1 Korean business conglomerates that consist of many subsidiaries, diversifying into various lines of 
business, usually owned and controlled by a single family. There have been many studies that have attempted 
to define chaebols in their own terms: See Cho·, Dong Sung (1991) for a survey of various definitions of 
chaebol. Comparable names of big business in other capitalist economies are: Trusts in the US around the 
turn of the 20th century, Konzerne in German industrialisation history, Japanese pre-war Zaibatsu (both 
chaebol and zaibatsu are written with the same Chinese characters, pronounced in Mandarin Chinese as caifa 
with the meaning of financial clique), business groups (kigyoshudan) or keiretsu in contemporary Japan, 
guanxiqiye (related enterprise) in Taiwan, etc. (Yoo, 1998) 
2 Gross sales by chaebols amounted to 96.2 per cent of the GDP in 1996 (KFfC 1998). Another economic 
concentration ratio - the average assets of the 30 largest chaebols - accounted for 46.5 per cent in 1994, 
compared to 22.4 per cent in the U.S.A., 22.7 per cent in Japan, and 22.7 per cent in Germany (Hwang 1997). 
2 
1n accounting transparency and monitoring mechanisms because most Korean 
PLCs are owned and managed by founders and founders' family with a high 
proportion of shares. 3 In this regard, the question of whether high insider 
ownership of the Korean PLCs affects their performance positively or negatively 
is of interest to this study. 
The corporate circumstances in Korea are relatively unique compared with those 
of other developed nations as well as other ownership structures, because 
uncontrollable 'one-man' management, the so-called 'owner-managerialism', is 
prevalent throughout Korean firms. Economists argue that whether the ownership 
structures are governed by 'one-man' owner management or family management 
under favourable government protection policy, the structure affects corporate 
performance and firm value, because not only might there be a strong incentive to 
the owner manager; but the result may be a distorted management of an arbitrary 
or entrenched kind.4 This thesis investigates the relation between the ownership 
structure of the PLCs and chaebol companies and their performance in Korea and, 
in what ways. 
Analytical issues 
"Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount interests of 
the community .... Rigid enforcement of property rights, as a temporary protection against 
plundering by control would not stand in the way of the modification of these rights in the interest 
of other groups. When a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is 
generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today must yield before the larger 
interests of society .. .. It is conceivable, - indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system 
is to survive, - that the "control" of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral 
technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to 
each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity." 
(Berle and Means, 1932:312-3) 
Berle and Means (1932) proposed three characteristics of modern firms as 
evidence of their entering the new era as economic organisations. First, big 
corporations are owned by a number of anonymous investors who hold only a few 
shares; second, most managers hold negligible (insignificant) quantities of shares; 
third, there are big differences between the interests of shareholders and 
3 In chaebols, it is well known that mutual shareholdings are prevalent among subsidiaries within a group. 
4 For the incentive argument, see Han and Suk(l 998), Holthausen and Larcker(l 996), Mehran(l 995), and 
Jain and Kini(l 994), and for the entrenchment argument, see Boyle, Carter and Stover(l 998), Slovin and 
Sushka(l 993), and Jensen and Murphy(l 990) 
3 
managers. Berle and Means also pointed out that if the corporate ownerships are 
widely dispersed, the conflicts between the shareholders and managers are 
inevitable. If the shareholders cannot exercise their voting rights, and the directors 
shirk supervising the managers on behalf of the shareholders, managers might 
laxly operate the firms, and pursue their own benefits.5 Berle and Means also 
raised the owner-agency problem: the conflict of interests between managers and 
owners affects corporate performance. 6 Berle and Means suggested that the 
separation of ownership and control causes managers to abuse the management of 
power in modern corporation. 
The initial motivation of this thesis originated from the theory of Berle and Means 
(1932). Based on their theory, the analytical issues to study here are as follows. 
1. Does the ownership structure of the Korean PLCs affect their corporate 
performance? If so, how? 
2. Are there significant correlations between corporate performance and 
ownership structure in the Korean corporate sector? If so, in what ways? 
In order to answer the questions above, we establish specific hypotheses as 
follows: 
Hl: Ownership structure (insiders' shares) of the Korean PLCs significantly 
affects their corporate performance. 
H2: Corporate perform~nce of the Korean PLCs significantly affects their 
ownership structure (insiders' shares). 
H3: There is a significant relationship between ownership concentration (top 3 
largest shareholders' shares) of the Korean PLCs and their corporate 
performance. 
5 According to Berle and Means, the actual power to manage an enormous enterprise belongs to the top 
managers who appoint directors, and express this power by using the word 'control'. The separation of 
ownership and 'control' in any modern corporation is irrevocable. 
6 But, Stigler and Friedland (1983) set up the hypothesis that owner-managers manage effectively regardless 
of the size of firms, and urge that it is not the owner-agency problem because there is no mention of the 
incentive system of managers ' compensation in Berle and Means' theory. 
4 
H4: There are significant relationships between ownership composition and 
corporate performance of the Korean PLCs. 
Finally, to examine the similarities and differences between the results regarding 
above issues for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms, the final hypothesis 
is established as follows. 
HS: There are significant similarities and differences between the results for the 
chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms. 
The issues to be examined in this thesis are raised from the assumption that the 
relations between ownership structure and corporate performance as · argued by 
Berle and Means ( 1932) exist in modern corporations. In order to identify the 
correlation between corporate performance and ownership structure, a brief 
overview of the concept of corporate governance is provided in Appendix 2. 
Empirical proposals and methodology 
Since Berle and Means ( 1932) raised the questions and warned of the dispersed 
ownership and separation of the ownership and control in modern corporations, 
many economists went one step further and suggested empirically various other 
proposals. These are briefly overviewed as an interim pathway to help the 
methodology of this thesis in this section. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) find that more equity ownership by the manager may 
increase corporate performance because it means better alignment of the monetary 
incentives between the manager and other equity owners (incentive alignment 
argument). Stulz ( 1988) argues that more equity ownership by the manager may 
increase corporate performance because the managers are more capable of 
opposing a takeover threat from the market for corporate control, and as a result 
the raiders in this market will have to pay higher takeover premiums (takeover 
premium argument). Shleifer and Vishny ( 1986 and 1997) develop a model to 
demonstrate that large owners or block owners may be more capable of 
monitoring and controlling the management, thereby perhaps contributing to 
5 
corporate performance (monitor argument). Fama and Jensen ( 1983 ), however, 
argue that increased ownership concentration (any kind of owner) decreases 
corporate performance because it raises the firm's cost of capital as a result of 
decreased market liquidity or decreased diversification opportunities on behalf of 
the investor (cost of capital argument). Stulz (1988) presents a formal model that 
predicates a roof shaped relation between managerial ownership and performance. 
The model integrates the takeover premium argument and the entrenchment 
argument into a single theory (integrated theory). Slovin and Sushka ( 1993) 
support Stultz ( 1988) with their empirical results that insider holdings at low level 
affects firm value, but when insider ownership is high, it adversely affects firm 
value (insider entrenchment argument). Likewise, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
( 1988a) find and emphasise that the incentive alignment argument and the 
.,. 
entrenchment argument can be presented in different levels of managerial 
ownership. There are three significant levels of managerial ownership: corporate 
performance increases below 5% and over 25% ownership, but it decreases 
between 5% and 25% ownership (combined theory). 
On the other hand, Kole ( 1996) reports that firms reward their managers for good 
past performance by giving them equity ownership, so better performance results 
in more management ownership (referred to as the reward argument). Cho ( 1998) 
presents an insider-reward argument in his empirical study that managers may 
prefer equity compensation when they expect their firm to perform well and, 
consequently, the value of the firm to increase. As a result, higher levels of insider 
ownership are expected at firms with high corporate values. Laderer and Martin 
(1997) show that owner-managers are insiders who may capitalise on their 
insights by increasing their ownership when they expect increased future 
performance and decrease their ownership when they expect decreased 
performance (insider-investment argument). Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Kole and Lehn (1997), however, argue that any kind of ownership 
structure is determined by corporate performance in the sense that corporations 
with inefficient ownership structures will fail to survive in the long run. It should 
be noted that an implication of this argument is that in the long run all ownership 
structures should be expected to perform equally well (endogeneity argument). 
6 
Morck et al. (1988a) selected 371 of the largest U.S. firms as research samples, 
and identified in the ownership structure significant ownership variables such as 
the combined shareholding by board members and the use of a dummy for the 
presence of the founder on the board. They also clarified corporate performance 
by Tobin's Q 7 by market value of stock, preferred stock and debt to replacement 
cost of plant and inventories, and profit rate by net cash flow to replacement cost 
of capital as performance variables. Piecewise linear regression was used as a 
statistical method. The incentive argument and entrenchment argument are 
explained simultaneously in their study. Their study particularly provides the 
empirical motivation to establish the hypotheses applied to the Korean case. 
The sample for the empirical study here in this thesis consists of 499 Korean 
PLCs, which are a combination of 146 chaebol subsidiaries of the 30 largest 
chaebols and 354 non-chaebol firms listed on the stock market, in Korea as of 
1999. Insider ownership, ownership concentration ratio, ownership composition 
t 
variables are used as ownership structure variables in the estimations. For a 
measure of corporate performance, the market to book ratio of asset (MBA) is 
used in the firm performance and ownership structure estimations. A number of 
equations are established to estimate the correlation between various ownership 
structure variables and corporate performance, then estimated by using the 
piecewise ordinary least squares regressions and the complementary two stage 
least squares (2SLS) regressions. In terms of the robustness of the results, 
ordinary least squares regressions are also estimated, and other measures of firm 
performance are examined. 
7 Introduced by Tobin, Tobin's Q is in general defined as the ratio of the market value to the replacement 
value of the firm, which can be measured as the market value of equity and debts over replacement value of 
net fixed assets and inventory. 
q ==1+ 1 
t RC 
f 
· (p-AC )Qe -r(r-t)d'r 
f 
P: Product price, Q: Product quantities, RC: Replacement cost, AC: Average cost 
Firm performance can be evaluated by considering Q 's size. 
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Scope and structure of the thesis 
This study does not seek to develop a complete theory of corporate value and 
ownership structure that can be applied in most economies. Rather, it has as its 
objective the exploration of facts about the Korean corporate sector and how they 
bear on the issues above in the context of existing theories. This thesis is 
organised around the theme of the relation between firm performance and 
ownership structure of the Korean PLCs. This study also focuses on 
understanding the corporate sector in a particular emerging market and finding out 
the specific aspects on the issues in that economy. The following chapters not · 
only deal with critical issues and questions related to the main theme of this 
thesis, but also attempt to provide strategical suggestions to the Korean corporate 
sector. 
Chapter 2 theoretically reviews major firm theories that examine the issues arising 
froiv the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance of 
the modern corporations, in which ownership is dispersed. It is important to 
understand the origin and background of the issues to be discussed in the 
following chapters. It starts from the theory of Berle and Means ( 1932), which is 
the first firm theory for the Modern Corporation. Following researchers develop 
their theories and prospect various aspects to identify the relations between 
dispersed ownership, control, and firm performance. 
Most major studies are based on the U.S. market. There are demands to examine 
other capitalist markets and even the emerging markets as well since the 
relationships might depend on unique ways of ownership distribution structures in 
those markets. There might be different forms of optimal relations for better 
corporate performance in each market. 
Chapter 3 discusses the Korean corporate environment and characteristics and 
ownership structures of the Korean corporate organisations. It outlines why this 
study examines the ownership structure issues. The Korean corporate environment 
is unique as an emerging market. This chapter reviews the history of economic 
development and political economy in modern Korea. It also focuses on the nature 
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and corporate governance of the big conglomerates, so called 'chaebol', including 
ownership concentration and ownership composition. 
Chapter 4 outlines data sources and methodology, and describes the sample with 
some analytical figures to understand the Korean data set. This chapter also 
discusses the variables and model specification to be used in the following 
chapters. Diagnostic tests are provided with statistics to ensure the validity of the 
empirical results. 
Chapter 5 is a core chapter analysing the issues raised in this thesis. This chapter 
reports the results of the regressions and discusses systematically the main 
findings of the analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate value for the Korean PLCs based on the models discussed in the last 
chapter. First, to be reported is the piecewise ordinary least squares linear 
regression analysis, replicating the break points method in Morck, Shleifer, and 
VisHny ( 1988a) and another break points method in Cho ( 1998), with the 
alternative break points method found in this analysis. Second, the results of 
insider ownership regression are discussed. Then the results of regressions 
between ownership concentration and corporate value are presented. Next, the 
relationships between ownership composition variables and corporate value are 
explored. The robustness of the results through the regressions with other 
performance measures on ownership structure variables is investigated. Finally, 
the results found in earlier sections are summarised and a conclusion is offered to 
answer the research questions and hypotheses raised in chapter I. 
Chapter 6 goes one step further to elucidate the similarities and differences of the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate value between the Korean 
chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms. The Chow-test results show that there is a 
statistical difference between the regression results of the chaebol firms and the 
non-chaebol firms, so that this chapter compares the two groups. It presents the 
results of the regressions and discusses the main findings of the models 
established in the last chapter. Discussion focuses on the piecewise ordinary least 
squares regression results for both the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms 
with the alternative break points method found in the last chapter. The regression 
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results, if any, are then presented for the reverse effects of insider ownership on 
corporate value for both the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms. The 
regressions between ownership concentration and corporate value for both sample 
groups are examined as well. The relationships between ownership composition 
variables and corporate value for both groups are estimated. The robustness of the 
results is also investigated to conclude this chapter. 
Chapter 7 summarises all of the empirical results discussed in previous chapters. 
This chapter answers the research questions and verifies hypotheses, and it 
suggests an optimal ownership structure for the Korean corporate sector. Finally, 
the limitations of the study and suggestions are made for further studies. 
Appendices provide some helpful information such as the OECD principles of 
corporate governance, concepts and problems of corporate governance, specific 
data on the Korean PLCs, including chaebols. 
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Theoretical Review 
This chapter discusses the theoretical issues arising out of studies of ownership 
structure in the governance systems of modern corporations. The chronological 
overview of the previous theories of firm relating to ownership structure clarifies 
the theoretical background of the issues to study in this thesis and provides a 
rationale of the empirical analysis in this thesis. 
Public corporation an~ ownership structure 
Large enterprises in the form of public corporations first appeared in the late 
nineteenth century in the United States, with their number and scale growing 
rapiqly, so that leaders in the twentieth century were at the forefront of modern 
capitalism. Managers operate public corporations, in which ownership and control 
are separate and ownership is freely transferable in the stock market and broadly 
dispersed. The development of the public corporation contributed to the 
improvement of the capital market, and became a special feature of the modern 
market economy. 
One hundred years later, the position of public corporations appears to be on the 
wane. If the great mergers and acquisitions of the late nineteenth century were 
motivated by vertical and horizontal integration to achieve economies of scale and 
scope, those of the late twentieth century focused on restructuring corporations. 
Market forces of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of public corporations, 
but circumstances in the late twentieth century have led to the decline of public 
corporations. Many economists have sought to explain why corporations succeed 
or fail in certain industries or countries . This work has elucidated the nature of 
corporations. Economic historians such as Chandler (1992) have studied the 
evolution of corporations from a dynamic perspective. The following sections 
provide a critical review of public corporations. 
1 1 
Change of ownership structure 
Berle and Means (1932) pointed out that concentration of economic power and 
extensive separation of ownership and control occurred in the United States 
during the twentieth century. They also emphasised that the big corporation is not 
explained by the classical theory of capitalism. 
1 Berle and Means' statistical 
analysis produced three main results. First, economic power is concentrated in the 
large enterprises. The 200 largest U.S. companies, except for banks, had assets of 
as much as $81 billion as at 1 January 1930 totalling 49 percent of the whole of 
the value of U.S. corporations.2. The second result is the new trend of separation 
of ownership and control. For example, in 1900, 4.4 million investors held 62 
billion stocks. The number of investors increased four-fold between 1900 and 
1928, so that the average stocks that investors had in 1929 decreased from 140 to 
51. In addition, 26 percent of the stock dividend was paid to investors who had 
annual incomes of less than $5,000 and 50 percent of the div_idend was paid to 
investors who had annual incomes of less than $25,000. Third, managers, at that 
time~ controlled the management of firms. Managers who did not have ownership 
operated 88 percent of the 200 largest companies. The next section goes one step 
further to analyse their theory. 
Berle and Means' theory: separation from the view of property rights 
Berle and Means ( 1932) proposed three characteristics of modern firms as 
evidence of their entering the new era as economic organisations. First, big 
corporations are owned by a number of anonymous investors who hold only a few 
shares; second, most managers hold negligible (insignificant) quantities of share; 
third, there are big differences between the interests of shareholders and 
managers. 
On the first characteristic, they found that in · the top three corporations of the U.S. 
at that time - Pennsylvania Railroad, U.S. Steel, and AT & T - the shares of the 
largest shareholders were less than 1 _percent. In the case of the 20 largest U.S. 
firms, holdings of the largest shareholders were less than 5 .1 percent. Moreover, 
1 Since The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776), the so-called 'the English classical school' of Adam Smith , 
David Ricardo (1772-1823 ), Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), and John Stewart Mill (1806-1873 ) led 
mainstream economics . 
2 Berle and Means noted that America's 200 largest firms constituted 22 per cent of all United States' wealth. 
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at least 44 percent of the shares of the 200 largest U.S. financial corporations were 
owned by these small shareholders who did not have any power to control the 
firms. The second characteristic emerged from the investigation of the first 
characteristic. The third characteristic emerged out of a study of corporate acts 
and regulations, and the judgments of court cases. The shareholders' rights were 
weakening whereas managers' discretion rights were strengthening. They also 
pointed out that the shareholders do not have the technical and financial abilities 
of legal reparation. Legal reparation is an effective method of exercising the rights 
of individuals in a field where the limitation of rights and responsibilities of the 
shareholders and managers is vague. 
" ... It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right both to use his own property 
as he sees fit and to receive the full fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be 
relied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any individual property he may possess. 
In the quasi-public corporation,3 such an assumption no longer holds. As we have seen, it is no 
longer the individual himself who uses his wealth. Those in control of that wealth, and therefore in 
a position to secure industrial efficiency and produce profits, are no longer, as owners, entitled to 
the bulk of such profits. Those who control the destinies of the typical modern corporation own so 
insignificant a fraction of the company's stock that the returns from running the corporation 
profitably accrue to them in only a very minor degree. The stockholders, on the other hand, to 
whom the profits of the corporation go, cannot be motivated by those profits to a more efficient 
use of the property, since they have surrendered all disposition of it to those in control of the 
enterprise .... " (Berle and Means, 1932) 
Berle and Means also pointed out that if the corporate ownerships are widely 
dispersed, the conflicts between the shareholders and managers are inevitable. If 
the shareholders cannot exercise their voting rights, and the directors shirk 
supervising the managers on behalf of the shareholders, managers might laxly 
operate the firms, and pursue their own benefits. Berle and Means also raised the 
owner-agency problem: the· conflict of interests between managers and owners 
affects corporate performance. 4 
Berle and Means concluded that the ownership of wealth with no control, and the 
control of wealth with no ownership is the logical termination of modern 
corporate evolution. They also pointed out that there are no factual differences 
between capitalist separation of ownership and control with widely dispersed 
3 They defined the 200 largest firms as 'Quasi-public Corporations ' . 
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ownerships, and socialism where the most productive assets are monopolised by 
minor party officials. Therefore, they recognised this as the crisis of capitalism. 
Berle and Means suggested that the separation of ownership and control causes 
managers to abuse the management of power. However, this did not mean a return 
to the classical concept of property right. Berle and Means claimed it is necessary 
to define afresh the concept of property right in the modern age, and to make 
public that definition. This is necessary because, in terms of legal interpretation, 
directors of public corporations are trustees on behalf of shareholders, consumers, 
workers, and other interested parties. It could be said that such an emphasis on 
publicity might conflict with a free-market standpoint. However, the view that 
publicity was necessary originated from the state of affairs in the U.S. where it is 
generally recognised that managers of great corporations used to fix prices (the 
so-called 'administered prices') in a monopolistic and oligopolistic market 
structure rather than follow supply and demand in a competitive market place. 
Berle and Means devised two public policies to overcome the problem of the 
separation of ownership and control. The first is the recognition by the courts that 
in corporate activities directors and managers are trustees; and the second is the 
encouragement of shareholders to participate actively in electing and appointing 
directors. When trust agreements are entered into, the trustees, who have the legal 
authority to manage the assets, manage the assets of the participants. If the 
separation of ownership and control is incorporated into the trust arrangements, 
courts can then force directors and managers to follow the highest standards of 
trust responsibility. Of course, this raises the question whether these policies are 
really applicable, because many shareholders cannot, in reality, easily obtain 
information about firms owned by themselves through the shares they hold. 
4 But, Stigler and Friedland (1983) set up the hypothesis · that owner-managers do effectively manage 
regardless of the size of firms , and urge that it is not the owner-agency problem because there is no mention 
of the incentive system of managers' compensation in Berle and Means ' theory. 
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In the U.S., security laws focusing on disclosure of all information about the value 
of stocks were established in 1933, and the stock exchange laws were enacted in 
1934. Finally, 'shareholder activism' was firmly established. 5 
According to Berle and Means, the legal vacuum, in which there is no ownership 
and no control of assets in the true sense, means that stockholders can exercise the 
right to use their wealth only through the disposal of their shares in stock markets. 
In addition, the activation and modernisation of stock markets brought about a 
great increase in the liquidity of ownership.6 That is, stock markets played the 
most important role in liquidation of private assets. Beard ( 1933) noted that such a 
legal vacuum released corporations from the control of strict state regulations of 
rights and responsibilities. That is, separation of ownership and control occurred 
without any reference to state government regulation or to the owners. 
Berle and Means pointed out that shareholders' rights had been undermined by the 
judg;ment of the courts that expanded the professional managers' discretionary 
rights. Such a separation of ownership and control led to a revolutionary change in 
the conception of private ownership: 
"Corporations have ceased to be merely legal devices through which the private business 
transactions of individuals may be carried on. Though still much used for this purpose, the 
corporate form has acquired a larger significance. The corporation has, in fact, become both a 
method of property tenure and a means of organising economic life. Grown _to tremendous 
proportions, there may be said to have evolved a "corporate system" as there was once a feudal 
system which has attracted to itself a combination of attributes and powers, and has attained a 
degree of prominence entitling it to be dealt with as a major social institution." (Berle and Means, 
1932) 
While Berle and Means were concerned about the agency problem caused by the 
separation of ownership and control, later economists offered different theories. 
Economic historians such as Chandler ( 1992) have studied the evolution of 
corporations from a dynamic perspective. The change in the nature of 
corporations in the U.S. is regarded as revolutionary. The findings of Chanq.ler are 
discussed in the following section . It was Chandler who suggested the reasons for 
5 But, Jensen ( 1989) paradoxically criticises these laws on the basis that they cause public corporations to 
decline because they restrict shareholders and creditors to passive participation. Monitoring of management 
and corporate restructuring is, in the long run, the province of banks . 
6 Chase (1933) represents metaphorically that the stock market is like a wheel of the new concept of assets. 
15 
the change of corporations since the second Industrial Revolution 1n the late 
nineteenth century. 
Chandler's hypothesis: a historical explanation of separation of ownership 
and control 
Chandler (1990) argued that a nation's competitiveness relies upon corporate 
organisation and financial capability. Corporate organisation and management 
patterns greatly affect both technological development and market structure. No 
fewer than 800 new types of corporations appeared during the two decades 
between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century in the U.S., 
Britain and Germany. Those corporations were created and developed under the 
same conditions throughout the twentieth century. The revolution of 
transportation and communication, such as the expansion of railways and 
steamship traffic, together with the development of telegraphic communications 
by tqe 1880s, made possible the exchange of large volumes of commodities and 
information both domestically and overseas. Over the next twenty years it induced 
the second Industrial Revolution 7, the technological revolution in the twentieth 
century. 
'Never before could manufacturers order large amounts of supplies and expect their delivery 
within, say, a week; nor could they promise their customers comparable large- scale deliveries on 
some specific date.' (Chandler, 1992b) 
In the 111iddle of the nineteenth century, renovation of production processes 
produced new industries and made existing industries transform themselves into 
new types of industries. These included metal production - processing of steel, 
copper, bronze and aluminium; oil and sugar refining; processing of grain; and 
new container processing in the form of cans, bottles and cartons. New industries 
emerged. Recently developed chemical processes produced artificial dyes, 
medicines, textiles, and fertilisers. The epoch-making event was the introduction 
of electricity, quickly taken up by new industries which dominated economic 
growth in urban industrial economies. Competition in international markets was 
7 See Chandler (1992), " ... to differentiate it from the "first" that occurred in Britain at the end of the I 8
th 
century, through the application of coal produced steam-powered machinery to mining and the production of 
textiles, metals and metal products." 
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stimulated. The degree of technological improvement adopted by industries 
depended on their scale and asset strength; organisations pursuing cost 
effectiveness of economies of scale and scope soon appeared. 
8 
Chandler showed that the new type of modern corporations appeared as a result of 
following three investment patterns: (1) investing in appropriately sized capital-
intensive production facilities in order to benefit from economies of scale and 
scope; (2) investing in creating networks of marketing, distribution, and 
purchasing in both domestic and overseas markets; and (3) investing in the 
employment of managers who were capable of supervising and controlling future 
production and distribution activities. 
' ... effective corporate activities do not mean any plans to make newly improved products and 
process, or commercialisation. Instead, they mean to build the optimal size of factory that can give 
the benefits of economy of scale and scope ... ' (Chandler, 1990) 
ChaHdler (1977) defined this new type of firm as 'modern multi-unit enterprises' , 
that consisted of single-unit factories, shops and marketing branch offices. The 
actual economies of scale and scope, as measured by throughput, were 
organisational. Such economies depend on knowledge, skill, experience, and 
teamwork - on the organised human capabilities essential to exploit the potential 
of techno.logical processes. In the capital-intensive industries, the throughput 
needed to maintain minimum scales of efficiency required careful coordination 
not only of the flow-through processes of production but also the flow of inputs 
from suppliers and the flow of outputs through intermediaries to final users 
(Chandler, 1992b ). 
Three types of investment - expansion of production facilities, marketing, and 
appointment of professional managers - were used to strengthen the advantages of 
prior occupation. Late new entrants in the competitive field had to pay fixed costs 
and "sunk costs" (the original capital investment); moreover, they had to employ 
8 But the labour-intensive industries such as textiles, lumber, furniture , printing, and publishing, etc. are not 
included in the second Industrial Revolution. Chandler (1990) notes that technological improvement is not 
automatic but is achieved as a result of management decisions in favour of: " ... renovation and relocation of 
producing elements; newly renovated machinery, smelting furnace, distiller, and other equipment; 
readaptation of production process; addition of interim process for complete goods; increase of using energy 
(eg, fossil fuel) ... " 
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professional managers who could systematise their firms' structures and who 
possessed marketing know-how. Under these emerging oligopolistic market 
structures, pricing policies became one of the most important strategies of most 
firms. However, as a result of competition with others, most firms increased their 
functional and strategic efficiency. This was achieved through, for example, more 
efficient processes, systematic research and development (R&D), improving 
products' qualities and processes, more effective marketing services, product 
differentiation, and market entry and exit promptness, all of which influenced 
market share and profits. Enterprises in these new capital-intensive industries 
grew under the ways of oligopolistic competition with retention of profits, and 
increasing horizontal and vertical integration. 
Chandler (1990) identified the characteristics of capitalism in the U.S., Britain and 
Germany that produced two-thirds of all the world's products from the 1880s to 
World War II. He characterised the U.S. type as 'competitive managerial-
capitalism'; Britain's as 'individual capitalism', and Germany's as 'co-operative 
managerial-capitalism'. He also examined why the economies of the U.S. and 
Germany overwhelmed that of Britain, arguing that this was not due to investment 
in physical capital, government, entrepreneurship, culture, and ideology, but to 
effective professional management and development of an organisational structure 
for vertically integrated firms. Particularly in his comparison of the U.S. and 
Britain, he showed that corporate ownership structures strongly influenced the 
development of industrial capitalism with Britain emerging second best. 
Modern U.S. manufacturing firms grew out of the process of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). Under oligopolistic market structures, mutual consent is not 
secure; moreover, since 1890 the Sherman Act9 prohibits it. Chandler ( 1990) 
interpreted the Sherman Act as giving an impetus to the evolution of modern U.S . 
_ manufacturing enterprises. That impetus took concrete shape in M&A.
10 The 
tendency towards M&A was the most important event in the period from the 
9
, The so-called "anti-trust Act" established in the U.S. in 1890 
'
0 His explanation for the evolution of M&A is that it was as a result of the establi shment of anti-monopoli sti c 
laws , the difficulties caused to conferences by the market stagnation of the 1890s, and the acti vation of the 
stock market. 
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1880s to the 1940s for the evolution of U.S. modern enterprises.
11 It reached its 
peak in the years 1899 - 1902. Moreover, the nation-wide integration had the 
effect of decreasing the proportion of family management, and for the first time 
agents of financial institutions were appointed to corporate directors' positions. 
In Britain, unlike in the U.S., there were no big manufacturing firms. Production, 
marketing and distribution, and management control, that were essential to 
modern multi-level enterprises, were not necessary. This caused the British 
economy relatively to stagnate. One of the most important factors that has 
affected the U.K. economy and dominated the nation's enterprise management 
since World War II, is family ownership and control. 
'In most British firms, top managers stay at the biggest factory or the nearest office from the 
factory, and can meet daily middle managers and work-site managers, so it is possible to directly 
supervise. In these organisations, the detailed organisational structure and system, which is already 
generalised in the big enterprises of the U.S. and Germany in 1914, are not necessary ... ' 
(Chandler, 1990) 
Chandler noted that the explanation for the small size of British enterprises and 
their less specialised family management systems lay in the relatively small scale 
of the national economy. In addition, British enterprises had already industrialised 
and urbanised before the transportation revolution. Britain, small in area and with 
an advanced transportation network in place by the 1860s, was not as greatly 
influenced by the expansion of railways and telegraph as was America, a big and 
new country. Because British companies were small, they could not be pioneers in 
modern management, accounting, and finance fields. Such enterprises in Britain 
did not actively make use of economies of scale and scope, investment in 
production, unique marketing and effective distribution networks, and 
employment of professional managers. Thus, 111ost British firms remained at the 
stage of individual management, such as family management, without the benefits 
of a modern company structure. 
In Germany, banks played an important role in raising funds to invest in the 
attainment of economies of scale and scope. This was quite different from the 
position in the U.S. and Britain. Appointed as corporate directors, bankers in 
I I M&A in Britain and Germany were just appearing in the l 920s 
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Germany participated in corporate decision making. In the case of the U.S., the 
financial market in New York had been a main source of funding for railway 
construction; on the other hand, in Germany, 'Kreditbank', a newly established 
institution, contributed to the supply of funding for bigger manufacturing 
companies. The minor 'Kreditbank', the so-called 'Grossbanken', became the 
leader in the German financial market. High level bankers were appointed as 
corporate auditors, and participated in the management. In terms of the legal 
system, German laws are remarkably different from those in the U.S.: German 
law not only allowed mutual consent, but in 1897, the high court also judged that 
mutual consent was not illegal, and was deeply related to public benefits. The 
cases of mutual consent also increased with 4 cases in 187 5, 106 cases in 1890, 
and 185 cases in 1905 (Chandler, 1990). Under this quite different legal system, 
there was no incentive for M&A in Germany. Chandler pointed out that overall 
M&A across industries was likely to be an essential prerequisite of industrial 
restructuring and rationalisation; however, such restructuring and rationalisation 
rarely occurred in Germany until World War I. 
To summarise Chandler's hypothesis in terms of industrial development - new 
technology is necessary, but so is investment in corporate manufacturing facilities, 
marketing services and distribution, and managerial organisations. All three forms 
of investment are required as sufficient conditions.
12 Chandler advocated first, 
that separation of ownership and control is necessary in order to facilitate 
professional managers who have the required unique knowledge and excellence in 
management, and second, that large-scale investment in production facilities was 
necessary to achieve economies of scale and scope. 
In the previous discussion, it was pointed out that since most modern corporations 
in the U.S. are controlled by professional managerial systems there could be 
conflicts of interest between owners and managers. The fundamental cause of the 
'agency problem' is that contracts - set by the owners between themselves and 
managers - which attempt to ensure that professional managers achieve business 
goals, cannot be prepared and executed without some cost to the owners. 
12 In the firm theory of Chandler (1992a), the essential units of analysis are material and personnel assets; this 
differs from Williamson's theory (1985) where transaction is a basic analytical unit. 
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Moreover, with modern corporations, 1n which ownership can be freely 
transferred in the stock market, the crucial factor in maintaining corporations is to 
control the level of the 'agency problem'. This has been the subject of study over 
the last several decades. 
The following section goes one step further in providing an overview of the 
theories about the mechanisms for obtaining security against agency problems. 
Corporate disciplinary mechanism 
Jen sen and Meckling ( 197 6) presented an agency theory relating to corporate 
ownership. According to them, an owner-manager gains both the pecuniary 
benefit and the nonpecuniary benefit from business activities. The optimum 
mixture of these two benefits is determined at the point of equilibrium between 
the marginal substitution ratio and the opportunity costs of nonpecuniary 
benefit. 13 In the case of an owner-manager who owns 100 percent of the shares, 
the opportunity cost = 1, but if the share a is transferred to outside investors, the 
opportunity cost = 1 - a. The cost of pursuing the nonpecuniary benefit is 
decreased, and the demand for transferring shares is increased. If an efficient 
stock market correctly assesses this situation, the corporate value will be 
decreased. The decreased corporate value will become the agency cost for any 
change in the ownership structure. 
In addition, Jensen and Meckling showed that the agency problem could occur in 
the fund raising process through the liabilities. When corporations issue bonds, 
the creditors ' maximum income will be only the principal and interest. On the 
other hand, the maximum income of debtors to the corporations will be much 
greater than that of creditors. This asymmetrical income curve is likely to cause 
corporations to invest in more risky businesses, and creditors to redistribute 
wealth to other debtors. However, investments in risky businesses induce a 
decrease in the corporate value and incur the agency cost. Furthermore, the 
monitoring costs, convincing costs, bankruptcy costs , and restructuring costs can 
be included in the agency costs. It is expected that any funds or capital raising 
13 The 'nonpecuniary benefit ' is similarly considered by Demsetz (1983 ) as 'On-the-job consumption '. 
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processes through the issue of stocks or bonds accompanies predictable agency 
costs, but the size of agency costs depends upon each industry. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) contended that separation of decision and risk-bearing 
functions survives in modern corporations characterised by separation of 
"ownership" and "control", in part because of the benefits of specialisation of 
management and risk bearing, but also because of an effective common approach 
to controlling the agency problem caused by separation of decision and risk-
bearing functions. 14 According to them, the corporate decision process has four 
steps: ( 1) initiation - generation of proposals for resource utilisation and 
structuring of contracts; (2) ratification - choice of the decision initiatives to be 
implemented; (3) implementation - execution of ratified decisions; _ and ( 4) 
monitoring - measurement of the performance of decision agents and 
implementation of rewards. In general, the corporate decision process is likely to 
combine the initiation and implementation functions under the term decision 
manigement, and the term decision control includes ratification and monitoring. 
Therefore, they understood that decision management and decision control are the 
components of the corporation's decision process or decision system. They also 
stated two complementary hypotheses regarding the relations between the risk 
bearing and decision processes as follows: 
1. Separation of residual risk bearing from decision management leads to 
decision systems that separate decision management from decision control. 
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2. Combination of decision. management and decision control in a few agents 
leads to residual claims that are greatly restricted to these agents. 
If there are no agency problems between decision managers and residual 
claimants, the residual claims that allow unrestricted risk sharing have advantages 
in small as well as in large corporations. This is because when ownership is 
concentrated, the 'wealth effect' on decision process may induce management 
14 Risk bearing is induced from uncertainty of corporate performance. 
15 In this regard, Fama and Jensen point out that the decision-making administration and control are 
distinctive functions , so the expression ' separation of ownership and control' is not correct. 
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efficiency to decrease. 16 If management is not separated from control over 
decision making, there could be an agency problem between residual clai_mants 
and decision agents, and this lowers the value of unrestricted residual claims. 
When the same agents manage and control important decision-making, a possible 
solution to the agency problem is to restrict residual claims to the important 
decision agents. The common stocks of unlisted corporations are this type of 
restricted residual claim, as are the residual claims in proprietorships and 
partnerships. Restricting residual claims to decision-makers controls agency 
problems between residual claimants and decision agents, but it sacrifices the 
benefits of unrestricted risk sharing and specialisation of decision functions. The 
decision process suffers efficiency losses because decision agents must be chosen 
on the basis of wealth and willingness to bear risk as well as for decision skills. 
Furthermore, when residual claims belong only to decision agents, it is reasonable 
for the residual claimant-decision makers to assign lower values to uncertain cash 
flow1 than residual claimants would in corporations where residual claims are 
unrestricted and risk bearing can be liberally spread across corporations. 
However, all decision systems and systems for allocating residual claims incur 
costs, because most contracts are not cost free in the writing or enforcing. So the 
optimal organisational formation will be determined on a balance of the costs of 
decision systems and systems for allocating residual risk against the benefits . For 
example, in small noncomplex corporations , a combining of decision and risk-
bearing functions is efficient, because the benefits of unrestricted risk sharing and 
specialisation of decision functions are less than the costs that would be incurred 
to control the resulting agency problems. 
Fama and Jensen pointed out that where residual claims are not held by a decision 
agent, but are concentrated in one or a few residual claimants, minority residual 
claimants can easily control decision agents, with the residual claimants ratifying 
and monitoring important decisions and setting rewards. 17 In complex and large 
16 But, in the case of small noncomplex corporations where decision management and control is concentrated 
in one or a few agents, it might be efficient to allocate both decision control as well as decision management 
to the minor agents. 
17 The cases of Korean corporate ownership structures can be included in this criterion. Fama and Jensen note 
that in this type of ownership structure the function of decision control is separated from the decision 
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corporations, however, valuable specific knowledge and information relating to 
decision control are widely dispersed among many inside agents. Eff~ctive 
decision control and management not only include separation of decision control 
and management, but also involve delegation and diffusion of decision control at 
different levels of the corporations. Separation of decision management and 
control limits the individual decision agent's power to expropriate the residual 
claimants' interest~. Diffusion and separation of decision management and control 
not only have benefits because they allow valuable knowledge to be used at those 
points in the decision process where it is most relevant but they help control the 
agency problems of diffuse residual claims. Generally in complex corporations, 
therefore, the benefits of diffuse residual claims and the benefits of separation of 
decision functions from residual risk bearing are greater than the agency costs 
they generate, including the costs of mechanisms to separate the management and 
control of decisions. Separation of management from control of decisions 
contributes to the survival of any corporation where the important decision 
mak;rs do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions, that 
is, in those corporations where there are serious agency problems in the decision 
process (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In most large listed corporations, the residual claims of common stock are 
unrestricted in the sense that stockholders are not required to have any other role 
in the corporation, and their residual claims are freely transferable. As a result of 
the unrestricted nature of the residual claims of open corporations, there is almost 
perfect specialisation and balance between decision management and residual risk 
bearing. The unrestricted risk sharing and diversification allowed by common 
stock contributes, therefore, to survival by lowering the costs of risk bearing 
services. Separation and specialisation of decision management and residual risk 
bearing leads to agency problems between decision agents and residual claimants , 
however, the unrestricted nature of common stock residual claims also allows 
special market and organisational mechanisms for controlling the agency 
problems of specialised risk bearing, such as the stock market, the market for 
takeovers and expert boards. 
management function, and is distinct from the classical corporate form, which combines ownership and 
control. 
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As an external monitoring mechanism in a stock market, stock prices are visible 
signals that summarise the implications of internal decisions for current and future 
net cash flows. This external monitoring puts pressure on a corporation's decision 
process to orientate toward the interests of residual claimants. The residual claims 
are freely transferable and separable from roles in the decision process, so a 
takeover market is also attributable to the unrestricted nature of its residual 
claims. A takeover market externally controls the agency problems either by a 
direct offer to purchase stock (a tender offer) or by an appeal for stockholder votes 
for directors (a proxy fight). In listed corporations residual claimants delegate 
internal control to a board of directors. In general, residual claimants keep hold of 
approval rights (by vote) on board membership, auditor choice, mergers and 
matters of new stock issues, and delegate to the board management and control of 
other matters. The board, in turn, then delegates most decision management and 
control functions to internal agents. It also exercises control over internal agents 
by maintaining the right . to ratify and monitor major policy initiatives and by 
hirintg, firing, and setting the rewards of top decision managers. 
For listed corporations, the existence of the stock market and the market for 
takeovers are effective watchdogs. There are, in particular, some special features 
of corporate boards: (1) inside board members, drawn from management, are 
generally more influential than outside members, and (2) outside board members 
are often decision agents in other complex corporations. 18 When the board is 
composed of experts, its most influential members are internal managers who 
have valuable specific information about the corporation ' s activities. When the 
internal decision control system works well internal managers nominate outside 
members of the board. Typically, internal managers use the relevant 
complementary knowledge, such as expertise in capital markets, corporate law, or 
technology, which outside board members bring to the board. 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) , outside directors have incentives to 
develop reputations as experts in decision control. Most outside directors of listed 
corporations are either managers or important decision agents in other complex 
18 S ee Herman, E.S. 1981. Corporate Control , Corporate Power. Ch2. for data on the characteri sti cs of 
corporate boards. 
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corporations. 19 Their human capital value depends on their performance as 
internal decision managers in other corporations. In carrying out their duhes in 
other corporations, outside board members act as arbitrators in disagreements 
among internal managers. They also assist in sorting out serious agency problems 
involving internal managers and residual claimants. Thus, when outside directors 
have incentives to conduct their missions and do not collude with managers to 
expropriate residual claimants, separation of top-level decision management and 
control is most effective. 
While Fama and Jensen ( 1983) discussed vanous corporate controllin_g 
mechanisms for solving the agency problems of separation of ownership and 
control, and diffusion of ownership in view of property rights, many other studies, 
' 
such as that by Holmstrom and Tirole (1990) took an institutional approach. They 
presented four disciplinary mechanisms: internal discipline, labour market 
discipline, product market discipline, and capital market discipline. The internal 
discipline focuses on the implementation of compensation to internal managers. 
20 
According to Clark ( 1985), internal directors and managers of corporations work 
for the corporations and stockholders as the trustees rather than as the agents. 
Under the imperfect contract system, therefore, the board has the authority to 
intervene in corporate activities, not the stockholders. If board directors are 
agents, then the stockholders have the ultimate authority to control corporate 
activities. From the viewpoint of trustees, the independence of directors is 
important. Independence is rewarded with incentives to carry out the fiduciary 
duty of monitoring corporate activities without colluding with managers. 
Stockholders may exercise their right to reconstruct board membership and even 
sue if directors and managers shirk their trust duties. 
A disciplinary mechanism in labour markets helps solve agency problems 
between managers and stockholders. If, for example, managers expropriate 
stockholders' interests and temporarily pursue their own profits, eventually the 
businesses become insolvent, and the human resource value of managers will be 
reflected in the labour markets. However, this is not likely to happen under the 
19 See Herman, supra note21 at Ch2. 
20 Stock options and the salary system of rewards can be included in the internal discipline. 
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optimal labour supply condition in labour markets. In normal labour markets, 
managers tend to choose investments to maximise their income, but these are 
contrary to stockholders' interests. In this regard, Holmstrom and Tiro le ( 1990) 
point out that the motives of managers may be a problem in the career 
management of managers. 
The product market disciplinary mechanism helps diminish agency costs, because 
competition in the product market improves the quality of the corporate 
environment and the information about corporate activities. 
21 In terms of 
efficiency, competition not only raises the efficiency of corporate activities 
undertaken by managers who protect their reputations, but also plays a great role 
in contributing to decreasing agency costs. 
Capital market discipline in the form of takeover threat might effectively diminish 
the agency problem. That is, if managers are not eager to maximise the corporate 
value, someone might take over the firm and then employ new managers in order 
to ensure better performance. For their own survival, therefore, managers cannot 
avoid making an effort to maximise the corporate value. There are, however, 
prerequisites to this piece of apparent logic. First, the high level of management 
abuse and misappropriation must be exposed before a takeover can be considered 
because not to do so is costly. A takeover does not play the same function as the 
management disciplinary mechanism. Second, if corporate performance can be 
improved only by takeovers, takeover value relies upon private information and 
particular benefits. This hypothesis might be verified when the party who takes 
over a firm only has private information and particular benefits. In real capital 
markets, however, private information and particular benefits are not the 
monopoly of the party who wishes to take over a firm. Third, there is the free-
rider problem of stockholders who do not participate in a takeover. 22 If the 
number of free riders is very large, a takeover may not be possible. However, if 
the party who wishes to take a firm .over assesses the firm's value as different 
from the value placed on it by existing stockholders, a takeover might occur. In 
other words, if the benefits from a takeover are much greater than the cost of the 
21 Jensen and Meckling (1976) presented the view that products and market structure, as factors of 
production, would not influence agency costs. 
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free-rider problem, a takeover will be possible. That is, takeover possibility will 
be increased accordingly as ownership dispersion decreases, and then the agency 
problem will dissolve. Managers' share also influences takeover possibility. When 
managers' share is small, the takeover possibility increases, and vice-versa. 
23 
Even if there were vanous corporate disciplinary mechanisms to dissolve the 
agency problems caused by separation of ownership and control, and diffusion of 
ownership in modern corporations, most agency problems incur great cost. This 
cost problem became serious in the U.K. and U.S. and it has also occurred in 
Japan, Germany, and Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) as well. This 
problem has led to other adverse effects such as some modern stock markets 
phenomena discussed in the following section. 
The Punter: an investment phenomenon 
stockmarket24 
• Ill the modern 
In general, separations of ownership and control, and widely dispersed ownership 
have contributed to maximise management capacity; on the other hand, its costs 
have been considerable. Theoretically, executing efficient disciplinary 
mechanisms, as discussed in the above section, might reduce agency costs. 
However, in practice, such mechanisms have not worked accurately, or have been 
abused by managers. These adverse effects incur additional monitoring expense in 
an effort to solve the agency problem. Therefore, in the real market, shareholder 
activism is required in order to activate the disciplinary mechanisms. But there is 
a problem in that the individual shareholders do not have sufficient voting power 
to give real weight to shareholder activism in the modern capital market. 
Individual shareholders ' share size in any particular firm is insignificant because 
they own portfolio investments to disperse risk. In that regard, such individual 
shareholders are called "punter shareholders" and they do not play any real role in 
the firms in which they have invested, and their residual claims are freely 
transferable on the stock market. 
22 See Sheard (1996) in order to refer to the 'free-rider problem' case in a market. l 35p 
23 See Morck, Shleifer and Yishny (1988). They analysed empirically the effects of manager' s share on 
corporate performance. 
24 The U.K. and U.S . stock investor was first called 'the Punter' in The Economist (1990,5,5). 
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Such "punter shareholders", together with control by managers, became the open 
corporations in the U.S. and U.K. economies. In a 'punter' economy, shareholders 
cannot monitor management activities effectively. In addition, any management 
disciplinary mechanisms do not work effectively. Management abuses are likely 
to happen, and these induce inefficiency of management. The agency problem can 
be ignored in high growth industries where the benefits derived from separation of 
ownership and control, and dispersion of ownership, offset their agency costs. In 
lagging industries, however, surplus is not paid to shareholders as a dividend, but 
is likely to be invested in inefficient industries and in M&A for management 
entrenchment. So agency costs of lagging industries are significantly high. 
25 
'Mob 
psychological behaviour' represents an another type of agency problem. 
26 In this 
situation, managers make an incorrect or inefficient decision intentionally and this 
is followed by a mob psychology response. 2
7 The managers then try to minimise 
the risk bearing in terms of the assessment of management performance in labour 
markets. It also happens in firms owned by owner-managers. In this case, the 
relatlonship between outside shareholders and creditors, and owner-managers 
appears as a principal-agent relationship. 
New paradigm for modern corporations 
About 70 years ago, Berle and Means presented ways of rectifying the agency 
problem caused by separation of ownership and management, and wide dispersion 
of ownership in modern corporations. They suggested that a society needs to 
participate actively with legal and institutional mechanisms in corporate 
management, and investors need to be encouraged to have accountability through 
participation in management. 28 Moreover, firms, in which managers abuse 
management, need to be reformed. Berle and Means emphasised ultimately to 
need to divide large open corporations and to recover classical competition and 
entrepreneurship. Recently, the issue of improving and solving problems relating 
to corporate ownership structure has been raised again. There could be a couple of 
approaches: one is the market disciplinary approach, which is centred on Jensen's 
25 See Jensen (1986) for his hypotheses of surplus cash flow. 
26 See Scharfstein and Stein ( 1990) 
27 Managers tend to follow major investors or shareholders who have the authority to assess managers. 
28 Modern investors were degraded to ths status of mere 'stock investors' who have no sense of ownership 
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proposals, and another 1s the organisational behavioural approach, which 1s 
centred on Porter's. 
Market disciplinary approach 
Jensen (1989) pointed out that open corporations have been the generative power 
of economic development over the last 100 years in the U.S.; however, they have 
now not only lost their utility in many areas, but also they have lost effective 
competitiveness to survive in modern competition. Jensen emphasised that surplus 
cash flows have led to lower corporate efficiency in low growth industries
29
; open 
corporations were losing their competitiveness as corporate organisations. He also 
predicted that open corporations in the air transport industry, in motor 
manufacturing, motor parts, banking, power generation, food, agricultural 
implements and transportation would decline. In other words, open corporations 
in all industries, except for high growth industries, have much demand for 
reinvestment. This is particularly true of industries such as computer, electrical, 
bio-tec, pharmacy, and financial service industries, which are all losing their 
competitiveness. 
Jensen argued from an evolutionary viewpoint, that the new type of corporate 
organisations that dissolve the surplus cash flow problem under financial 
deregulation and revolution have replaced the U.S. open corporations. The new 
type of corporate organisations are characterised by high debt ratio, an incentive 
reward system, high shareholdings of managers and directors, and contracts 
between owners and creditors for concrete corporate activities including surplus 
cash. These characteristics are in response to shareholder activism. Financial 
deregulation and financial revolution have played a critical role in growth of the 
new type of corporations. For instance, in the U.S., general stock investors 
alternated their stocks to mutual funds, and sold off ordinary stocks valued at over 
$ 500 billion (equivalent to 38 percent of all holding stocks during 1984 - 1989). 
The stocks sold off by general investors were absorbed into Leveraged Buy-Out 
(LBO)30, Management Buy-Out (MBO)3 1, M&A, and takeovers. 
29 For example, tyre, oil refining, steel and iron , chemistry, liquor, tobacco, broadcasting, timber and paper 
pulp industries. 
30 It involves the acquisition of the firm through the use of debt financing. In the U.S . much of the LBO 
activity was financed with junk bonds . 
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The credit market ensured that junk bonds were issued and circulated. LBO firms 
operated corporate activities through the issue of junk bonds, instead of the issue 
of stocks. However, many experts were concerned about the deterioration of the 
U.S. financial structure in the 1980s. 32 In fact, the collapse of the junk bonds 
market and the internal transaction scandal in the U.S., of the late 1980s, incurred 
considerable agency costs. Nevertheless, the financial market played an important 
role in the emergence of the new type of corporation in the U.S. 
Organisational approach 
Porter (1992) found the reason that U.S. corporations' competitiveness is less than 
that of Japan and Germany is a result of the workings of the capital distribution 
mechanism. The ownership of open corporations in the U.S. is mainly based on 
the institutional investors,33 but the institutional investors are not actively 
participating in and monitoring corporate activities. Their shareholding activity is 
characterised by diversification of their shares, for risk control, together with an 
aved1ge holding period of stocks of less than 2 years, indicating an investment 
pattern that aims at short term profit. The trend towards investing in indexed 
bonds weakens the motive to gather information about corporate activities. 
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Porter pointed out that this leads to the liquid capital system. On the other hand, in 
Germany and Japan, shareholder activism, in which banks participate and monitor 
corporate activities , is strongly exercised. He defined capital in Germany and 
Japan as dedicated capital. This argument is consistent with the outline of punter 
shareholder attributes; it strengthens the so-called liquid capital system by 
institutional investors. 
According to Porter, a solution designed to strengthen U.S. corporation 
competitiveness is to focus on construction of legal and institutional mechanisms 
to activate the shareholder activism of institutional investors. There is, however, a 
problem, in a sense, that this solution cannot identify the principal easily. There is 
also a possibility that the agency problem could occur between managers and 
institutional investors. A more essential problem is that Porter tries to find a 
31 Similar to a LBO, but the purchase group is led by the management of the firm. 
32 Non-financial corporations' liabilities increased from$ 835 billion in 1979 to$ 2 trillion in I 988. 
33 Among all listed stocks in the U.S ., the proportion of the institutional investors increases from 8 percent in 
1950 to 60 percent in 1990. 
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solution only through a static companson between the U.S. and Japanese 
corporations rather than consider the dynamic circumstances. In other words, he 
pays no attention to interaction between markets and corporate organisational 
structures with which Chandler and Jensen are concerned. 
Summary 
Public corporations first appeared in the late nineteenth century in the U.S., and 
played a very important role in shaping twentieth century modern capitalism. 
While ownerships were widely dispersed and individual shareholders did not pay · 
close attention to the control of firms, managers exercised their own discretionary 
control. The agency problem between shareholders and managers was established 
and this obstructed the development of the modern corporate organisation or 
public corporation. Many economists have analysed the problems of modern 
corporations and prospected the alternatives. 
Berle and Means (1932) proposed the following three characteristics as evidence 
that modern firms were entering a new era as economic organisations: first, big 
corporations are owned by a large number of anonymous investors who hold just 
a few shares; second, most managers hold insignificant quantities of shares; third, 
there are big differences between the interests of shareholders and managers. They 
also noted that the ownership of wealth with no control and the control of wealth 
with no ownership is the logical conclusion of corporate evolution. They 
suggested two public policies to overcome the problem caused by separation of 
ownership and control. The first is that courts monitor corporate activities on the 
basis of recognising that directors and managers are trustees; the second, is that 
shareholders be encouraged to participate actively in electing and appointing 
directors. 
Chandler ( 1990) contended that the competitiveness of modern nations relies on 
corporate organisation and financial capability. He proposed that corporate 
organisation and management patterns largely affect technological developments 
and market structure. He identified three types of investments in modern 
34 See Wrase, J.M. (1997) 
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corporations: investing 1n production facilities, marketing, and professional 
managers. Those strengthened the advantages of prior occupation. Comparing the 
characteristics of modern corporations in the U.S., U.K. and Germany, he 
emphasised that new technology is a necessary condition, but that the three types 
of investment should be seen as sufficient conditions. 
Jensen and Meckling ( 1976) pointed out that an 'owner-manager' en Joys both 
pecuniary benefit and nonpecuniary benefit from business activities. The optimal 
mixture of these two benefits is determined in equilibrium with the marginal 
substitution ratio and the opportunity costs of nonpecuniary benefit. They also 
showed that agency problems could occur through the liabilities in the capital 
supply process. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) pointed out that separation of decision and risk-bearing 
functions survives in corporations, in part because of the benefits of specialisation 
of dianagement and risk bearing, but also because of an effective common 
approach to controlling agency problems caused by separation of decision and 
risk-bearing functions. The corporate decision process has four steps: initiation; 
ratification; implementation; monitoring. They understood that decision 
management and decision control are the components of the corporation's 
decision process or decision system. 
Since the presentation about 70 years ago by Berle and Means of ways to rectify 
the agency problem - caused by separation of ownership and management, and 
wide dispersion of ownership in modern corporations - the issue of mitigating 
agency problems relating to corporate ownership has been a matter of wide 
discussion. There were two proposed approaches: the market disciplinary 
approach, centred on Jensen's proposal, and the organisational behavioural 
approach, centred on Porter. Jensen (1989) pointed out that open corporations 
have been the generative power of economic development over the last 100 years 
in the U.S.; however, they have now not only lost their utility in many areas, but 
they are also no longer effective corporate organisations in modern competitive 
economy. He pointed out the new type of corporate organisations are 
characterised by high debt ratio, an incentive reward system, high shareholdings 
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of managers and directors, and contracts between owners and creditors for 
concrete corporate activities including surplus cash flows. These characteristics 
are due, in part, to shareholder activism. Porter ( 1992) noted that the lower level 
of competitiveness of U.S. corporations compared with Japanese and German 
corporations was caused by the capital distribution mechanism. He presented a 
solution to strengthen the U.S. corporations' competitiveness by focusing on 
construction of legal and institutional mechanisms to activate the shareholder 
activism of institutional investors. 
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3 
The Korean Corporate Organisation: 
The Analytical Issues 
This chapter presents in some detail the historical background and general 
characteristics of the Korean corporate organisations. The nature of the Korean 
corporations is discussed with a focus on chaebols. The issues relating to 
corporate governance including the ownership structures of the Korean corporate 
organisations are then discussed. Prior to an empirical analysis, this chapter sets 
out its aims which are to find out how and why each hypotheses for this particular 
emerging market are raised for examination in this thesis. This chapter justifies 
the validity of the verification of the hypotheses in terms of the application of 
theories, which are applied in the analysis in subsequent chapters. The insider 
ownership structure of the Korean PLCs reveals a particular phenomenon in 
"t 
Korea and leads to establish the hypotheses 1 and 2. The sections of the 
ownership concentration and ownership composition provide respectively the 
reasons why the hypotheses 3 and 4 are established. 
To develop an understanding of the circumstances of the emerging market the first 
section describes the historical background and political economy in Korea 
focusing on the corporate sector. The characteristics of the Korean corporations 
within the corporate environment are broadly discussed, then the characteristics of 
the chaebols - their remarkable growth, close relationship with government, high 
financial leverage, insider ownership and control, excessive diversification - are 
also discussed in the second section. The third section goes one step further to 
discuss the chaebol issues: economic concentration, corporate governance, and 
overcapitalisation. The ownership structure issues with ownership concentration 
and composition are considered in the fourth section. Finally, as a challenge in the 
new economic era three ways of changing the Korean corporate sector are 
proposed in the final section. 
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Historical overview and political economy 
Rapid economic development over the last four decades 1n Korea was made 
possible by the export-oriented growth strategy of the previous Korean 
government. The annual GNP growth rate from 1963 to 1993 was 9 .4 per cent on 
average, which was the fas test among the developing countries for the same 
period. 1 The leading type of business entity in this rapid economic growth was the 
big corporation group, the so-called 'chaebol ', which can be defined as 'a 
business group, which is owned and controlled by a person and that person's 
family'. This definition coincides with Morikawa' s ( 1980) definition of a 
zaibatsu,2 as 'exclusively owned and controlled by the family', and fits reasonably 
with the rest of the definition, 'diversified industrial firms', since it is a business 
group. 
Korean corporate organisations - most of the big companies belong to chaebols -
wen;. developed as the tools and results of economic growth by the Park Chung-
Hee government in the 60s. Park's military background government generated 
new economic policies and a unique government-business relationship (see Yoo, 
1997 for details). The government forced private businesses to become the engine 
for development of Korea's lagging economy in the early 60s. Therefore, the 
relationship between government and business was put in place - "government, 
the leader - business, the follower". This relationship had been widely discussed 
as a "government-led, chaebol-centred economic growth model" for the 
developing nations. In the 1960s, under the strong export drive and protection 
policies of the government, most corporations focused on exports. In the 1970s, 
the heavy and chemical industries (HCI) drive was one of the most influential 
industrial policies. This HCI drive caused consolidation of the Korean industrial 
organisations dominated by chaebols. The HCI drive created an environment in 
which active participation in the industries targeted by the government was an 
essential for any corporations wishing to grow. It induced dramatic growth for a 
1 The average annual GDP growth rate of low- and middle-income countries was recorded as 5.9% during 
1965-80 and 3.3 % during 1980-90. The average annual GDP growth rate of high-income economies was 
recorded as 3.7% during 1965-80 and 2.9% during 1980-91. However, the annual average GDP growth rate 
of Korea was 9.9% during 1965-80 and 9.6% during 1980-91 (World Bank, 1992; 1993) (See Table A3. l and 
A3.2 for the national accounts) 
2 See Kim, B.H. 1991. The Genesis of the Chaebol and Entrepreneurship: the Japanese feudal family-based 
rich merchants until World War II. 
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large number of big businesses. In view of the economies of scale of many HCis, 
it was believed that in order to compete well in the markets the size of production 
should exceed minimum efficiency scales (Yoo, 1997). This led the government 
to protect the monopolistic positions of many firms in the industry. 
In the 1970s, chaebols grew rapidly in terms of the number of subsidiaries and 
their size. The number of subsidiaries of the 30 largest chaebols increased from 
126 in 1970 to 429 in 1979 (Yoo, 1998). The industrial restructuring of the 1970s 
caused chaebols to diversify their businesses into new industries with the support 
and arrangement of the government. Policy loans from state-controlled banks and 
equity investments from other subsidiaries within the same business group 
generally financed most diversifications of the 1970s. Big companies were able to 
grow into conglomerate groups that expanded across most important industries, 
such as manufacturing, construction, petrochemicals, automobiles, retailing and 
the non-bank financial sector. By the end of the 1970s, most conglomerates had 
evol~ed into chaebols characterised by the following: family ownership, control, 
and management; many subsidiaries under a single control; high degree of 
diversification; cross shareholding among the subsidiaries within a group through 
equity investments; and mutual debt guarantees among subsidiaries within a group 
(Yoo, 1997). Since the chaebol were accountable for a large share of the Korean 
economy's assets, sales and debts, most industrial policies were inevitably 
connected with them. Strategic concerns in oligopolistic markets forced them to 
expand their capacity. They became larger and larger, generating the notorious 
' too-big-to-fail' legacy of the chaebol. Moreover, the government controlled the 
banking system: it allocated financial resources so as to supporf big businesses 
and sometimes to resuscitate them. As a result, the chaebol ended up with high 
debt-equity ratios through over-capitalisation. 3 
From the early 1980s an anti-monopolist policy began to focus attention on 
regulating economic concentration. The 'Regulation on Monopoly and Fair Trade 
Act ' was enacted in 1980. The regulations covering M&As and big business 
groups were introduced in 1986. The regulations covering market concentration 
and cross-debt guarantees among chaebol subsidiaries were introduced in 1990 
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and 1992, respectively. Table A3.3 presents the main regulations regarding 
economic concentration as of 1990. The Fair Trade Commission selected the top 
30 chaebols, based on the size of their assets, as its main target of regulation. The 
government also put restrictions on loans to the chaebols to prev~nt the 
concentration of financial resources. During the 1990s, it introduced the business 
specialisation policy, inducing the chaebols to limit diversification to 2-3 
specialised business lines. These regulations, however, were not as effective as 
expected. Both the net assets and cross holdings of the chaebols have increased by 
2.1 times during 1993-1997. Market concentration is still high-the top 30 chaebols 
accounted for 46.88 per cent and 46.62 per cent of total sales in 1988 and 1997, 
respectively (Hwang, 1999b ). The top 30 chaebols accounted for 24.2 per cent 
and 21.5 per cent of total financial loans in 1990 and 1995, respectively. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, chaebols dominated the Korean economy, even 
though economic growth fluctuated as a result of many factors like the business 
cycle, industry restructuring, changes in the subsidised credit supply to chaebols 
and 'j)rivatisation of state-owned enterprises. Without any serious challenges or 
competition, chaebols led the high growth of the Korean economy in the 1980s 
and 1990s. There were a few exceptions: a number of chaebol bankruptcies, such 
as the Kukje, Myungsung, Yulsan, Duksan, Yuwon, and Hanyang group. 
The financial crisis in 1997, however, changed the environment of the Korean 
economy. The IMF program for the financially distressed Korean economy 
entailed the implementation of global standards and the liberalisation of the 
economy. Korea not only strengthened the standards and legal frameworks of its 
economy to global levels, but also opened up its economy to the world. 
Restructuring of the corporate . sector was one of the most important tasks in the 
recovery of the economy. · Past industrial policies that had contributed to the 
economic growth, but which had failed, were totally investigated to improve the 
economy and adjust it to fit the era of global competition. Since then, the Korean 
corporate sector has tried to renovate its weak corporate governance system by 
various approaches. Before discussing the corporate sector, the general corporate 
environment is first outlined in the following sub-section. 
3 See the characteristics of the chaebols section in detail. 
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Corporate environment 
According to the Industrial Census of 1989 in Korea, there were 61,723 
companies with over five employees in Korea: among them were 14,600 business 
incorporates, 247 other incorporates, and the rest were individual business~s. The 
average number of employees per firm was about 52, the average production per 
firm was about 2.19 billion won, the value-added per firm was about 799 million 
won, and the tangible fixed assets per firm was about 778 million won. However, 
these average figures do not accurately reflect the full economic environment, 
because only 1,363 big firms, no more than 2.21 percent of the number of all 
firms with over 300 employees, produced 60.50 percent of total products (See 
Table 3.1). In fact, except for a few state-enterprises such as the Korea Electric 
Power Corporation, the Korea Communication Corporation, the Korea Heavy 
Industry Corporation and the Po-Hang Iron and Steel Company, most large 
Korean firms belong to chaebols. In 1990, 687 firms were singled out as the 50 
largest chaebol subsidiaries, constituting more than half of the total of big 
companies in Korea. Thus, in order to understand the Korean corporate 
organisation, it is necessary to focus on studying the chaebol. 
Table3.l Mining and Manufacturing firms in Korea 
(firms with over five employees) 
(Unit: firm, person, and billion won) 
1984 1988 Over 300 employees 
(Average rer firm) (%) 
Number of Firms 43,428 61,723 1,363 
Number of Employees 2,431 ,310 3,208 ,100 (51.97) 1,360,671 
Production 72,297 135,689 (2 .19) 82,069 
Value Added 25 ,361 49 ,329 (0.799) 28 ,360 
Tangible Fixed Assets 25 ,178 48 ,004 (0.777) 30,256 
Source: Korea Economy Planning Organisation, Investigation and Statistics Section, 
' 1988 Industrial Census Report' , 1990. 
Understanding the Korean corporate organisation 
(2.21) 
(42.41) 
(60.50) 
(57.49) 
(63 .03) 
As discussed earlier, for the last few decades the big businesses, called chaebols, 
have led and represented the Korean corporate sector with enormous contributions 
to the national economy. Most chaebols manufacture and export goods across a 
broad cange of industries. As of 1999, the 30 largest chaebols had, on average, 23 
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subsidiaries in 19 business areas. These chaebols used to rely heavily on debt 
capital, so that market adaptability was weakened due to the high financial risk. 
Subsequently they became insolvent and bankrupt when the market became 
stagnant (See Kim, 1990; YK Lee, 1985, and 1992). Furthermore, most firms in 
chaebols were financially linked with other subsidiaries on cross-shareholding 
and debt-payment guarantee; one firm's insolvency induced, in turn, another 
firm's insolvency like a chain reaction. This situation was a serious national 
economic problem. 4 
Table 3.2 Financial details of the 30 largest chaebols 1987-1999 
(Unit: Billion Won) 
Total Shareholders' Capital Total Sales Net Number of 
Assets Eguit~ Stock Income Subsidiaries 
1987* 56,633 10,328 6,938 72,946 321 493 
1988* 66,526 13,224 8,629 84,460 872 504 
1989 81,742 18,002 10,525 94,507 1,328 535 
1990 
"t 
96,692 26,355 13,649 104,223 1,543 557 
1991 125,283 31,688 16,090 126,339 1,546 570 
1992 156,278 37,234 17,954 157,964 1,250 590 
1993 178,466 50,105 22,232 212,164 1,615 604 
1994 199,477 57,735 24,439 248,020 3,593 616 
1995 233,445 56,974 24,036 245,136 3,579 623 
1996 286,924 70,542 26,802 319,996 6,315 669 
1997 348,364 75,183 29,654 374,992 360 819 
1998 435,318 75 ,592 32,305 441,485 -4,383 804 
1999 472,757 101,997 42,145 479,331 -22,119 686 
Note: Figures in 1987* and 1988* are as of the end of 1986 and 1987. 
Other figures are as of 1st of April each year. 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commissions, 2000 
To understand the nature of the chaebols, the following financial figures are 
provided. Table 3 .2 shows details of the 30 largest chaebols ( 1987- 1999) with 
most factors significantly increasing from 1987 to 1999. Specifically, total assets 
increased sharply from 56,633 billion won in 1987 to 472,757 billion won in 
1999, with an overall 834% rise, and shareholders' equity, capital stock, and total 
sales also increased by over 600% between 1987 and 1999. However, net income 
4 This kind of circumstance is like a fleet of vessels that are connected together with rope which offers 
protection from a storm; on the other hand, fire occurring in one vessel could destroy the whole fleet. 
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and the number of subsidiaries began to decrease suddenly from 1998, most likely 
because of the financial crisis in 1997. 
Since the chaebols strongly influenced the national economy, the economic 
concentration issues have been continuously discussed. But the important role of 
the chaebols in creating rapid economic growth cannot be denied. In fact, they 
operated conglomerate managements, pursued economies of scale and scope, 
produced an internal capital market, and invested in high technology industries 
through mutual capital supply and debt guarantees. Moreover, chaebols not only 
internally trained competent professional managers and provided an effective 
labour market through their competition, but also produced excellent 
entrepreneurs outside the chaebols (Lee, YK. 1996). 
Characteristics of the Korean chaebols 
From the traditional Anglo-American point of view, the chaebol is often 
.. 
< . 
recognised as an abnormal type of business organisation because of its ownership, 
financing, excessive diversification and close connection with the government. 
The Korean firms, like those from other non-Anglo-American countries, have 
been usually "viewed through a looking glass that has an American frame" 
(Cottrell, 1997). It is true that the modern corporations first emerged in the U.S., 
but the view that their institutional features should be the norm is less acceptable. 
Chandler ( 1990) pointed out that international difference in firm organisation have 
been an essential feature in the development of capitalism during the last century 
or so. Moreover, the judgement that something is abnormal can be misleading 
when what is normal is not defined clearly, which is the case in the currently 
prevailing discourse. In fact, the Korean chaebols have some similarities with 
other countries' businesses, as well as some unique characteristics. The 
differences and simi larities do not directly connect to any judgement of whether 
or not they are worse than others. While directly dealing with these fundamental 
methodological issues may be beyond the scope of this study, this section simply 
addresses the chaebols indirectly by factual investigation. The next sub-sections 
discuss those major characteristics of the chaebols, which are related to the issues 
analysed in this thesis. 
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Economic concentration. It is arguably agreed that the Korean chaebols are the 
businesses of the fastest growing business conglomerates in the world. Within 
only three decades , Korea became the country famous for 'conglomerates', and 
the economic concentration seems to have been recognised as relatively high. The 
total sales of the 50 largest chaebols was 28,502.6 billion won in 1980, and in 
1996, sales of the 30 largest chaebols amounted to 374,992 billion won. Their 
total sales amounted to as much as 96.2 per cent GDP in 1996 (see Table 3.3; 
B .H. Kim, 1991). Further discussion of international comparisons is provided in 
the section dealing with the nature of the chaebol issues. 
Table3.3 The total sales of the 30 largest chaebols and GDP 
(Unit: billion won) 
Total Sales of the 30 Chaebols GDP Proportion (%) 
1993 248,020 267,146 92.8 
1994 245,136 305,970 80.1 
1995 319,996 351,975 90.9 
t 
1996 374,992 389,813 96.2 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2000 and Economic Bulletin, 20: 12, 1998 
Crony relationship with the government. Together with the chaebol system, the 
government-chaebol relationship has been identified and criticised as a 
pathological element of the traditional Korean capitalism that was a root cause of 
the recent crisis. The early government's export-led policy and HCI drive 
provided the chaebols with incentives in the domestic market (KH Jung, 1989). 
Initially, the Korean economic development policy took precedence over 
everything. Sometimes, therefore, chaebols were exhorted to take over financially 
failing firms, or to invest in risky businesses on a political rather than economic 
basis. Many chaebols that . followed this 'stick and carrot' policy settled, and 
expanded their businesses internationally in order to take advantage of economies 
of scale in production and marketing (0. Y. Kwon, 1997). 5 After the crisis, this 
cronyistic connection was well known both inside and outside the country. The 
cronyistic connection was concealed by the past economic success under the guise 
of 'government-led development policy'. However, this non-market-based 
5 
'S tick and carrot' policy is a metaphorical word, which means 'toughness and moderateness'. 
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adhesion between politics and economics finally faced its limitation in the global 
liberalisation era. 
The reasons for the failure of the crony relationship are many. One of those is the 
chaebols' weak competitiveness against global competitors in both the domestic 
and international markets. Under the protection of the government, most chaebols 
did not have to improve their competitiveness because most of their businesses 
were determined and offered by the government. Another reason might be 
corruption (Chang, 2000). The traditional Korean government-chaebol 
relationship may have generally been corrupt, except in the key manufacturing 
sectors. The corruption that existed was a generalised rather than a cronyistic one. 
Since the late 1980s, however, under the new government, cronyistic relationships 
have spread into some key manufacturing sectors. In the traditional system, it was 
very difficult to change the course of industrial policy for cronystic purposes. This 
weakened the industrial policy, and the policy guidelin~s were now much less 
cleat. The corruption surrounding Hanbo' s entry into the steel industry and the 
collapse that occurred in the early stage of the recent crisis is the best example. 
Insider ownership and control. It is often argued that the Korean chaebols are 
owned and controlled by the founders' families and the cross-shareholding by 
their subsidiaries in a group (Yoo, 1995). According to Table 3.4, the mean of the 
in-group shareholding ratio of the 30 largest chaebols from 1987 to 1999 reached 
nearly half of the total number of shares, including family shares and cross-
shareholdings. Besides, the owner-managers enjoyed enormous controlling power 
because of a lack of internal and external monitoring. Except for the Kia Group, 
most chaebols are managed by the founders, the so-called 'Chong-su', or their 
families as top management. In some chaebols, for example, Hyundai, Samsung, 
LG, SK, Hanjin, Kumho, and a number of others , founders have already passed on 
their powerful positions to their descendants (B.H. Kim, 1991). 
One important note to be made here is that, after the recent cns1s, insider 
ownership rose again to 50.5 per cent as of 1999 (from 44.14 per cent as of 1996), 
because of the marked increase in the share of cross-subsidiary holdings, which 
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rose from 33.8 per cent 45.1 per cent in 1999 despite a reduction in the shares of 
the controlling shareholders and the relatives from 10.3 per cent to 5.4 per cent. 
Table 3.4 In-Group shareholding ratio of the 30 largest chaebols 
(Unit: eer cent) 
Largest shareholder Subsidiaries In-Group 
and the relatives shareholding ratio 
1987 15.8 40.4 56.2 
1989 14.7 31.5 46.2 
1990 13.7 31.7 45.4 
1991 13.9 33.0 46.9 
1992 12.8 33.4 46.2 
1993 10.3 33.1 43.4 
1994 9.7 33.1 42.7 
1995 10.6 32.8 43.3 
1996 10.32 33.82 44.14 
1997 8.5 34.5 43.0 
1998 7.9 36.6 44.5 
t 
1999 5.4 45.1 50.5 
Mean 11.14 34.92 46.04 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
This sudden rise in insider ownership, especially in cross-subsidiary holdings, 
may seem paradoxical given that the recent corporate reform measures were 
supposed to remedy those features of the chaebol, such as excessively high insider 
ownership, by liberalising and opening-up the stock market. However, the fact is 
that the reform created even bigger incentives and opportunities for increased 
insider ownership. In terms of incentives, the most important was the allowance of 
hostile take-overs, which led the chaebols to increase insider ownership for 
defensive purposes. In terms of opportunities, the legalisation of investment funds 
allowed the chaebol to increase their insider ownership by mobilising large-scale 
funds, a disproportionate part of which they invested in their own subsidiaries 
(Chang, 2000). Thus, control over the chaebol became more dependent on cross-
subsidiary ownership. 
This raises the question as to why the Korean chaebols have chosen to retain such 
a high proportion of insider ownership by way of cross-subsidiary shareholding. If 
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the reason is to maintain corporate control, it raises the further question of what 
level of insider ownership is necessary for the maintenance of corporate control, 
which is one of the main issues to examine here in this thesis. Changes in the 
share of insider ownership are provided in Table A3.4. 
Excessive diversification. The chaebols have widely expanded the scope of their 
businesses into related and unrelated areas, which are often described as the 
"octopus leg" expansion strategy. Thus, by looking at the changes in the number 
of businesses and subsidiaries, the expansion is easily noted (see Table 3.5). 
While in 1970 the 30 largest chaebols had on average only 4.2 subsidiaries each, 
by 1999 the number had increased to 22. 9 in an average of 19 .07 business 
categories. The number of businesses in a chaebol on average in 1987 was 9.9. 
Most of the subsidiaries are concentrated in the heavy and chemical industries, 
textiles and apparel, and food and beverages. Currently, chaebols focus on the 
motor, electronic appliance, computer, and telecommunication industries. But 
govc!rnment regulation does not permit chaebols to own any nation-wide 
commercial banks in Korea (0. Y. Kwon, 1997). 
Table 3.5 The number of businesses and subsidiaries on average of the 30 
largest chaebols 
. The number of businesses on average 
1987 9.9 
1988 11.3 
1989 11.7 
1990 12.3 
1991 17.9 
1992 18.3 
1993 19 .1 
1994 18.5 
1995 18.83 
1996 19.53 
1997 19.11 
1998 19.74 
1999 19.07 
Mean 16.56 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
The number of subsidiaries on average 
16.4 
16.8 
17.8 
18.6 
19.0 
19.7 
20. l 
20.5 
20.8 
22.3 
27.3 
26.8 
22.9 
20.7 
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Most subsidiaries, however, do not perform equally well. Most chaebols are 
actually much more focused on a few core businesses. In other words, large 
numbers of their subsidiaries in a wide range of industries are not profitable. 
Between 1988 and 1995, the 4 largest subsidiaries of the top 4 chaebols geqerated 
an average of 79 per cent of their total sales. Particularly in the case of Samsung, 
the four largest subsidiaries accounted for about 90 per cent of sales, which is a 
surprising proportion of the total number of its subsidiaries ( 50 as of 1995). The 
other smaller chaebols show similar trends in concentration on a few core firms 
(Chang, 2000). Profitable firms and loss-making firms are mixed up in a chaebol 
by using cross-shareholding and cross-debt guarantees for the strong interlocking 
relationship among them (see Table A3.5,6, and 7). 
In addition, unrelated diversification can be another feature of the chaebol. The 
chaebols' diversification strategy is best described as an alternating pursuit of 
related as well as unrelated diversification. Chandler et al. ( 1997) pointed out that 
big tiusinesses had to integrate the production of many basic intermediate goods in 
order to secure necessary inputs as well as to exploit the economies of scale. Lee 
and Lee (1990) also empirically found that there seems to be a positive correlation 
between related diversification and the size of the chaebol. It, however, does not 
mean that unrelated diversification is not useful. Economies of grouping creates 
financial synergies which enable the chaebol to mobilise large-scale investment 
funds effectively in a short time when such funds are required for investment in 
facilities , human resources, and organisational capability, all of which are 
essential for achieving economies of scale and scope (Chandler, 1990). The 
related information is provided in Appendix.6 
High financial leverage. The high debt-leveraged financing of Korean big 
businesses, mostly chaebols, has been often criticised as a primary cause of the 
recent crisis. Historically, the owners and their families , who founded their 
businesses in the 1950s-1970s, tried to maintain control rights while relying on 
outside investors to accommodate new investments and expansion. The stock 
market was so weak that it was unable to provide sufficient capital for the rapidly 
growing Korean firms. However, the big commercial banks that are indirectly 
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controlled by the government supplied large-scale loans to particular businesses in 
order to build up strategic industries such as heavy and chemical industries that 
needed large-scale investment, thus causing enterprises to be more debt-
dependent. Thus, the main entities that caused the current high debt ratios a.re not 
only the businesses: businesses had no choice but to go ahead with such leveraged 
expansion for the sake of national economic growth. This financial vicious circle 
caused the debt-equity ratio to rise until 1997 before it started decreasing under 
reform pressure from the government (see Figure A3.2). It is, however, also true 
that no one can say that debt financing is always better than equity financing, 
itself the subject of a well known and inconclusive debate (see Harris and Raviv, 
1991; Brennan, 1995). It is difficult to say that there is, therefore, an optimal level 
of corporate leverage. Moreover this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. A 
World Bank study reporting the capital structure of selected countries between 
1980 and 1991 (Demigruc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996) shows that, at 366 per 
cent, the debt-equity ratio of Korean corporations is not exceptionally high 
compared with that of other advanced nations such as Japan (369 per cent), France 
(361 per cent), and Italy (307 per cent), and much lower than Norway (537 per 
cent), Sweden (555 per cent), and Finland (492 per cent).7 
A more senous problem emerges when high leverage is accompanied by 
excessive investments. This was the case of chaebols and the problem was 
exacerbated as a result of many chaebols earning less than their economic costs. 
In fact, most chaebols recorded negative economic value-added results during the 
several years before the crisis (The Korea Stock Exchange, 1997, see Figure 
A3.4). Excessive investments in Korea brought about a serious capital shortage 
compared with Japan and Taiwan (see Table A3 .14). Korea had a capital shortage 
until the 1997 crisis. 
Korean firms have been heavily reliant on foreign capital, so that they are 
vulnerable to the instability of international financial markets. Korea has twice 
experienced a structural upward period in its corporate debt-equity ratio. The 
debt-equity ratio surged after the international financial turmoil following the 
6 See Table A3.8 ,9, 10, 11 , and 12, and Figure A3. l. 
7 See Table A3 . l 3 and Figure A3.3. 
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collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, and again following the 
debt crisis in Latin America in the early 1980s. However, this kind of fluctuation 
did not happen in Japan. 8 
Another problem occurred when firms borrowed debt-guarantee money from the 
banks. The system of so-called 'mutual payment guarantees', has been criticised 
as one of the primary sources of high-leveraged management. That system is one 
in which the chaebol subsidiaries in a group promise each other to reimburse 
lenders if their brother firms default on a loan. Most chaebols abused this system 
to borrow more money. However, as one of the conditions outlined in the IMF 
agreement, they were required to clear any debt-payment guarantees completely 
by the end of March 2000. Through diversified means such as the redemption of 
debts, the provision of more collateral, and risk-adjusted interest rate increases, 
the chaebols succeeded in lowering the amount of debt-guarantees from 33.6 
trillion won in 1997 to 9.8 trillion won in 1999, which accounts for only 9.7 per 
cent'tof their capital (see Figure A3.7). The debt-guarantees were no longer a 
problem by the end of March in 2000. 
The nature of the chaebols: The issues 
In the last section, the general characteristics of the Korean corporations, mostly 
chaebols, are discussed. This section goes one step further to analyse the nature of 
the chaebol issues that have been raised and argued by both public and academics 
in detail. Coase ( 1937) launched the modem theory of the firm by asking in the 
"Nature of the firm", "If markets worked perfectly, why would there be firms?" 
Coase argued that firms would exist only in environments in which firms perform 
better than markets could. Markets in some environments would not perform 
efficient! y because of 'transaction costs'. This is very useful insight to understand 
why chaebols exist and what determines what they do. Coase ( 1960) pointed out 
that in a regime of . zero transaction costs, an assumption of standard economic 
theory, negotiations between parties would lead to those arrangements being made 
that would maximise wealth. He also pointed out that the role of government is 
8 See Figure A3 .5 and A3.6. 
48 
finding and maintaining the efficient structure of property rights. A market-based 
chaebol-restructuring plan can be suggested from this insight. 
The economic concentration issue 
Most existing issues and policies concerning chaebols are often discussed with the 
matter of economic concentration. It has been known that such concentration, 
which is defined by the proportion of large corporations in the national economy, 
is relatively high in Korea. In particular, business conglomerates in Korea are 
unique organisations, with the economic concentration generated by the chaebols 
generally being morally recognised as a distorted phenomenon. In this regard, the 
government controlled the 30 largest chaebols under the Fair Trade Laws and 
Credit Management Policies, and it considered restraint of the economic 
concentration as its prime chaebol policy. An understanding of the attitude of a 
Korean government organisation (Korea Fair Trade Commission) towards 
economic concentration may be gained from the following: 
"In general, 'economic concentration' is variously defined by .... 'corporate concentration (general 
concentration)', 'market concentration (industrial concentration), 'ownership 
concentration', .... 'diversification'. We agree with these conceptions for the Korean economic 
concentration, which has the unique characteristics that 'minority people' actually own and control 
a number of big firms with their family, manage the group businesses rather than individual 
business, expand and diversify their business, and monopolistically dominate the markets."
9 
Thus, according to above comment, the government recognised the chaebol 
problem not only from the point of view of restraining economic concentration, 
but also from a general approach to solving every type of concentration problem. 
However, there are contradictions in this. For example, 'the business category 
specialisation' policy, which is the one of the policies of economic concentration 
restraint, would force chaebols to concentrate on their core businesses, but it 
actually strengthened the monopoly and oligopoly, and interrupted free market 
competition. Therefore, 'the business category specialisation' policy conflicts 
with 'the market competition encouragement' policy. These contradictory policies 
ultimately induced the financial crisis in 1997 (Hwang, 1998). 
9 from 'Fair Trade Annual Report, 1996 ' and 'Fair Trade White Paper, 1997' 
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After the crisis of 1997, the new chaebol policy was launched. In 1998, a five-
point accord between the Dae-Jung Kim government and the chaebols was 
concluded. It proposed the following: enhancing transparency, clearing up the 
mutual payment guarantees, improving the financial structures, reformin,g core 
businesses, and strengthening the accountability of controlling shareholders. The 
accord is a general improvement compared with previous policies because it 
emphasises transparency and control of shareholders' accountability as corporate 
governance matters. Nevertheless, the policy has not shifted much in terms of 
economic concentration. It still focuses on restraint of economic concentration, 
especially with the 30 largest chaebols, rather than encouraging free market 
competition. For instance, the policy of restraining economic concentration, which 
is a discriminatory policy based on corporate size, still exists. So too do the 
combined financial statements, clearing up the mutual payment guarantees, 
dismantling the chairman's office, and restriction of internal transactions. 
(Hwang, 1999). 
There are two issues regarding the policy, which places priority on restraint of 
economic concentration. First, the phenomenon of economic concentration does 
not seem to occur only in Korea. Table 3.6 provides a comparison of the largest 
conglomerates of the OECD countries. In terms of employment, the proportion of 
Korea's 30 largest chaebols of the total is 18.5 per cent, which is lower than those 
of the U.K., Germany, the U.S., France, and Sweden. In addition, in the U.K., 
France and Sweden, the proportion of sales in their manufacturing industries is 
higher, at 42.5 per cent, than in Korea. Conversely, as regards the total assets of 
the largest conglomerates, Korea's concentration is much higher than the total 
assets of those of other nations. 
Thus, the results are varied in relation to the concentration measures. But, assets 
and sales are unstable factors easily affected by international currency value 
changes or corporate accounting systems. It can be supposed that the employment 
factor, as a real variable, is more applicable to international comparison. In this 
regard, the Korean chaebols' economic concentration is not higher than the other 
OECD advanced nations , except for Japan. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
the Wallenberg family in Sweden control as much as 40 per cent of the whole 
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Swedish stock market value through a pyramid type ownership structure and 
cross-shareholding (Morck et al, 1998) 
Table 3.6 Comparison of the economic concentration of the 30 larg~st 
conglomerates in the selected OECD nations 
(Unit: per cent) 
Korea U.S. Japan Germany U.K. France 
Employment 18.5 22.9 15.0 31.7 32.6 36.9 
Sales 42.5 34.6 25.8 38.8 48.6 46.2 
Assets 46.5 22.4 22.7 22.7 29.5 28.6 
Note: 1. Figures for France and Sweden are respectively for the 20 and 10 largest 
conglomerates. 
Sweden 
58.6 
65.5 
37.3 
2. Employment= the total number of employees of the 30 largest conglomerates/ the 
total number of labourers in the manufacturing industries. 
3. Sales = the total sales of the 30 largest conglomerates / the total sales in the 
manufacturing industries '. 
4. Assets = the total assets of the 30 largest conglomerates/ GDP 
Source: Hwang, I.H. Economic Concentration, the Problem of Korean Recognition. KDI, 1997. 
The ~econd issue is that economic concentration is not the cause of the chaebol 
problem, but is the outcome of the chaebol system. So the policy of restraining 
economic concentration cannot be the fundamental solution to the chaebol 
problem. In fact, the reason for most concern about economic concentration is the 
ill effects flowing from the chaebol system. These ill effects originate from 
'corporate hegemony', and centre on the potential power of the corporation to 
influence important social fields such as politics, economy, culture, etc. in order to 
keep their vested rights or expand their businesses with their economic resources 
(Hwang, 1997). For example, collusion with politicians, monopoly and oligopoly, 
propagation of an ideology to maintain vested rights (in culture and society), etc. 
are included in the activities for 'corporate hegemony'. In terms of corporate 
hegemony, the total amount of economic resource is just one of the variables that 
contributes to the power of corporate hegemony. In addition, corporate hegemony 
can be synthetically determined by their transparency, health of the corporate 
governance system, transparency and fairness of political decision making, 
accuracy and consistency of policy standard, reliability of legal institutions, 
healthy social act, degree of openness of the market, and so on. Therefore, if 
economic concentration is high, but other factors noted above are healthy, then the 
possibility of corporate hegemony could be low. Thus, the fundamental problem 
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of the chaebols is not caused by economic concentration, but by the institutional 
environment, including the corporate governance structure (Hwang, 1999). 
The corporate governance issues 
Most Korean corporations and chaebols have similar ownership and control 
structures. The lack of institutions to protect investors' property rights, is one of 
the most serious problems in terms of ownership and control structures in the 
Korean corporations. In other advanced nations, especially the U.S. and U.K., 
agency problems occur between managers and shareholders. Although, most 
Korean chaebols are controlled by the largest shareholders, they still cannot avoid 
the agency problem between controlling shareholders and outside minority 
investors. It is different from the agency problem between shareholders and 
managers outlined by Berle and Means (1932). For example, in the case of the 30 
largest chaebols in 1999, the largest shareholders and their families own 5.4 
percent and the subsidiaries hold, on average, 45.1 percent by cross-
shareholdings. Therefore, the so-called 'in-group' shareholding proportion of 30 
largest chaebols is as much as 50.5 percent on average (Korea Fair Trade 
Commission). They, the largest shareholders, their families, and the subsidiaries 
in their groups, subsequently control the conglomerates without any effective 
check and monitoring by outside investors or institutions. Most chaebols have 
actually expropriated their investors' property rights over the last several decades. 
For instance, arbitrary decision-making by a nominal board to invest in risky 
businesses is not uncommon. Until their mismanagement was disclosed by the 
financial crisis of 1997, chaebols had an undoubtedly successful expansion and 
diversification without check or monitoring under the government's tacit policy of 
favouring chaebols. The financial crisis, however, exposed their mismanagement 
practices and moral hazard, and induced the bankruptcies of such chaebols as the 
Kia Group, Daewoo Group, etc. In other words, a lack of governance discipline, 
which can solve and prevent agency problems, tempted chaebols to build a 
corporate empire and caused them finally to go bankrupt. (Hwang, 1999) 
Owner-managerialism. Figure 3.1 indicates the trends of the controlling 
shareholders' share, the internal shareholding, and the number of subsidiaries on 
average of the 30 largest chaebols from 1987 to 1999. Even though the share of 
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controlling shareholders, including the share of their families, decreased from 17 
percent in 1983 to 5.4 percent in 1999, they still exclusively hold the greatest 
authority to manage and control the conglomerate businesses. Because they 
internally share the subsidiaries as a means of cross-shareholding with a .level of 
40 -50 percent share through the high level of mutual investment among 
subsidiaries in a group, they possess complete governance power to control an 
average of over 20 subsidiaries in a business group. 
Figure 3.1 The Internal shareholding and number of subsidiaries of the 30 
largest Chaebols 
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Note: 1. The unit of figures for controlling shareholder's share and internal shareholder's share is 
per cent 
2. The unit of figures for subsidiaries is the number of subsidiaries 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
Figure 3.2 shows the international comparison of share holding distribution of the 
public listed companies in Korea, Japan, the U.S. and U.K. The institutional 
investors' share in Korea is 13.6 percent, which is much lower than that of the 
U.S., U.K, or Japan, because of the role of institutional investors, such as banks, 
and financial institutions. In Korea corporate governance had not yet been 
activated. Thus, most publicly listed firms in Korea do not have to pass the 
checking and monitoring scrutiny of institutions. Moreover, the individual 
shareholders who hold relatively low share holdings (28.9 per cent) also cannot 
afford to check and monitor the firms . 
Figure 3.2 Comparison of shareholding distribution of the public listed 
companies in 1999 
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Source: Stock Exchange Market, 'Stocks', 1999 
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Table 3. 7 Comparison of the debt/equity ratio 
Korea 
Manufacturing Industries 
~ on average 
1991 306.7 
1992 318.7 
1993 294.9 
1994 302.5 
1995 286.8 
1996 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
30 largest chaebols on 
average 
402.5 
426.3 
397.5 
402.5 
387.8 
386.7 
U.S. 
147.3 
168.2 
174.5 
166.5 
(Unit: per cent) 
Japan Taiwan 
220.5 
216.5 
212.5 
209.6 
97.9 
93.0 
88.0 
87.2 
According to Table 3. 7, on an international comparison of the debt/equity ratio, 
Korea has the highest ratio compared with the U.S. Japan, and Taiwan. It is 
conjectured that firms prefer to get their funds through the indirect financial 
market rather than the direct financial market in order to avoid losing controlling 
power. Besides, the firms belonging to chaebols practise mutual investment with 
other subsidiaries with bank funds subject to debt payment guarantees. These 
figures indicate a distortion of the owner-managerialism problem in Korea as 
measured by the accurate debt/equity ratio (Hwang, 1998). 10 
10 However, the level of the ratio does not represent better corporate performance and national 
economy, it simply indicates the efficiency of corporate management. 
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Pyramid control system. The pyramid control system refers to a consecutive 
ownership structure. It means that a leverage effect is obtained by controlling 
shareholders or their families, who hold the power to manage core businesses 
then, in turn, core companies become the controlling shareholders of other 
subsidiaries. In this pattern of shareholding, the controlling shareholders or their 
families can control most assets of many firms by holding a few equities. For 
example, if we suppose that the required share to manage a firm is a, a 
shareholder holds a of firm A, and firm A again owns a of firm B I and B 2 • In 
turn, B I holds the share a of firm C 1 , and so on. That is, a shareholder can control 
many company assets by holding comparatively few equities. Morck et al. (1998) 
present, in the following equation, the total assets ( 0) of the firms, which can be 
finally controlled by a shareholder who has the wealth (w): 
e = L1 w (L1: Pyramid multiplier, L1 = 1/a 11 ) (3-1) 
The n represents the number of stages of pyramid control. If it is supposed that a 
shareholder has 1 billion dollars, he or she can control 27 billion dollars of assets 
through the leverage effect by using 3 stages of pyramid control. Furthermore, in 
the case of Korea, the mutual investment share of the 30 largest chaebols is, on 
average, 34.5 percent while the controlling shareholders' share is, on average, 8.5 
percent. So, if it is supposed that the minimum share required to hold sufficient 
power to manage a firm is about 10 percent, the pyramid multiplier will be 10 
3
• 
That is, a controlling shareholder can control 1,000 times the size of his or her 
own assets. 
As a matter of fact, this kind of situation occurs widely and appears throughout 
the world, except in most Anglo-Saxon countries. In Canada, however, the 
Bronfman family case is an example: 
'The Edward and Peter Bronfman family own Bronfman Inc. Bronfman Inc. hold 19.6 percent 
shares of HIL Corp., HIL Corp. again hold 97 percent shares of Edper Resources, Edper Resources 
hold 60 percent shares of Brascan Holdings, who hold 5.1 percent of Brascan, who hold 49.9 
percent of Braspower Holdings, who hold 49.3 percent of Great Lakes Power, who hold 100 
percent of First Toronto Investment, who hold 25 percent of Trilon Holdings, who hold 64.5 
percent of Trilon Financial, who own 41.4 percent of Gentra, who hold 31.9 percent of Imperial 
Windsor Group. Even though the Bronfman family own 0.03 percent of Imperial Windsor Group, 
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they completely control Imperial Windsor Group. And they govern every firm that is located in the 
control pyramid by way of mutual investment and floating stocks with special voting rights. In this 
way, the Bronfman family owns and controls hundreds of companies (Morck et al., 1998)' 
Therefore, the chaebol type of ownership is not restricted only to Korea. There are 
arguments that pyramid control could induce management entrenchment, 
aggravate the agency problem, and diminish firm value; on the other hand, the 
pyramid control system might contribute to developing the national economies of 
developing countries (Khanna and Palepu, 1998; cited from Hwang, 1999). 
Inefficient management disciplinary mechan.ism. According to the OECD 
definition (1999) corporate governance is the system by which business 
corporations are directed aI)d controlled. 11 However, there were no effective 
management control systems to check and monitor business corporations in 
Korea. The management disciplinary mechanism generally consists of the market 
disciplines and internal disciplines, with the market discipline subdivided into 
't 
four markets: capital market; financial market; product market; and labour 
(professional managers) market (Hwang, 1998, see Figure 3.3). 
Capital markets can check managers through the exercising of shareholders' rights 
and mergers and acquisition (M&A); financial markets can monitor through credit 
assessment and post censorship; in product markets consumers play the role of 
assessing goods and products and force uncompetitive firms to exit from the 
market; and labour markets also can assess managers' competitiveness. These 
four disciplines are included under the heading market discipline. There are inside 
organisations, such as holding companies, and planning and coordinating offices 
(or 'chairman's office' - the name differs among chaebols in Korea), board 
committees, stock options, and relationship investing mechanisms that allow 
institutional investors to participate in management. 
11 
"Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
participants in the corporation, such as, the board , managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spell 
out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the 
structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance" (OECD, 1999). The OECD principles of corporate governance are in Appendix A 
for the reference. 
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Figure 3.3 Management Disciplinary Mechanism 
Management Discipline 
Source: Hwang, 1998, Corporate Governance Issues and Policies. 
In K'brea, over the last several decades, these disciplines could not be exercised 
properly because there were no motives to do so at that stage of high economic 
growth. However, since the national economy entered its low growth period, and 
the world economy became tougher and more competitive, the demands for 
information about corporations and the need to check and monitor management in 
an era of uncertainty of corporate survival, increased. The above disciplines and 
their related institutions are necessary to prepare for and execute a complete 
reform of the Korean corporate governance system. 
Khanna and Palepu ( 1997, 1999) also suggest the institutional contexts: the 
product, capital and labour markets, regulatory systems, and mechanisms for 
enforcing contracts for three nations (see Table A3.15). Unlike the U.S. and 
Japan, Korea has suffered from weak institutions. Firms in the U.S. and Japan 
may take for granted a range of institutions that support their business activities, 
but many of those institutions do not exist in Korea. It is the different institutional 
contexts that explain why different form.s of economic organisations have 
developed and the success or failure of diversified business groups. Unlike 
advanced economies, in Korea, where there exist less developed financial and 
labour markets, companies must develop substitutes for those markets' roles. 
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Firms in the same chaebol provide reserved capital and /or labour resources to 
each other, when necessary. It is through the chaebol' s internal capital and labour 
markets that the voids of necessary institutions are filled. 
A comparison with advanced corporate governance systems. A comparative 
study of advanced corporate governance systems seems to be helpful in 
determining how corporate governance should be organised in the Korean 
context. There are two basic corporate governance systems that predominate in 
the current developed economies. One is the Anglo-American . "market based" 
model, with widely dispersed shareholders and a fairly vigorous corporate control 
market. The other is the "relationship based" system as in Japan and Germany, 
with large banks, corporate cross-holdings and conspicuous absence of takeovers. 
Anglo-American corporate governance is based on the 'property right' view that a 
firm belongs to shareholders. It is organised in accordance with the "shareholder-
valub principle" that managers are expected to run firms to maximise the interests 
of shareholders who bear residual risks. That is why the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system is called shareholder capitalism or 'shareholderism'. 
Shareholders are considered as passive investors. The primary mechanism to 
discipline management is the active market for tender offers. 
On the other hand, in the Japanese-German corporate governance system, which 
is the other predominant model in developed economies, the mechanism to 
discipline management through the capital market is not as developed in Japan as 
it is in the U.S. Instead, Japan relies on organisational networks called keiretsu to 
control management. One of the main characteristics of the big Japanese firms is 
that they form a group, or keiretsu, by interlocking ownership around a main 
bank. In the case of the U.S. the shares of individuals and institutional investors 
are much larger than those of financial institutions and non-financial institutions; 
in Japan the shares of financial institutions and non-financial institutions are 
comparatively large. In Japan, formal mechanisms such as a general assembly for 
shareholders and the board systems do not play a major role in controlling 
management. Instead, informal inter-firm monitoring plays a major role in 
disciplining management. 
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It is undoubtedly true that because these two unique corporate governance 
systems have merits and demerits of their own, it is not possible to judge which 
system is better. Their advantages can only be considered to apply to the 
particular economy, because every economy has its own business culture and 
system. Table A3.16 shows a comparison of corporate governance systems of the 
U.S. Japan and Korea. 
Recent proposals to improve corporate governance. Since the crisis, under the 
agreement between the Korean government and the IMF, many internal and 
external reform efforts were proposed. First of all, in the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, the primary internal control mechanism is the board 
system. In the past the board system in Korea has not played its role of checking 
owners' powers effectively. The recruiting of outside members would increase the 
independence and autonomy of the board enough to restrain inappropriate 
behaviour of owner-managers. This reform is based on the implicit assumption 
that t the board system abroad plays the role of checking top management 
effectively. However, even in nations like the U.S., U.K. and Canada where board 
systems are well developed, board members are closer to management, who meet 
with board members regularly, than to faceless shareholders. The function of the 
board generally does not work effectively, except in the case of crisis, when the 
board performs the duty of changing managers (Prahalad, 1997). 
In this regard, the board system reform effort might not be effective in the long 
run. In addition, the cultural background is different from the U.S. where 
individualism is predominant. Other factors such as blood relation, religion and 
school background play an important role in Korean society. It is expected that the 
new board system will lead to insider trading rather than checking and monitoring 
of management (Jeon and Gong, 1995). 
The market pressure exerted by the invisible hand is recognised as better able to 
achieve transparency or soundness of management rather than direct government 
intervention in the internal control mechanism. In other words, the promotion of 
rivalry in product markets and the activation of the monitoring function of the 
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banking and security sector will exert pressure on firms to provide rational and 
transparent management (Jwa, 1999: 242-3). 
The product and corporate control markets are the primary external corporate 
mechanisms. The competition for corporate control through the capital market 
exerts discipline on management. This corporate governance mechanism is 
thought to be the most effective method of checking the power of owner-
managers in Korea. One of the major problems with the capital market is that it is 
often too late to take meaningful corrective action by the time outsiders intervene. 
Another problem is that top managements can find ways to use their legal and 
regulatory systems to set up roadblocks, which make attempts to replace 
managements very costly. The option of selling stocks and moving on to better-
managed alternatives is less feasible for large institutional holders. Too much time 
and energy spent on maneuvers involved in mergers and acquisitions takes 
attention away from the real issue of long run corporate renewal (Prahalad, 1997: 
47-8). 
The strengthening of the rights of small shareholders seems to be effective in 
checking the owner-managers' opportunistic behaviour of serving their own 
profits at the expense of other shareholders. However, this mechanism should be 
limited to exclude intrusion in the policy-making realm of entrepreneurs, because 
this action undermine·s the entrepreneurial spirit, which in turn does not serve the 
interests of shareholders. 
Overcapitalisation 
Since the financial cns1s of 1997, persistent overcapitalisation and debt 
management by the chaebols have been seized upon as the issue to explain the 
causes of the crisis. In fact, overcapitalisation and debt management were carried 
out by most corporations during the last three or four decades with the Korean 
government's connivance, and used as an important strategy to achieve high 
economic growth. Three fundamental questions are raised: ( 1) Did 
overcapitalisation and debt management really happen?; (2) If so, why did it 
happen?; and (3) What is the solution? For the first question, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 
show the net income/total assets ratio of the 72 largest chaebols during 1985 -
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1997, and the change in the number of subsidiaries and business categories of the 
30 largest chaebols. 
Figure 3.4 Net income/total assets ratio of the 72 largest chaebols (1985-1997) 
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The net income/total assets ratios of most chaebols have decreased remarkably 
during the whole period from 1985 to 1997. In particular, the 19 insolvent 
chaebols - which are in the process of workout, composition, legal management or 
dishonour proceedings - have the worst ratio of deterioration from 0.48 percent to 
-0.39 percent. Except for the 5 largest chaebols, the ratio of the 48 chaebols the 
ratio has diminished from 1.39 percent in the 1980s to 0.33 percent in the 1990s. 
Meanwhile, the 30 largest chaebols have constantly expanded their business 
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categories and subsidiaries, respectively from 9.9 in 1987 to 19.07 in 1999, and 
from 16.4 in 1987 to 22.9 in 1999 on average. Most chaebols appear to have 
invested over the optimum level of opportunity costs of capital since 1989. 
(Hwang, 1998) 
If a corporation is thought of as merely a nexus of contracts or a governance 
structure, managers might be motivated to over-invest intentionally (that is, they 
invest in the expectation that net income ratio is lower than the opportunity costs 
of capital). There are three reasons for overcapitalisation in Korea. 
First, there was no check and monitoring function, which could modulate the 
conflicts between controlling shareholders or outside shareholders, to check 
managers in the capital market. So, controlling shareholders, who exclusively held 
the power to manage and control firms, might have under estimated the expected 
costs and over estimated the expected income and were thereby motivated to 
invest in low-profit businesses below the opportunity costs of capital. 
Second, even though the debt/equity ratios (300-400 percent) of most chaebols 
were much higher than those of other developed nations (See Table 3.7), the 
creditors, that is, the banks and financial institutions, did not actively play a role 
in checking and monitoring chaebols, because the banks did not have the proper 
skills or systems to assess the credit and risk management skills of corporations 
under state-dominated control. With creditors not playing the checking and 
monitoring role effectively, managers most likely were motivated to invest in 
high-risk return businesses, thus inducing overcapitalisation and, in some cases, 
insolvency. 
Third, there was no disciplinary mechanism to check and monitor management in 
the product market. Under the state's excessive entry and exit restriction policy, 
the product market could not play its proper role. This induced the moral hazard 
that led existing corporations to over-invest because of the state's concern about 
political and social disturbance. The government suppressed exits through 
preferential treatment and tax favours. In terms of entry restriction, the existing 
corporations most likely over established idle facilities when prospective new 
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rivals presented in the market. There are two examples of this behaviour - the 
reaction of existing companies to the trial entry of Samsung into the motor vehicle 
manufacturing industry, and the case of Hyundai's trial entry into the steel and 
iron industry. 
Overall, the reasons for overcapitalisation were the lack of disciplinary 
mechanisms to check and monitor managers' decision-making in the capital 
market, the states of the financial market and the product market, and the laxness 
of board committees. 
Therefore, rather than direct intervention by the state, the first solution should be 
the reforming of corporate governance related institutions and activation of 
various market functions such as the internal early warning system, and M&A 
from the financial market. It is also necessary to restore the role of investment 
coordination by the government through industrial policy measures. Moreover, 
given the growing importance of chaebol-controlled financial institutions, tougher 
financial regulations will also be necessary in order to prevent the accumulation of 
vast funds, which may aggravate overcapitalisation by channelling a 
disproportionate share of the chaebol' s funds into their subsidiaries. 
Ownership structure: The issues 
Ownership structure used to be considered as the most important factor in shaping 
the corporate governance system of any country. Particularly, it used to determine 
the extent of the agency problem of the conflict between managers and 
shareholders, or between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. A 
Korean chaebol is, in general, governed by an owner and his/her family. It is 
common that owner-and-family are the accountable top bosses. This is similar to 
the pre-war Japanese zaibatsu. The ownership of Korean chaebols is quite 
different from both the Anglo-Saxon type, owned by many small shareholders, 
and the German or Japanese type, owned by the bank or by cross-shareholders 
(YO Kim, 1993). 
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The shareholding by owners and their families of the 5 largest chaebols was 4.6 
percent as of 1 April 1999, and that of subsidiaries owned by owners and their 
families, directly or indirectly, was 49.8 percent, so that the total share of the 
dominant stockholders became 54.4 percent. This makes the owner's decision-
making power absolute. The dominant stockholder's average share of the 30 
largest chaebols was 50.5 percent, which was a little lower than that of the 5 
largest chaebols (See Table 3.8). 
Commercial banks r:arely hold shares in chaebol firms. Mutual investment was 
once prevalent, but when the Fair Trade Law was reformed it prohibited direct 
mutual investment in a chaebol by the subsidiaries. The custom of mutual 
investment was formally similar to the Japanese zaibatsu, but they are really quite 
different from each other. While Japanese keiretsu 12 firms invest mutually and 
independently among themselves, Korean subsidiary firms invest in each other 
under the control of the owner. That is, Korean mutual investment between 
subsldiaries may be characterised as the proxy investment of the owner. 
Table 3.8 The In-Group shareholding ratio of the 5 largest chaebols as of 
April 1999 
Chaebol The owner and his 
Hyundai 
Daewoo 
Samsung 
LG 
Sunkyung 
5 largest chaebols on average 
30 largest chaebols on average* 
Note: * See Table 3.4 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
family(A) 
5.4 
5.6 
2.0 
3.7 
6.3 
4.6 
5.4 
(Unit: percent) 
Subsidiaries(B) In-Group 
Total(A+B) 
51.0 56.4 
48.5 54.1 
40.5 42.5 
48.7 52.4 
60.5 66.8 
49.8 54.4 
45.1 50.5 
In the management of Korean chaebols, typically the ultimate authority is always 
the owner and his family, no matter who manages. For instance, Samsung Group, 
one of the top 5 chaebols in Korea, also has an owner-manager system, in which 
12 A Japanese corporate organisation, which refers to a group of companies that have close trading and 
financial relationships and cross shareholdings. 
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the owner's family holds the final responsibility. That is, all the employed 
managers are accountable to the owner. Samsung Group owner, Lee, and his 
family participate directly in management. Routine affairs are entru_sted to 
professional managers who have full powers except for personnel and financial 
management, where they are limited. In any case the final authority is President 
Lee. As the dominant stockholder, Lee's family usually appoints and dismisses 
executives, which is typical indirect participation. Lee's family members also 
directly participate in routine management affairs as the presidents of groups, 
sectors, or core enterprises. In other words, Lee's family governs the Samsung 
group completely through its domination of the general meeting of stockholders 
and the executive committee (YO Kim, 1993). 
' A specific characteristic of the Korean chaebol' s corporate governance lies not in management 
control through appointing and dismissing executives, but in direct participation in management, 
being the president or the executive. Lee Byung Chul, the founding owner of Samsung Group, 
exercised his final decision-making authority as the president of Samsung Group in addition to his 
indirect management control, for example, the changing of executives. Most of the important new 
inves~ents, such as the fertiliser industry in the 1960s, shipbuilding and precision industry in the 
1970s, and the semi-conductor industry in the 1980s, followed the decision of President Lee. It is 
said that the professional managers are entrusted with matters other than strategic decision-
making, such as the reshuffle of executives, financial management, and crucial new investment. 
This is true to some extent, but Lee has supervised and appraised the management results through 
the president's year-end council meeting, the results of which are reflected in the next year's 
reshuffle of the subsidiary presidents. By using the secretarial office, furthermore, Lee gets 
information on the ordinary management affairs of the subsidiaries and controls them as the real 
decision-maker. Lee and his family are said to govern Samsung totally, in terms of both ownership 
and management (YO Kim, 1993).' 
The corporate governance system of Samsung is different from that of Anglo-
Saxon firms, which are accountable to many small stockholders at their general 
meeting, or that of Japanese or German firms, which are accountable to the banks 
or the cross-shareholders. 13 There are two key aspects of corporate ownership 
structure: concentration and composition. The Korean type of ownership structure 
can be identified and estimated using these two aspects. 
Ownership concentration 
The grade of ownership concentration in a company determines the distribution of 
power between its managers and shareholders, or controlling shareholders and 
outside shareholders. When ownership is dispersed, shareholder control tends to 
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be weak because of poor shareholder monitoring. In the U.S. and the U.K., where 
corporate ownership is relatively dispersed, the major mechanisms for shielding 
shareholders from expropriation by incumbent managers are legal protection and 
the market for corporate control. 
When ownership is concentrated, large shareholders may play an important role in 
monitoring management. In fact, in Continental Europe and East Asian countries 
as well as in Latin America where corporate ownership is concentrated, corporate 
management is usually in the hands of controlling shareholders. 14 Table 3.9 
indicates the ownership concentration in the selected East Asian countries, for 
publicly listed companies (PLCs) in most countries. The average share of the 
largest shareholders ranges from 20.4 percent in Korea to 48.2 percent in 
' 
Indonesia, and the ratio of the top 5 shareholders ranges from 38.5 percent in 
Korea to 67 .5 percent in Indonesia. 
Thble 3.9 Ownership Concentration in the selected East Asian countries 
Country 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Largest 
shareholder 
20.4 
30.3 
33.5 
28.5 
48.2 
Top 5 Shareholders 
38.5 
58.8 
60.2 
56.6 
67.5 
As of end of the 
year 
1998 
1998 
1997 
1997 
1997 
(Unit: percent) 
Company 
coverage 
81 non-
financial 
PLCs 1 
All PLCs 
All non-
financial 
PLCs 
All PLCs 
All PLCs 
Note: The concentration ratio is defined as the percentage of total outstanding shares of an 
average PLC owned by the largest or top 5 shareholders. The percentages are not 
weighted by market capitalisation. 
1. Based on the ownership data from the ADB survey of 81 non-financial PLCs. 
Ownership data comparable to those of the other countries are not available. 
Source: Country Studies under RETA 5802, Asian Development Bank. 1999. 
A fundamental problem in corporate governance under concentrated ownership is 
how to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders may act in their own interests at the 
expense of minority shareholders and other investors. This could take the form of 
13 See The Economist, 14 Jan. 1994 and Figure A3.8. 
14 See La Porta et al. 1998. 
66 
paying themselves special dividends, and taking on excessively risky projects 
inasmuch as they share in the upside while the other investors, who might be 
creditors, tolerate the cost of failures. 
Many Korean chaebols have highly concentrated structures of ownership and 
control. This concentration of ownership and control, in fact, is not simply a 
chaebol-specific characteristic, but is also found in most non-chaebol firms. In 
most Korean firms, the ownership concentration is high enough to give control 
over all subsidiaries to the owner-managers and their family members. The 
control power of the largest shareholder ( owner) of a firm is reinforced by the 
widespread practice of cross-shareholdings among the subsidiaries in a business 
group. As shown earlier by the in-group ownership concentration in Table 3.4, for 
the 30 largest chaebols, in 1999, the average ratio is as high as 50.5 percent. The 
largest shareholder and family share is 5.4 percent, and the cross-shareholdings 
among the subsidiaries represent 45.1 percent of the total shares outstanding. 
Critics frequently point out that the Korean ownership structure leads to a 
distinctive structure of corporate control such that the corporate control over all 
subsidiaries is excessively concentrated in the hands of owner-managers, and the 
role of professional managers in individual subsidiaries is quite limited. 
Furthermore, it is often advocated that Korea needs to establish separation of 
ownership and management with the professional managers responsible for 
management (YK Lee, 1992b). But establishing a professional management 
system, together with separation of ownership and control, 15 appears to require 
preconditions such as a new corporate governance mechanism that could 
minimise possible agency problems while enhancing managerial efficiency. A 
policy of ownership deconcentration is a controversial issue and long-term goal 
since it requires an efficient capital market. 16 Such policy intervention should 
clearly understand the time horizon over which the policy would take effect. 
Rather than pursuing the separation _of ownership and control in firms, public 
policy that liberalises the financial market so that the risk-return trade-off is 
15 Agency theory points to the fact that the separation of ownership and control does not necessarily enhance 
economic efficiency. 
16 See YK Lee. 1992b. 
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considered in corporate financing decisions is more desirable. The fear of 
bankruptcy will force Korean firms to rely more on equity financing to improve 
their debt-ridden capital structure. 
Ownership composition 
Ownership composition is the second key aspect of corporate ownership structure. 
Ownership composition refers to who the shareholders are and, more important, 
who among them belong to the controlling group. A shareholder can be an 
individual, a family or family group, a holding company, a bank, an institutional 
investor, or a non-financial corporation. If a family or family group were a 
significant shareholder, they would be more likely to be interested in control 
benefits as well as profits. On the other hand, an institutional investor as a 
significant shareholder is more likely to be interested only in profits. 
Similar to many other East Asian nations, the ownership profiles in Korea suggest 
substantial family corporate holdings. Family ownership of chaebols is usually 
achieved through controlling shareholdings and cross-shareholdings among 
subsidiaries (individual companies). Table 3.10 indicates that the ownership 
composition in Korea, in 1997: around 60 per cent of the total outstanding shares 
of all non-financial PLCs were owned by individuals, including controlling 
shareholders and their family members. Financial institutions, including banks, 
securities companies, insurance companies, investment trusts, and other finance 
companies, owned 16.6 percent of the total outstanding shares. Non-financial 
corporations owned 16.7 percent, reflecting mostly equity investments in 
subsidiaries by member companies of the chaebols. The shares owned by the 
government were insignificant, at less than 2 percent. The two aspects in Korea, in 
terms of composition, are controlling shareholders and their family domination, 
and cross-shareholdings among subsidiaries in a group. 
Compared with the U.S. and Japan, 1n Korea the shares of the institutional 
investors are lower, while the shares of the government are relatively higher. 
These reflect the relative weakness of the role of the institutional investor in 
Korea, and continuing excessive government intervention in industries in Korea 
compared with the two advanced economies. The higher shares of the non-
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financial institutions in Korea and Japan show that the cross shareholdings or 
investments among subsidiaries in a business group (chaebol or keiretsu) are 
prevalent in these two nations (see Figure A3.9). 
Table 3.10 Ownership composition in Korea 1 
(Unit: eercent) 
1980 1985 1990 1993 1994 1997~ 
Banks 5.9 7.1 6.3 11.6 10.7 8.5 
Securities companies 2.2 7.4 5.4 5.3 4.0 6.1 
Investment trusts n.a. 3 n.a. 9.3 6.6 7.3 n.a. 
Insurance companies n.a. n.a. 6.3 6.5 5.9 2.0 
Other finance companies n.a. n.a. 0.9 0.6 0.9 n.a. 
Institutional Investors in total 8.2 14.4 28.1 30.6 28.8 16.6 
Non-financial companies 19.4 30.0 18.0 19.2 20.1 16.7 
Individual shareholders 56.9 52.5 51.6 41.3 40.2 60.0 
Foreign Investors 2.0 2.6 2.0 8.8 9.1 4.5 
Government 14.5 0.4 0.1 0 1.8 1.5 
t 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: 1. Refers to ownership composition of the total outstanding shares of an average non-
financial PLC in Korea. 
2. Figures in 1997 are not weighted by market capitalisation. 
3. n.a. indicates that the particular group is not separately classified in ownership data. 
Source: Korea Stock Exchange Market, 'Stocks' and Country Studies under RETA 5802, Asian 
Development Bank. 1999. 
A challenge for the Korean corporate sector 
The experience of the crisis exposed the intrinsic weakness of the complex 
corporate system and management mechanism of the Korean corporate sector and 
proposed the great demands on structural reform. In other words, the Korean 
corporate organisations needed to fundamentally change the way they run their 
businesses in order to survive in the future. 
Institutional change 
One of the most influential factors in changing the cost of business group 
management is the condition of competition in the market. Coase ( 1937) pointed 
69 
out that the degree of competition ultimately determines the final configuration of 
the firm. 
"A firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an extra transaction within the firm 
become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the 
open market or the costs of organising in another firm." (Coase, 1937). 
The Korean business groups, chaebols, are now being exposed to competition at a 
higher level than ever before and the extent of competition will be intensified 
further in both domestic and international markets. If they fail to make 
transactions organise more efficiently than other firms in domestic and 
international markets, they cannot stand by themselves and avoid being integrated 
into the market system. Thus, the transactional efficiency of firms _can be a 
function of both market and its competition. Since the crisis, the increasing 
pressure from global competition has forced the chaebols to change the structure 
of group management in the direction of "de-conglomeration" of business, "de-
levei;aging" of the capital structure, and "dis-empowering" of the controlling 
families. However, it does not mean that all the chaebols have to become 
extremely specialised companies with a purely equity-financed capital structure. 
One thing chaebols should be aware of is that internal transactions are more costly 
than market-type transactions. Hence, market transactions will increase. To 
accommodate the market pressure, the chaebols might become a more loosely 
linked federation of affiliated subsidiaries. A chaebol will be spun-off to some of 
the subgroups, the so-called FBOs (Family Buyouts). Furthermore, at the firm 
level, traditional MBOs (Management Buyouts) will take place to achieve 
managerial independence, and subsidiaries will be affiliated strategically, not 
financially. In addition, at the division level, diverse types of EBOs (Employee 
Buyouts) will take place as a way of spinning-off non-profitable divisions. In 
addition to the de-diversification efforts, several functions organised inside the 
chaebol will be spun-off to become sub-contractors or replaced by independent 
outsourcing. Any function such as advertising, R&D, finance, human resources 
management, intermediate parts and material procurement, and facility and 
maintenance management can be considered as possible functions for outsourcing. 
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De-diversification and de-leveraging are linked to the dis-empowerment of 
current management. In fact, many manager-owners in chaebols have already lost 
their control rights after making debt-equity swaps with creditor banks. As an 
outcome of recent revisions in corporate, securities, and accounting regulations, 
internal transactions will be exposed to and tested by markets and regulatory 
agencies such as Fair Trade Commission. As a result, managerial and accounting 
transparency will be significantly enhanced as well as management transparency 
and information disclosure. Trade-oriented nations like Korea should reform their 
corporate governance and institutional frameworks to follow global standards and 
trends, but adjust them efficiently in order to minimise the cost. 
Managerial change . 
The market environment is changing in such a way as to increase to a great extent 
the relative price of using internally coordinated systems, like business groups. 
One effective response to this condition is to adopt a market-based style of 
manlgement. Khanna and Palepu ( 1999) suggested the abandonment of the 
traditional model whose headquarters were deeply involved in directing resource 
allocation inside business groups. Instead, they suggested a new model for 
headquarters that actually provide a soft infrastructure - organisations such as 
venture capital funds or leveraged buyout firms. As many chaebol critics argued, 
it is true that chaebol managers have predominantly been owners and many 
subsidiaries have had negative earnings. Hence it would be hard to find accurate 
examples as the dominant ones in capital re-allocation inside the chaebol. Khanna 
and Palepu ( 1999) also pointed out that the financing of businesses is indeed best 
left to commercial banks and capital markets rather than so-called 'internal capital 
market'. In order to eliminate cross-shareholdings and internal transactions among 
subsidiaries, business groups can adopt a . holding company. But holding 
companies should not interfere in the day-to-day operations of subsidiaries. If they 
do, the groups could become corrupted as Williamson ( 197 5) expected. Business 
groups need to give their firms greater freedom in running their operations. 
Operating decisions are also delegated to the subsidiaries level. They are 
evaluated on a profit-centred base. 
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The groups also need to adopt a different capital structure. They should be based 
more on equity financing. Before the crisis, chaebols were both heavily indebted 
and involved in very risky ventures. This severe mismatch between a company's 
asset structure and its financial structure has made Korean enterprises vulnerable 
to high rates of default risk. The headquarters of business groups should play a 
more active role in bringing world-class standards and practices of disclosure and 
governance to their affiliated firms. These recapitalisation and the rational 
readjustments are necessary to generate other reforms such as business 
readjustment. As Khanna and Palepu (1999) predicted, the active response to 
these reform needs can offer a chance to access virtually unlimited capital. 
Structural change 
In Korea, it would be quite misleading to forecast that if the chaebols were totally 
dismantled by force, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) would have more 
growth opportunities. If breaking up the chaebols is not approached strategically 
in ccireful steps, it could destroy value in the chaebols and also in the whole 
Korean economy. However, this does not mean that they do not need to 
drastically restructure. As market pressure intensifies and institutional 
arrangements are set up properly, they will have no choice but to reorganise. They 
will need to strategically spin-off some parts. 17 Broad divestment of non-core 
assets . and functions will enable large enterprises to restructure and re-invest in 
growth areas. Spinning-off peripheral parts can be a good way to develop 
emerging small-scale independent enterprises. 18 As chaebols are spinning off 
existing functions and outsourcing work, SMEs will have more opportunities to 
widen their market share. The spun-off companies will gradually move from 
being subsidiaries to becoming independent subcontractors. Then, SMEs will 
have a better chance than before in competing for subcontracting work from large 
groups. 
In the new era, every growing business will be transformed into a knowledge-
based one. Traditionally, the chaebols have had a competitive advantage in mega-
sized manufacturing industries such as electronics, steel, shipbuilding, chemical, 
17 See Figure A3. I 0. 
18 See Figure A3. l l. 
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motor vehicle and semiconductors industries that requ1re huge lump-sum 
investments. However, the new technological industries such as information 
technology (IT), bio technology, telecommunication and computer science 
industries make those manufacturing industries transform to knowledge-based 
industries. This trend is rapidly emerging in every market, so that large chaebols 
will have no choice but to join to this trend in order to avoid losing out. To catch 
up to leading firms in those new industries, chaebols will need to completely 
readjust their lines of business into a new business portfolio. Many existing 
structures for the old manufacturing businesses would be abandoned or reformed 
in order to focus on new businesses. Many business lines or products shed by the 
large firms can be taken over by SMEs. In these new industries, SMEs and other 
venture businesses can be as competitive as the large business groups can be. 
They are small but more flexible and speedier in response to rapidly changing 
market trends of these new industries. These changes imply greater opportunities 
for promising SMEs and ventures in the new era. 19 
Another economic actor to influence the chaebols' structure is foreign-owned 
companies operating in the domestic market. Many foreign companies, mostly 
multi national enterprises (MNEs), are now making strategic alliances with 
Korean big businesses in fields such as marketing and R&D. Since the crisis, 
foreign direct or indirect investment in Korea has notably and consistently 
increased. 20 This means that foreign companies are now becoming major players 
in both the capital and products markets in Korea. They are not only making 
alliances with the chaebols, but also competing fiercely with domestic companies. 
Moreover, most foreign companies are international market leaders, so that 
domestic firms should adjust and reform strategically their business and 
management structures to compete with world class competitors. 
In the near future, the Korean corporate sector may be rearranged with new major 
business actors such as a group of loosely linked chaebols (much smaller than 
before), a group of foreign-owned companies, and a large group of SMEs 
including venture companies in the growing new industries. 
19 See Figure A3 . l 2. 
20 See Figure A3 .13. 
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Summary and conclusion 
The Korean big corporate groups, the so-called 'chaebols', led the remarkable 
economic growth over the last four decades in Korea. Chaebols dominated the 
national economy under the state's 'stick and carrot' policy. Chaebols have 
unique characteristics compare with other nations' conglomerates. First, they are 
among the fastest growing business conglomerates in the world, and their 
economic concentration is substantial in the national economy. Second, they have 
close relationships with government, so-called "crony capitalism". Third, most of 
them are owned and controlled by founders and their families, with cross-
shareholding by their subsidiaries in a group. Fourth, they widely diversified the 
scope of their businesses in related and unrelated areas except banking. Finally, 
they experience high financial leveraging. 
The nature of the chaebol issues is focused on economic concentration and 
corpprate governance with overcapitalisation. On the economic concentration 
issue, there are two notable points. First, the phenomenon of economic 
concentration does not only occur in Korea. Second, economic concentration is an 
outcome of the chaebol problems, not the cause of the chaebol problems. On the 
corporate governance issue, the first point to note is that most Korean 
corporations are controlled by their founders and their families in a pattern of 
owner-managerialism. Second, the controlling shareholders possess the power to 
control firms in a group by using a pyramid control system. But this does not 
happen only in Korea. Third, there is no effective management disciplinary 
mechanism to check and monitor managers in the Korean corporations. An 
effective management disciplinary mechanism should consist of an interaction 
among forces providing market discipline (including the capital market, financial 
market, product market, and labour market) and internal discipline in the form of 
corporate organisation , board committees and so on. Fourth, the advantages of the 
two major corporate governance systems are considered to apply to the Korean 
system, but there is a need to adjust them to fit the particular business 
circumstance in Korea. Finally, the lack of a corporate governance mechanism has 
induced overcapitalisation. 
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Ownership structure used to be considered as the most important factor in shaping 
the corporate governance system of any country. The two aspects of ownership 
structure are ownership concentration and composition. The degree of o~nership 
concentration in a company determines the distribution of power between its 
managers and shareholders, or controlling shareholders and outside shareholders. 
Many Korean corporations, including chaebols, have highly concentrated 
structures of ownership and control, likewise other East Asian nations. In terms of 
composition, family ownership in a chaebol is usually achieved through 
controlling shareholdings and cross-shareholdings among subsidiaries. 
Overall, the Korean economy and corporate sector are now facing very important 
moments to reform their institutional, managerial, and structural frameworks to 
compete with more numerous and stronger world competitors. They must do so 
without any protection in the new economic era. 
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4 
Data and Model Specification 
This chapter describes the data sample, definitions of variables, data sources, 
variables and model specification, descriptive statistics, and diagnostic tests that 
form the basis for analysis in the following chapters. The first section describes 
the data sample and defines the variables which are used in analysis. The second 
section discusses the model specification and describes the variables used. The 
third section reports the descriptive statistics and correlations among the 
variables. The final section examines the diagnostic tests applied in later chapters 
to inspect the models established in the earlier section. 
Sa~ple description and definition 
' 
The sample used here consists of 675 randomly selected publicly listed companies 
(PLCs) including ch_aebol subsidiaries in Korea as of 1999. The 675 PLCs are 
randomly selected from 1,116 firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange market 
(KSE) and the Korea Securities Dealers Association (KOSDAQ) market. 1 The 
sample firms represent a variety of industries and there is no industrial restriction 
on inclusion in the sample. Data on the ownership fractions of insider shares and 
the three largest share holdings could not be obtained for all companies selected, 
so the final sample consisted of 146 subsidiary firms of the 30 largest chaebols 
and 353 other PLCs. Most firm specific data relating to the sample came from the 
data obtained by the National Information and Credit Evaluation Inc. (NICE).2 
The identification of the 30 largest chaebols is based on data in the annual report 
of the Korea Fair Trade Committee (KFTC). Since the financial crisis of 1997 in 
Korea, the firm specific data for 1999 are the most reliable and latest that are 
available. 3 A financial crisis swept over the Korean economy in 1997 and affected 
the financial statements of most firms with unexpected effects on management. As 
1 The 590 firms listed in the KSE and 526 firms listed by the KOSDAQ in Korea as of 1999. 
2 An approved organisation which is specialised in financial information of the listed firms in Korea. The data 
are extracted from the website (http://www.nice.co.kr) 
3 Some firms that collapsed due to the financial crisis between 1997 and 1998 are excluded. 
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a result, the data of the financial years 1997 and 1998 might be distorted, and so 
these years were not included for analysis in this thesis. The use of a data from a 
single year raises the question of the stability of the results. However, the findings 
of McConnell and Servaes ( 1990, 1995) suggest that the relation · between 
ownership structure and corporate value is consistent across years. 4 
Variables and model specification 
The econometric models used in this study consist of 12 equations. The variables 
included in the models and defined in Table 4.1 are drawn from the studies of · 
Morck et al. ( 1988a), Cho ( 1998), Demsetz and Lehn ( 1985), and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001). 
Variable 
MB)\ 
INS 
L3S 
LS 
PDS 
FS 
FIS 
AA 
DA 
NINVT 
A 
LIQ 
MFG 
IT 
FIN 
Table 4.1 Variables, definitions, and sources 
Definition 
Market value of assets to book value of assets. The numerator is the 
annual market value of equity and debt. The denominator is the 
book value of total assets 
Fraction of shares owned by insiders, such as founder, founders' 
family and relatives, and subsidiary firms in groups 
Fraction of shares owned by three largest shareholders in firms 
Fraction of shares owned by largest shareholder in firms 
Fraction of shares owned by president in firms 
Fraction of shares owned by foreigners in firms 
Fraction of shares owned by financial institutions 
Average book value of total assets in billions of won. The average 
is of annual values as of 1999 and 1998 
Debt to book value of total assets as of 1999. 
Net investment, which is including capital expenditures and 
research and development (R&D) expenditures, to total assets. 
Liquidity. Cash flow to average assets 
Manufacturing industry indicator that 1s 1 if a firm is a 
manufacturing firm, 0 otherwise. 
Information technology industry indicator that is 1 if a firm is a IT 
firm, 0 otherwise 
Finance industry indicator that is 1 if a firm is a financial firm, 0 
otherwise. 
Source 
NICE, 
Author's 
calculation 
NICE 
NICE, 
Author's 
calculation 
NICE 
NICE 
NICE 
NICE 
NICE 
NICE 
NICE, 
Author's 
calculation 
NICE 
NICE 
NICE 
NICE 
Table 4.1 provides definitions of the variables and the source of the data for these 
variables. MBA is defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book 
4 They explored empirically the cross-sectional relation between firm performance and insider ownership 
with the samples of U.S . firms for the years 1976, 1986, and 1988. The results were consistently similar. 
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value of assets and is used as a proxy for performance. INS is the fraction of 
shares owned by insiders, such as founder, founders' family and relatives, and 
subsidiary firms. L3S is identified as the fraction of shares owned by the largest 
three shareholders and is used as a proxy for ownership concentration level. The 
four ownership composition variables LS, PDS, FS, and FIS are respectively the 
fractions of shares owned by largest shareholder, by the president, by foreigners, 
and by financial institutions. These variables are used to examine the relationship 
of ownership composition with performance. AA is the average book value of 
total assets which is used as a proxy for firm size. DA, NINVT A and LIQ are 
respectively defined as debt to total assets, net investment including capital 
expenditures and research and development (R&D) expenditures to total assets, 
and cash flow to average assets. The industrial classifications form three 
categories: manufacturing, information technology and finance. Industry dummy 
variables are used to capture these broad industry effects.5 
In Fquation ( 4-1 ), corporate value (MBA) appears as the dependent variable and 
insider ownership variables (INS 1, INS2, and INS3), control variables and 
industrial dummy variables appear as explanatory variables. The insider 
ownership variables are used to identify the relationship between the level of the 
insiders' share fraction and corporate value in Equations (4-1). Equation (4-2) is 
designed to test whether insider ownership is determined by performance as 
argued by Demsetz (1983). In Equation (4-2), the fraction of shares owned by 
insiders of firm (INS) appears as the dependent variable, while corporate value 
(MBA) appears as an explanatory variable, because there would be the possibility 
of this reverse causality. This possibility might reduce the usefulness of results 
obtained from Equation ( 4-1) of the effect of insider shareholdings on corporate 
value. Other things being equal, insiders may grant stock compensation when 
their firm performs well and the value of the firm increases. As a result, higher 
levels of insider ownership are expected for firms with high corporate values. The 
use of compensation policies involving stock and options on stock, insider trading 
possibilities and corporate takeover arguments all suggest that corporate 
5 Other industries are not categorised and are not included in any of the three categories . 
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performance might affect ownership structure and that, in turn, performance might 
be affected by ownership structure. 6 
Based on previous studies, the two break points on insider ownership are 
proposed in this model. However, the levels are different from those in the U.S. 
studies, because the two different break points that suggested by Morck et al 
(1988a) and Cho (1998) are not applicable to the Korean data set.7 That is why the 
alternative break points are explored and used in Equation ( 4-1 ). 8 
MBA =/(INSl, INS2, INS3, NINVTA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
INS =/(MBA, AA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
(4-1) 
(4-2) 
The model specification is somewhat arguable. The determinants of ownership 
structure, for instance, could be extended to include stock market volatility, as 
hypothesised by Kyle (1985), even though Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and others 
did ~ot include it in their models. However, that would lead into the quagmire of 
the stock price theory and make the model large and complicate unnecessarily. 
That is clearly beyond the scope of the study. The analysis proposed here in this 
thesis is a piece of a potentially bigger puzzle. 
In the ownership concentration model, in Equation (4-3), corporate value (MBA) 
is the dependent variable, and ownership concentration ratio (L3S) is one of the 
independent variables. In Equation ( 4.4 ), the ownership concentration ratio is the 
dependent variable, and corporate value (MBA) is included in the independent 
variables. Equation (4-4) is apparently similar to Equation (4-2), but INS and L3S 
are positioned in separated equations because of their high correlation.9 The three 
largest shareholders' share fraction (L3S) represents the degree of ownership 
6 See Cho (1998), Laderer and Martin (1997), Kole (1996), and Demsetz (1986). 
7 Morck et al.(1988) propose 5 and 25 per cent of insider management ownership break points, while Cho 
(1998) suggests 7 and 38 per cent of insider ownership break points. In chapter 5, the alternative break points 
of 15 and 35 per cent are found and tested. 
8 INS 1 = insider ownership if insider ownership < 15%, 
= 15% if insider ownership~ 15%; 
INS2 = 0 if insider ownership< 15%, 
= insider ownership - 15% if 15% ~ insider ownership< 35%, 
= 20% if insider ownership~ 35%; 
INS3 = 0 if insider ownership< 35%, 
= insider ownership - 35% if insider ownership~ 35%. 
9 See page 9. 
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concentration: few studies have included this variable to test the relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate value. 10 
MBA =f(L3S, NINVTA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
L3S =/(MBA, AA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
(4-3) 
(4-4) 
Equations ( 4-5), ( 4-6), ( 4-7) and ( 4-8) are designed to test respectively the 
relationship between performance (MBA) and the largest shareholders' share 
fraction (LS), presidents' direct share fraction (PDS), foreigners' share fraction 
(FS) and financial institutions' share fraction (FIS). Equations ( 4-9), ( 4-10), ( 4-
11) and ( 4-12) capture the reverse effects of corporate value on ownership 
composition variables. 
MBA =/(LS, NINVTA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
MBA =f(PDS, NINVTA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
MBA= f (FS, NINVTA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
MBA= f (FIS, NINVTA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
I LS =/(MBA, AA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
PDS = f (MBA, AA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
FS =/(MBA, AA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
FIS =/(MBA, AA, DA, LIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
(4-5) 
(4-6) 
(4-7) 
(4-8) 
(4-9) 
(4-10) 
( 4-11) 
( 4-12) 
The market to book ratio (MBA) is used in all of these models as a measure of 
market value of firm. Pontiff and Schall (1998) found in their empirical study that 
the book-to-market ratio forecasts future market returns and the excess returns of 
small stocks over big stocks. Vuolteenaho ( 1999) also suggests that more than 
60% of the book-to-market variance can be attributed to variation in expected 
excess returns. Chui and Wei (1998) found that the book-to-market ratio could 
explain the cross-sectional variation of expected stock returns in Hong Kong, 
Korea, and Malaysia. Lewellen ( 1999) reported that the book-to-market ratio 
predicts economically and statistically significant time-variation in expected stock 
returns. A number of other studies have found that book-to-market (or market-to-
'
0 Demsetz and Villalonga (2001 ), and Xu and Wang (1997) used the five and ten largest shareholders' 
fraction respectively in their studies as proxies for ownership concentration. The three largest shareholders' 
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book) captures the variation in average stock returns and firm profitability. 11 In 
fact, Xu and Wang ( 1997) and Shin and Park ( 1999) used the market to book ratio 
as a proxy for performance in their empirical studies. MBA appears as an 
independent variable in Equations (4-2), (4-4), (4-9), (4-10), (4-11) and (4-12) to 
capture the possibility that corporate value affects the ownership structure 
variables. 
Variable NINVT A, which is defined as net investment including capital 
expenditures and research and development (R&D) expenditures to total assets, is 
used in Equations (4-1), (4-3), (4-5), (4-6), (4-7), and (4-8) to measure the extent 
to which firms invest in capital, and then to examine whether investment 
influences firm value (MBA). The results of the previous U.S. studies show that 
investment affects positively firm value, but not vice versa. 12 
Variable DA, which is the ratio of the debt to average assets, in Equations ( 4-1 ), 
( 4-3), ( 4-5), ( 4-6), ( 4-7), and ( 4-8) serves to capture the value enhancing or 
reducing effects of debt. Debt is generally negatively related to firm value, as 
shown in previous studies. 13 In Equations ( 4-2), ( 4-4 ), ( 4-9), ( 4-10), ( 4-11) and ( 4-
12), DA serves to reflect the possibility that creditors would provide some 
monitoring of management. Hence, a larger value of DA might be associated with 
lower levels of various indicators of ownership structure. 
LIQ is used as a control variable in every equation and is defined as cash flow 
divided by the average assets. 14 High liquidity may signal that the firm has done 
well and is likely to continue to do so and, thus, it may reflect both higher 
corporate performance. 
AA, which as average assets, is used in Equations (4-2), (4-4), (4-9), (4-10), (4-
11) and ( 4-12) to measure firm size. Larger firms require more investment from a 
share fraction is chosen in this study due to data feasibility. 
11 See Chen and Zhang (1998), Clare, Priestley and Thomas (1998), Daniel and Titman (1996), and 
Elfakhani, Lockwood, and Zaher (1998). 
12 See Morck et al (1988a), Cho (1998), Demsetz and Villalonga (2000). 
13 See Morck et al (1988a), Cho (1998), Demsetz and Villalonga (2000). 
14 See Cho (1998). 
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controlling equity holder, hence, AA is expected to have a negative coefficient in 
ownership structure equations. 
Finally, industry dummy variables MFG, IT, and FIN are also used 'in every 
equations to represent industry effects. Their specification is based on the Korean 
Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC), and these variables are referred to in 
the Demsetz and Lehn study ( 1985). Membership of the information technology 
industry (IT) is expected to affect corporate performance positively because of the 
recent change in emphasis from traditional industry to the new and more 
profitable information technology industry. Conversely, manufacturing activity 
(MFG) may have a negative effect on firm value due to the move to information 
technology. Demsetz and Villalonga (2000) found that participation in the .. 
financial industry (FIN) was negatively related to firm value and insider 
ownership in their study and this is included here to capture this effect. In this 
study, 337 firms and 57 firms are respectively included in the manufacturing 
indu~try and the information technology industry, and 43 firms are categorised in 
the finance industry. The remaining, 62 firms in other industries, such as 
construction and service industries, are not categorised. 
Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the publicly listed 499 firms drawn from the KSE 
and the KOSDAQ (hereafter PLCs and used in this analysis) are shown in Table 
4.2. The sample consists of 146 subsidiaries of the 30 largest chaebols and 353 
other PLCs. As shown in Table 4.2 and 4.3, the mean percentage of shares owned 
by insiders (INS) is more than 33 per cent. This is much higher than the level of 
around 10 per cent observed in the U.S. studies. 15 This indicates that insider 
ownership in Korea is relatively high compared with the U.S. and insiders in 
Korea seem to play a greater role in management decision-making. The mean 
value of insider ownership (INS) is 33.66 per cent, while the median value is 
31.55 per cent, suggesting that the distribution is not highly skewed. However, 
there are 18 observations that have negligible values of the fraction of insider 
15 In the study by Morck et al. , the mean value of insider ownership of 371 Fortune firms as of 1980 is 10.6%, 
11.84% for 1093 Compustat firms as of 1986 (McConnell and Servaes 1990) , 12.14% for 326 Fortune firms 
as of 1991 (Cho 1998), and 9.79% for 824 NYSE firms as of I 994 (Chen and Steiner 2000). 
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ownership. They are eliminated from the data set. The mean and median values of 
the largest three shareholders' share fraction (L3S) are respectively 38.63 per cent 
and 37 per cent. There is no evidence of skewness in the L3S distribution. 
Table 4.2 also shows that the mean MBA is 2.29, while the median MBA is 1.08. 
The distribution shows that skewness is present along with some outliers. MBA 
values also range from 0.41 to 60.53 with high variability. Of the all observations 
most observations have values less than 20, but the five observations with MBA 
greater than 20 are the exception. The five largest MBA values are for Handysoft 
with MBA=26.86; BE Technology with MBA=38.32; Eolith with MBA=50.37; E-
net with MBA=54.77; Daum Communication with MBA=60.53. 16 Barnett and 
Lewis (1978) define that an outlier is 'an observation which appears to be 
inconsistent with the remainder of that set of data'. Because outlying values are 
more likely to be errors in data than observations closer to the mean, they might 
be considered as being unrepresentative of the sample. McConnell and Servaes 
( 19qQ) and Cho ( 1998) excluded outliers over a specific value in their empirical 
studies, while Morck et al. ( 1988) do not mention outliers. 
The mean and median values of largest shareholders' share fraction (LS) and 
president direct share fraction (PDS) reflect that the distributions are not highly 
skewed. However, one prominent large value is detected in foreigners' share 
fraction (FS). This is Hankuk Electric Glass, in which foreigners hold 82.5 per 
cent. 17 The mean and median values of financial institutions' share fraction (FIS) 
show that the distribution is skewed. 
Even though the mean and median values of debt to total assets ratio (DA) suggest 
that the distribution is generally symmetric, the two large values in DA are 
identified in the distribution plot. These are Daewoo Corporation with DA=2.35 
billion won (Daewoo Corporation is a major subsidiary firm of Daewoo group 
which collapsed in 1999 and is under legal management) and Tongkook with 
16 All of these are information technology (IT) related firms such as Internet service providers and software 
program developers. This reflects the fact that the IT industry achieved the highest performance in Korea in 
1999. 
17 This company is an affiliated firm of Asahi Group of Japan . 
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DA= l.74 due to it poor performance 1n the fabric business (it 1s undergoing 
re tru turi n g). 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for the Korean PLCs 
ariable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
MBA 499 2.29 1.08 ,., 10 .) . .) 0.41 60.53 
IN (%) 4 I 33.66 31.55 17.90 0.20 100.00 
L3 (%) 499 38.63 37.00 18.24 3.80 100.00 
L (%) 499 25.04 21.30 15.49 2.00 92.90 
PDS(%) 180 23.38 21.55 14.91 0.20 79.50 
FS(%) 296 8.86 3.40 13.02 0.10 82.50 
FIS(%) 106 14.00 9.70 14.28 1.60 79.40 
TA 499 -0.07 -0.04 0.15 -0.73 0.57 
DA 499 0.57 0.55 0.24 0.08 2.35 
AA 499 1,025.71 151.43 3,083.20 1.95 40,856.00 
LIQ 499 0.04 0.01 0.16 -0.41 2.86 
ote: The sample consists of 146 subsidiary firms of the 30 largest chaebols and 353 other PLCs 
in 1999. 
The mean and median values of net investment to total assets (NINVT A) and 
liquidity (LIQ) show that the distribution is not skewed. Outliers are not observed 
in the plot for investment, however, one large value of LIQ is found. This is 
Daeyoung A & V with LIQ=2.86 due to successful trading in 1999. 
The mean and median values of average assets (AA) appear to be skewed 
throughout the observations. The four large observations in AA are also observed .. 
They are Daewoo Corporation with AA= l9,799 billion won, Sanisung 
Electronics with AA=22,743 billion won, Hana Bank with AA=25,587 billion 
won, and Cho Hung Bank with AA=40,856 billion won. 18 
Table 4.3 reports the distribution of the sample statistics, grouped by level of 
insider ownership. In 25 firms, comprising 5 per cent of the sample, insiders own 
less than 5 per cent of the firm. In 444 firms, 89 per cent of the sample, insiders 
own more than 10 per cent of the firm, and in 363 firms, 73 per cent of the 
ix These two large banks do not belong to the 30 largest chaebols even their big firm size. By the Fair Trade 
Law, the 30 largest chaebols should not be owners of Seoul-based commercial banks in Korea. 
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sample, insiders own more than 20 per cent of the firm. These numbers are much 
higher than those of the U.S. firms in the studies by Demsetz and Lehn ( 1985), 
Morck et al. ( 1988a) and Cho ( 1998). 19 These results also generally indicate that 
there is an inverse relation between level of insider ownership and average assets 
(AA). The level of insider ownership is low for large firms, and generally higher 
for small firms, which is consistent with the case of the U.S. (Cho, 1998) 
Table 4.3 Mean values of MBA and other variables for 499 Korean PLCs as 
of 1999, grouped by level of insider ownership share fractions. 
Insider Number MBA NINVTA DA AA LIQ 
ownership of firms (in billion 
level(%) won) 
Negligiblea 18 2.653 -0.127 0.769 4452.9 0.009 
0< INS<5 7 3.208 -0.117 0.748 2811.986 0.005 
5<INS<10 30 1.959 -0.056 0.638 709.205 0.012 
10<INS<15 27 1.260 -0.066 0.615 3300.852 0.011 
15<]NS<20 54 1.653 -0.038 0.576 1045.44 0.011 
' 
20<INS<25 60 2.329 -0.076 0.586 1435.117 0.009 
25<INS<30 54 3.601 -0.102 0.555 1011.897 0.047 
30<INS<35 41 4.113 -0.070 0.520 397.983 0.042 
35<INS<40 48 1.315 -0.039 0.580 650.558 0.051 
40<INS<45 49 1.953 -0.071 0.519 413.410 0.092 
45<INS<50 32 2.303 -0.102 0.532 298.098 0.092 
50<INS<55 19 2.423 -0.038 0.505 646.092 0.032 
55<INS<60 15 2.353 -0.150 0.385 377.063 0.012 
60<INS<65 l 1 2.535 -0.149 0.465 90.441 0.073 
65<INS<70 14 1.494 -0.107 0.570 431.603 0.056 
70<INS<75 10 1.524 -0.024 0.502 122.525 0.064 
75<INS 10 1.151 -0.042 0.649 165.67 0.138 
a Negligible insider ownership ratio means that the shares are too small to report in the financial 
data (NICE) so that the data do n·ot present the ratios. 
Note: The sample consists of 499 PLCs, which are combined with 146 chaebol firms and 353 
other PLCs in 1999. The figures are rounded off to three decimal points. 
19 In their studies, around 55 per cent of the sample own less than 5 per cent of the firm, around 30 per cent 
own more than 10 per cent, and 20 per cent own more than 20 per cent of the firm, suggesting the prevalence 
of significant ownership in the U.S. 
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Correlations 
The correlations among insiders' share fraction (INS), the largest three 
shareholders' share fraction (L3S), the largest shareholders' share fraction (LS), 
and president direct share fraction (PDS) are relatively higher than among any 
other variables: 0.96 between INS and L3S; 0.87 between INS and LS; 0.90 
between L3S and LS; 0.66 between LS and PDS; 0.55 between L3S and PDS; 
0.51 between INS and PDS. It is expected that many of insiders are also one of the 
three largest shareholders, the largest shareholders, and presidents. That is why 
these ownership variables are separated in the regressions as shown in the models · 
earlier. None of the remaining variables is as highly correlated. 
Diagnostic tests 
There was skewness of the variables in the presence of some outlying values, as 
just discussed. Moreover, from the initial regression results, functional form 
protilems were also detected in some of the models. To obtain symmetric 
distributions and correct the weak functional form problems, all variables are 
graphed except for industry dummy variables, and this analysis suggested the use 
of a log transformation for the variables. The logged values of these variables 
(LNMBA, LNINS, LNL3S, LNLS, LNPDS, LNFS, LNFIS, LNAA, LNDA, and 
LNNINVT A) are used in main analysis. 
While auto correlation of regression ·error terms is usually associated with time 
series analysis, Johnston (1984) suggests that spatial autocorrelation may affect 
cross sectional studies. In particular, if a large quantity of observations from firms 
in a particular industry is included, errors are likely to be related. In the presence 
of autocorrelation, R-sq' s may still be high and coefficients may remain unbiased, 
but variance is hot minimised, so the estimates are inefficient. However, Durbin 
Watson statistics indicate that the assumption of independence of the residuals 
appears valid in this case. 
The production of reliable information from regressions requires the satisfaction 
of the assumption that the variance of the error terms is a constant, or the error 
terms are homoscedastic. Where this is not the case so that heteroscedasticity is 
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present, standard errors will be biased and the co-efficient estimates will be 
inefficient. These estimates will, however, remain unbiased. In the case of 
heteroscedasticity, t-statistics and F-statistics will be unreliable. White's ( 1980) 
test examines residuals to detect heteroscedasticity. In this study, only a small 
number of regressions were found to suffer from the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. Where mis-specification is detected, White's heteroscedasticity 
consistent t-statistics are calculated and reported. 
Adjusted statistics 
The adjusted descriptive statistics for the Korean 499 PLCs are reported in Table 
4.4. The mean value of LNMBA is 0.32, while the median value is 0.07, 3.33 and 
3.44 respectively for the mean and median values of LNINS, and 3.53 and 3.62 .. 
for LNL3S. These values of the log-transformed variables not only suggest that 
their distributions are not skewed, but the mean and median values of LNFS, 
LNFIS, LNAA also suggest that the skewness in their distributions is corrected. 
4 
' 
Variables 
LNMBA 
LNINS 
LNL3S 
LNLS 
LNPDS 
LNFS 
LNFIS 
LNNINVTA 
LNDA 
LNAA 
LNLIQ 
N 
499 
481 
499 
499 
180 
296 
106 
499 
499 
499 
499 
Table 4.4 Adjusted statistics for the PL Cs 
Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
0.32 0.07 0.75 -0.89 4.10 
3.33 3.44 0.68 -1.61 4.61 
3.53 3.62 0.54 1.34 4.61 
3.03 3.06 0.65 0.69 4.53 
2.87 3.07 0.90 -1.61 4.38 
1.00 1.22 1.77 -2.30 4.41 
2.29 2.27 0.81 0.47 4.37 
-0.09 -0.04 0.19 -1.29 0.45 
-0.66 -0.60 0.42 -2.55 0.55 
5.12 5.00 1.85 0.67 10.15 
0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.52 1.35 
Note: The sample consists of 499 PLCs. The sample is a combination of 146 chaebol firms and 353 other 
PLCs in 1999. But the 481, 180, 296 and 106 samples are used respectively for LNINS, LNPDS, LNFS, and 
LNFIS. The figures are rounded off to two decimal points. 
Adjusted correlations 
Table 4.5 shows the adjusted correlation matrix of log-transformed variables. 
There is no notable difference from the first estimated correlation matrix, while 
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the correlation between LNINS and LNL3S is 0.94, although slightly lower than 
before, is still high. The correlations are 0.89, 0.91 respectively between LNINS 
and LNLS, and LNL3S and LNLS, suggesting that those three ownership 
variables are still highly correlated. The correlations between LNPDS and LNINS, 
LNLS, and LNL3S are not high and also lower than in the first estimation. 
Therefore, three ownership variables (LNINS, LNLS, and LNL3S) are still 
preferably appeared in separated equations, as discussed in an earlier section. 
None of the remaining variables is as highly correlated. 
Table 4.5 Adjusted correlation matrix of variables for the Korean PLCs 
LNMBA LNINS LNL3S LNLS LNPDS LNFS LNDA LNAA LNLIQ LNNI 
NVTA 
LNMBA 1.00 
LNINS -0.01 1.00 
LNL3S 0.05 0.94 1.00 
LNLS 0.18 0.89 0.91 1.00 
LNPDS 0.15 0.33 0.34 0.38 1.00 
LNFS, 0.01 0.12 0.22 0.15 -0.02 1.00 
LNDA -0.35 -0.08 -0.17 -0.23 -0.18 -0.05 1.00 
LNAA -0.75 -0.11 -0.17 -0.33 -0.13 0.09 0.50 1.00 
LNLIQ 0.41 0.19 0.16 0.22 -0.09 -0.14 -0.29 -0.54 1.00 
LNNINVTA -0.60 -0.13 -0.17 -0.31 -0.07 0.03 0.46 0.56 -0.40 1.00 
Note: The sample consists of 75 PLCs for which all the ratios of ownership variables are available. LNFIS is 
not included in this correlation matrix, because only 12 observations are involved for LNFIS and these are not 
enough to estimate in the correlation matrix. The figures are rounded off to two decimal points. 
Summary 
Included in this chapter was a discussion of the sample analysis, variables and 
model specification, descriptive statistics and diagnostic tests that are relevant in 
assumption of regression analysis in the following chapters. 
The variables 1n the models, which are based on empirical models used in 
previous studies, are defined and selected as particular empirical proxies for 
dependent and independent variables in the specific equations. The models consist 
of 12 equations to estimate the relationship between corporate value and 
ownership structure, including insider ownership, ownership concentration and 
other ownership composition variables. 
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The diagnostic tests require that certain assumptions regarding the distribution of 
input data, functional form, and heteroscedasticity be satisfied. The methods 
employed to overcome these problems were discussed in detail. The data and 
models are now appropriate to apply for the regression analysis in the following 
chapters. 
The following chapter presents the empirical results for hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate value of the Korean 
PLCs. As well as considering the results of this study, the relevance of these 
findings is considered in the context of existing research. 
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Empirical analysis of the relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate value of the Korean PLCs 
This chapter reports the results of the regressions and discusses the main findings 
of the analysis regarding the cross'.""sectional relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate value of Korean PLCs. The first section reports a 
piecewise ordinary least squares linear regression analysis, replicating the break · 
points method in Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a) and another the break 
points method in Cho ( 1998), and a set of alternative break points are found and 
reported in the analysis. The second section discusses the results of the insider 
ownership regression. The third section states the results of regressions between 
ownership concentration and corporate value. The fourth section examines the 
rela~onships between ownership composition variables and corporate value. The 
fifth section investigates the robustness of the results. The final section 
summarises the results found in earlier sections and provides a conclusion. 
Piecewise linear regression results 
Morck et al. (1988a) and Cho (1998) found a non-linear relation between insider 
ownership and corporate value for the U.S. Fortune 500 firms. In this section their 
research results are first reported, then their methods are replicated to explore the 
relation between two variables on the model shown in Equation (5-3) for the 
Korean PLCs. Morck et al.' s piecewise linear regression results including break 
points are reported in Equation (5-1 ). As noted in the previous chapter, Morck et 
al. found that firm performance rises as insider ownership increases from 0 per 
cent to 5 per cent, falls as insider ownership rises further to 25 per cent, and then 
continues to rise, although much more slowly, as ownership rises beyond 25 per 
cent. Although not statistically significant above 25 per cent, the results in 
Equation (5.1) suggest a significant non-monotonous relation between the level of 
insider ownership and firm performance. 
Q = Control variables+ 5.11 INS 1 - 1.49 INS2 + 0.773 INS3 
(2.39) 
R-sq = 0.602, N= 325 
INS 1 =ownership< 5%, 
INS2 = 5% <ownership< 25%, 
INS3 =ownership> 25% 
(0.668) 
Q = Tobin's Q, a proxy for firm performance 
(0.422) 
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(5-1) 
In the meantime, Cho (1998) also found a significant non-linear relation between 
insider ownership and corporate value, consistent with Morck et al. (1988a). Cho 
found that the non-monotonous relationship between insider ownership and 
corporate value had break points of 7 per cent and 38 per cent according to the 
grid search technique. 1 The piecewise regression provides the results shown in 
Equation (5-2). 
Q = 1.1101 + 7.766 INS 1 - 1.949 INS2 + 0.959 INS3 
(9 .68) (2.65) (-2.18) (0.94) 
Adj. R-sq = 0.014, N= 326 
INS 1 = ownership < 7%, 
INS2 = 7% <ownership< 38%, 
INS3 =ownership> 38% 
Q = Tobin 's Q, a proxy for firm performance 
(5-2) 
As described in Equation (5-2), t-statistics are shown in parentheses below 
coefficients. The relation between insider ownership and Tobin's Q is 
significantly positive for ownership levels below 7 per cent, significantly negative 
for levels between 7 per cent and 38 per cent, and positive, but insignificant, for 
levels above 38 per cent. 
1 To find two break points, starting with O %, firstly find the insider ownership level that produces the most 
significant slope coefficient on the first insider ownership variable. Then search for the second level that 
yields the most significant slope coefficients on the second and the third variables in the regression . Finally 
find the two levels that provide the most significant slope coefficients on the three insider ownership 
variables simultaneously. 
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Table 5.1 Piecewise linear ordinary least squares regressions. 
LNMBA LNMBA LNMBA LNMBA 
INSl -0.1655 -0.0941 -11.2275 -5.7413 
(-1.3907) (-1.6111) (-1.7079)* (-1.4884) 
INS2 0.0081 0.0034 0.5034 0.3379 
(1.1019) (0.6274) (1.2515) (1.2358) 
INS3 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.2068 -0.3220 
(-0.3177) (-0.5052) (-0.5346) (-1.1667) 
MFG -0.1251 -0.1300 
(-1.8037)* (-1.8754)* 
IT 0.7379 0.7367 
(5.6313)*** (5 .6294 )*** 
FIN 
LNDA 
LNLIQ 
LNNINVTA 
0.0699 
(0.9374) 
-0.1779 
(-2.0009)** 
1.0573 
(3.0769)*** 
-1.4328 
0.0702 
(0.9422) 
-0.1746 
(-1.9751)** 
1.0434 
(3.0673)*** 
-1.4378 
(-5.7353)*** (-5.7754)*** 
Constant 1.0127 0.4492 0.9964 0.3740 
(1.7877)* (1.6154) (2.2826)** (1.4162) 
Adj. R-sq 0.0011 0.3846 0.0010 0.3860 
Note: The regressions of firm value on insider ownership share fraction with the break points of 
Morck et al.(l 988a) and Cho(l 998), control variables, and industrial variables for the Korean 
PLCs. Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample in this table includes the 481 PLCs that 
randdmly selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics are 
(in parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's correction. The second and the 
third columns are the results replicating Morck et al. The fourth and the fifth columns are the 
results replicating Cho. 
INS 1 = insider ownership if insider ownership< 5% in the second and third columns, 
or< 7 % in the fourth and fifth columns 
= 5% if insider ownership z 5% in the second and third columns, 
or 7 % if insider ownership z 7% in the fourth and fifth columns; 
INS2 = 0 if insider ownership< 5% in the second and third columns, 
or< 7 % in the fourth and fifth columns 
= insider ownership - 5% if 5% ::; insider ownership< 25 % in the second and third columns, 
or insider ownership - 7% if 7%::; insider ownership < 38 % in the fourth and fifth 
columns; 
= 20% if insider ownership z 25 % in the second and third columns, 
or 31 % if insider ownership z 38 % in the fourth and fifth columns; 
INS3 = 0 if insider ownership< 25 % in the second and third columns, 
or O if insider ownership< 38 % in the fourth and fifth columns, 
= insider ownership - 25 % if insider ownership~ 25 % in the second and third columns, 
or insider ownership- 38 % if insider ownership~ 38% in the fourth and fifth columns. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
Following Morck et al. ( 1988) and Cho ( 1998), the piecewise linear regression of 
corporate value on insider ownership are replicated as shown in Equation (5-3) for 
the Korean PLCs, which is adjusted from Equation (4-1 ).2 
2 For the model specification and di agnostic tests, see chapter 4. 
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LNMBA = f (INSl, INS2, INS3, LNNINVTA, LNDA, LNLIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
(5-3) 
Table 5 .1 presents the results of the piecewise regressions of corporate value on 
insider ownership and other control variables. The figures in the second and third 
columns are replicated Morck et al. ( 1988a) and the figures in the fourth and fifth 
columns are replicated Cho ( 1998). The results generally suggest that all of the 
three-ownership levels are not only insignificant, but also the signs of the 
coefficients differ from those reported in Morck et al. and Cho. Moreover, the 
results of piecewise linear OLS regressions with the control variables in the third 
column and the fifth column are also insignificant. These results suggest that the 
models of Morck et al. (1988a) and Cho (1998) do not apply to the Korean PLCs. 
To find other break points for the Korean data set, the levels of insider ownership 
are grouped over a range of 5 percentage points into 16 categories, then graphed 
agaihst the levels of corporate value as shown in Figure 5 .1. The lowest and 
highest turning points at which the change in slope is significant are selected. 
Those points are 15 per cent for the lowest turning point as a first break point and 
35 per cent for the highest turning point as a second break point. The 40 per cent 
can be one of the lowest points as a third break point, but the trends are not 
remarkable above 40 per cent, so that 40 per cent is not suitable for one of the 
notable break points. Therefore, 15 per cent and 35 per cent are selected as the 
two natural break points. Consequently, the results of the piecewise regression 
using these three break points are reported in Table 5 .2 to examine whether the 
use of alternative break points rather than those proposed previously for the U.S. 
firms is effective for the Korean PLCs. The figures in the second column are from 
the regression including only three insider ownership variables. The third column 
includes results from the regression including the control variables and industry 
dummy variables as shown in Equation (5-3). 
The regressions reported in Table 5.2 strongly suggest that there is a significant 
non-monotonous relation between the level of insider ownership and corporate 
value, which is consistent with Morck et al. ( 1988a) and Cho ( 1998). The level of 
corporate value declines as insider ownership increases up to 15 per cent. It rises 
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as insider ownership increases up to 35 per cent and then declines again after 35 
per cent. The relation between insider ownership and corporate value is significant 
ownership level between O per cent and 35 per cent, but is insignificant for levels 
above 35 per cent. These results are impressive compared to the case of ·the U.S. 
In the studies of Morck et al.( 1988a) and Cho ( 1998), levels of 5 per cent and 7 
per cent of insider ownerships respectively would be optimal for firm value. 3 In 
the case of Korean PLCs, however, around 35 per cent of insider ownership 
would be considered to adjust for their higher corporate value. 4 
Figure 5.1 Insider ownership (INS) and corporate value (MBA) for the Korean 
PLCs. 
MBA and Insider ownership for the PLCs 
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Insider ownership level 
The results in this analysis are also broadly consistent with Stulz ( 1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) who predicted that firm value would first increase, 
then decrease, as insider ownership increases. At insider ownership levels below 
15 per cent and above 35 per cent, the results are consistent with the arguments of 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), Slavin and Sushka (1993), and Boyle, Carter and 
Stover (1998) who support entrenchment theory. The results here are also 
consistent with Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and 
Lewellen, Laderer and Rosenfeld ( 1985) at insider ownership level between 15 
per cent and 35 per cent. 
3 In their studies, both the results are positive, but insignificant in the levels above 25 per cent and 38 per 
cent. 
Table 5.2 Piecewise linear ordinary least squares regressions. 
INSl 
INS2 
INS3 
MFG 
IT 
FIN 
LNDA 
LNLIQ 
LNNINVTA 
LNMBA 
-2.3599 
(-1.3608) 
1.0499 
(1.7505)* 
-0.3256 
(-0.8903) 
LNMBA 
-2.2633 
(-1.8312)* 
0.9491 
(2.1880)** 
-0.4353 
(-1.5812) 
-0.1383 
(-2.0025)** 
0.7373 
(5 .7509)*** 
0.0716 
(0.9515) 
-0.1774 
(-2.0055)** 
1.0256 
(3.0321)*** 
-1.4399 
( -5 . 8 144) * * * 
Constant 0.5390 0.2651 
(2.4544 )** ( 1.6252) 
Adj. R-sq 0.0007 0.3895 
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Note: The regressions of firm value on inside ownership share fraction with the alternative break 
points, control variables, and industrial variables for the Korean PLCs.Variable definitions are in 
Table 4.1. The sample in this table includes the 481 PLCs that randomly selected from the 1,116 
firms1 listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics are (in parentheses) are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using White 's correction. The second column shows the figures with the 
ownership variables only. The third column includes the ownership variables and control variables 
and industrial dummy variables. 
INS 1 = insider ownership if insider ownership< 15%, 
= 15% if insider ownership 2 15%; 
INS2 = 0 if insider ownership < 15%, 
= insider ownership - 15% if 15% :s; insider ownership< 35%, 
= 20% if insider ownership 2 35%; 
INS3 = 0 if insider ownership< 35%, 
= insider ownership - 35% if insider ownership 2 35%. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
For the international companson, Chen and Ho (2000) suggested that, 1n 
Singapore, insiders (managers) who have more shares have more incentive to 
perform effective diversification than those who have fewer shares of their firms 
because the private benefits may outweigh the value loss from diversification. 
They also suggested the implications to the Singaporean corporate sector that 
Singaporean managers should be given higher stakes in their firms and 
Singaporean firms should issue more shares to their managers, because outside 
blockholders do not effectively mitigate the agency problems in firms with low 
4 The current average insider ownership in the Korean large business groups is around 50 per cent (KFfC). 
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insider ownership. Farrer and Ramsay (1998) empirically examined whether there 
is a positive relation between the level of director share ownership and the 
performance of Australian firms. They suggested that there is a ·· positive 
correlation between director share ownership and returns to shareholders·, so that 
the Australian listed firms should encourage their directors to increase their 
personal shareholdings. 
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1997) found that, however, in the 
transition economies like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, outsider-
owned firms perform better than insider-owned firm in terms of privatisation in 
the countries undergoing postcommunist transition. Hence, there may have unique 
economic environmental factors that determine the appropriate level of insider 
ownership in an individual economy rather having a certain level of insider 
ownership for all economies. 
The t remaining findings 1n Table 5 .2 are discussed here. The manufacturing 
industry variable MFG 1s insignificantly negative, but the IT coefficient is 
statistically significant and positively related to firm value. These results are 
consistent with a situation in which the IT industry in Korea in 1999 was 
becoming more profitable and was replacing the less profitable manufacturing 
industry. The FIN parameter estimate is not statistically significantly different 
from zero. LNDA is negatively related with firm value and LNLIQ is positively 
related with firm value, which are consistent with Morck et al. ( 1988a) and Cho 
(1998). There is a negative relation between the investment variable LNNINVTA 
and firm value. Perhaps this reflects the financial instability around 1999. In fact, 
most firms in Korea were affected by the 1997 crisis and their level of investment 
shrank. 
Insider ownership regression 
While the results found above in this study and other consistent studies suggest 
insider ownership affects non-monotonously corporate value, Demsetz and Lehn 
( 1985), Murphy ( 1985), Kole ( 1994 ), Cho (1998) argue that insider ownership 
structure is endogenously determined and provide evidence of a reversal of 
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causality in the ownership-corporate value relation, suggesting that corporate 
value could be a determinant of the insider ownership structure rather than being 
determined by insider ownership. Particularly Murphy ( 1985), Kole ( 1994) and 
Cho ( 1998) found that corporate value positively affects insider ownership, 
suggesting that insider ownership can represent an endogenous outcome of the 
compensation contracting process. Taken together, this possibility leads to the 
hypothesis that insider ownership and corporate value might be interdependent. 
That is, insider ownership affects corporate value, and corporate value, again, 
affects insider ownership and so forth. 
To find out whether insider ownership is endogenously determined, an insider 
ownership equation is provided in Equation (5-4). 
LNINS = f (LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNAA, LNDA, LNLIQ) (5-4) 
In Table 5.3, the insider ownership regression results are first reported in the 
second column including only corporate value variable. The log-transformed 
market to book ratio of assets (LNMBA) is not statistically significant in the 
regression, although the sign of the coefficient for LNMBA is positive. Next, the 
insider ownership equation including control variables as shown in Equation (5-4) 
is reported in the third column. The results also show that corporate value is not a 
determinant of insider ownership despite the positive sign of its coefficient. 
Therefore, these findings here suggest that there is no reverse effect from 
corporate value to insider ownership for the Korean PLCs. 
According to other findings with control variables reported in the third column, 
insiders hold fewer shares· of equity in larger firms, which is consistent with 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) (see LNAA parameter). Log-transformed liquidity 
(LNLIQ) is positively related with insider ownership, suggesting that firms with 
higher liquidity have higher insider ownership. The log-transformed debt to assets 
ratio (LNDA) is negative to insider ownership, supporting the notion that higher 
debt levels lead insiders to hold fewer shares if creditors are important to the 
monitoring of management behaviour. This is consistent with Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001). Finally, insiders' shares are lower in the information 
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technology industry, than for the other industries, while they are higher in the 
finance industry. 
In conclusion, ignoring the endogeneity issue, the insider ownership regressions 
suggest that corporate value does not affect insider ownership. 5 Taken together, 
this finding and the results from the corporate value regression suggest that insider 
ownership affects corporate value, but not vice versa, which is generally 
consistent with Morck et al ( 1988a), Stulz ( 1988) and McConnell and Servaes 
(1990). 
Table 5.3 Two-stage least square regressions of insider ownership structure 
on corporate value variable, control variables, and industrial variables. 
LNMBA 
MFG 
IT ~ 
FIN 
LNDA 
LNLIQ 
LNAA 
Constant 
Adj. R-sq. 
LNINS 
0.0050 
(0.1210) 
3.3309 
(99.5633)*** 
-0.0021 
LNINS 
0.0179 
(0.2167) 
0.0370 
(0.4943) 
-0.2939 
(-2.4559)** 
0.2294 
(2.1168)** 
-0.1989 
(-1.9220)* 
0.5194 
(1.9004)* 
-0.0897 
( -4 .4 7 51) * * * 
3.6024 
(17.9159)*** 
0.1082 
Note: Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample in this table consists of 499 PLCs. The 
sample is a combination of 146 chaebol firms and 353 other PLCs. The chaebol firms are 
subsidiaries of the 30 largest chaebols, and the other PLCs are randomly selected from the 1,116 
firms listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using White's correction. The second column shows the figures with the 
ownership variable only. The third column includes the ownership variable and control variables 
and industrial dummy variables. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level · 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
Ownership concentration and corporate value 
Demsetz and Lehn ( 1985) find that there is no significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and accounting profit rates as a proxy for firm 
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performance for the U.S. firms in their study, which brings into question the 
theory of Berle and Means ( 1932). There are, however, many studies that find 
contradictory results about the relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance. Wruck (1989) found that the change in firm value at the 
announcement of a private sale is positively associated with the change in 
ownership concentration. Xu and Wang ( 1997) also found empirical evidence for 
the positive effects of ownership concentration on firm's performance for Chinese 
stock companies. Claessens ( 1996), and Claessens, Djankov and Pohl ( 1996) also 
suggested that more concentrated ownership is associated with higher valuation 
and profitability for the Czech and Slovak Republics, while Renneboog (2000) 
found that the ownership of most Belgian companies are highly concentrated on 
the controlling shareholders like holding companies with 43 per cent of shares, on 
average, in the listed firms, and there is little relation between ownership 
concentration and disciplinary function of the take-over market. On the contrary, 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) suggest that there is a negative relation between 
ownership concentration and firm value. 
To examine these issues, Equations (5-5) and (5-6), which are adjusted from 
Equation (4-3) and (4-4), are estimated. The regression results are reported in 
Table 5.4. 
LNMBA=f(LNL3S, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNNINVTA) (5-5) 
LNL3S = f (LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNAA) (5-6) 
The regression results in the second column indicate that ownership concentration 
is not a determinant of corporate value in Korean PLCs. This result is consistent 
with Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Investment shows a negative relationship to firm 
value, the same result as in Table 5.2. IT and MFG are respectively positively and 
negatively related to firm value, which is also the same result as in Table 5.2. 
5 The endogeneity issue is that ownership structure of firm is determined endogenously, as noted by Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985), Murphy (1985), Kole (1994) and Cho (1998). 
Table 5.4 Adjusted two-stage least squares regressions between corporate 
value and ownership concentration variable with control variables and 
industrial variables 
LNMBA LNL3S 
LNMBA 
-0.1208 
(-1.5016) 
LNL3S 0.9069 
(1.2408) 
MFG -0.2040 0.0312 
(-2.6077)*** (0.5002) 
IT 0.8736 
-0.1187 
(5.0626)*** (-1.1426) 
FIN -0.1331 0.3175 
(-0.7696) (3.9043)*** 
LNDA -0.0753 -0.0680 
(-0.7598) (-1.0030) 
LNLIQ 0.6208 0.5084 
(1.3229) (2.2776)** 
LNNINVTA -1.3756 
(-5.7496)*** 
LNAA -0.0763 
(-5.0824)*** 
Constant -3.1352 4.0073 
(-1.2127) (25.5205)*** 
Adj. R-sq. 0.3965 0.0900 
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Note: Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample in this table consists of 499 PLCs. The 
samp1e is a combination of 146 chaebol firms and 353 other PLCs. The chaebol firms are 
subsidiaries of the 30 largest chaebols, and the other PLCs are randomly selected from the 1,116 
firms listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using White's correction. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
In the third column, the results show that there is no reverse effect of firm value 
on ownership concentration. Log-transformed average assets (LNAA) is 
negatively related to ownership concentration, suggesting that ownership is not 
concentrated in larger firms. The log-transformed liquidity (LNLIQ) is positively 
related with ownership concentration, suggesting that firms with higher liquidity 
may lead to higher ownership concentration. Finally, ownership concentration is 
significantly higher in the finance industry, while insignificant in the information 
technology industry and manufacturing industry. 
Ownership composition and corporate value 
To go one step further in this section, the regression results on the relationship 
between ownership composition and corporate value are discussed. The 
relationships between ownership composition variables and corporate value are 
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explored using corporate value Equations (5-7), (5-8), (5-9), and (5-10), and 
ownership composition Equations (5-11 ), (5-12), (5-13) and (5-14 ). Equation (5-
7) has the log-transformed largest shareholder's share fraction (LNLS) as one of 
the independent variables with the control variables and the industrial- dummy 
variables, and also has the log-transformed market-to-book ratio of assets 
(LNMBA) as a dependent variable. The log-transformed president direct share 
fraction (LNPDS), the log-transformed foreigners' share fraction (LNFS), and the 
log-transformed financial institutions' share fraction (LNFIS) as explanatory 
variables are estimated respectively in Equations (5-8), (5-9), and (5-10) with the 
control variables and the industry variables. 
LNMBA=f(LNLS, MFG, IT, FIN, LNLIQ, LNNINVTA, LNDA) 
LNMBA=f(LNPDS, MFG, IT, FIN, LNLIQ, LNNINVTA, LNDA) 
LNMBA=f(LNFS, MFG, IT, FIN, LNLIQ, LNNINVTA, LNDA) 
LNMBA=f(LNFIS, MFG, IT, FIN, LNLIQ, LNNINVTA, LNDA) 
(5-7) 
(5-8) 
(5-9) 
(5-10) 
The regression results are presented in Table 5.5. The results reported in the 
second and third columns indicate that the largest shareholders' share fraction 
(LNLS) and president direct share (LNPDS) are positively related to corporate 
value. These results suggest that the largest shareholders and top management 
who have a smaller share could be irresponsible in management, and 
consequently, the value of firm would decrease, which is consistent with Berle 
and Means (1932). 
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 5 .5 provide the regression estimates of 
Equations (5-9) and (5-1 OY, The results show that the level of shares of financial 
institutions is positively related to corporate value, suggesting that monitoring by 
financial institutions having shares would protect management entrenchment. This 
result is different from evidence from Kutsuna, Okamura, and Cowling (2002) 
who analysed the relation between performance and ownership structure for 
Japanese companies. They found that the banks' shareholdings are statistically 
insignificantly related to firm performance of Japanese companies. Another 
101 
interesting result here is that foreigners' share has a negative relation to firm 
value. 6 The largest shareholders' share is highly correlated with insiders' share as 
shown in Table 4.5, suggesting that the shares controlled by insiders and 
management positively affect corporate value, while the shares controlled by 
outsiders of firm such as foreigners' share have a negative effect on firm value. 
Table 5.5 Adjusted two-stage least square regressions of corporate value on 
ownership composition variables, control variables, and industrial variables. 
LNMBA LNMBA LNMBA LNMBA 
LNLS 1.6675 
(11.0102)*** 
LNPDS 1.8781 
(6.6825)*** 
LNFS -0.4380 
(-7.4698)*** 
LNFIS 2.4607 
(5.7461)*** 
MFG -0.3000 -0.1170 -0.1281 -0.2441 
(-4.8173)*** (-0.9400) (-1.6428) (-2.1545)** 
IT 1.0368 1.3267 0.6599 1.2338 
4 (8.9487)*** (7.1133)*** (5.0894)*** (5.8802)*** 
' 
FIN -0.4579 -2.0587 0.2824 -1.5753 
(-5.0621)*** (-8.4943)*** (2.8575)*** (-5.3634 )*** 
LNLIQ -0.4698 -0.7989 2.0798 1.9435 
(-1.1998) (-1.5921) (1.3077) (10.2607)*** 
LNNINVTA -1.2807 -1.8236 -1.9415 -0.1274 
(-6.6897)*** (-7.1620)*** (-7 .3408)*** (-0.3545) 
LNDA 0.1812 0.4736 -0.1128 -0. 1043 
(2.3296)** (2.6482)*** (-1.1256) (-0.6935) 
Constant -4.5826 -4.6464 0.3879 -5.0781 
(-10.7400)*** (-6.4277)*** ( 4.2103)*** (-5.7495)*** 
Adj. R-sq 0.5245 0.5812 0.5529 0.6756 
Note: Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample in this table consists of 499 PLCs. The 
sample of the second column regressions consists of 499 PLCs, the sample of the third column 
regressions consists of 180 PLCs, and the sample of the fourth column regressions consists of 296 
PLCs. The sample of the last column regressions consists of 106 PLCs. The PLCs are randomly 
selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's correction. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
To find out whether the reverse effects of corporate value on ownership 
composition variables, the adjusted equations are the following. 
6 There is a unverified assumption in the Korean stock market that foreigners are market leaders, 
so as foreigners get more shares of the firms, whose share prices go up. Despite the regressions 
here used MBA as a firm performance proxy. MBA is not quite same as share prices. 
LNLS=f(LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNAA) 
LNPDS=f(LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNAA) 
LNFS=f(LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNAA) 
LNFIS=f(LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNAA) 
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(5-11) 
(5-12) 
(5-13) 
(5-14) 
The regressions reported in the second and third columns of Table 5.6 show that 
there are no significant effects of corporate value on the largest shareholders' 
share and president direct share. These suggest that there are no reverse effects 
between corporate value, and these aspects of shareholder composition. Another · 
significant result is the negative effect of average assets on the largest 
shareholders' share and president direct share, suggesting that the largest 
shareholders and top management hold a smaller proportion of the ownership in 
larger firms. 
~ Table 5.6 Adjusted two-stage least square regressions of ownership 
composition on corporate value variable, control variables, and industrial 
variables 
LNLS LNPDS LNFS LNFIS 
LNMBA -0.0147 -0.3861 0.9258 0.3460 
(-0.1151) (-1.2202) (2.1594)** (0.5384) 
MFG 0.0443 -0.0440 0.5380 0.0929 
(0.5577) (-0.2341) (2.0823)** (0.4693) 
IT -0.1855 0.1405 -0.4585 -0.4480 
(-1.2394) (0.3512) (-0.9607) (-0.6803) 
FIN 0.3604 0.3272 0.2850 0.6430 
(3.2120)*** (0.3382) (0.7598) (2.8096)*** 
LNDA -0.0576 -0.2468 -0.7934 0.0424 
(-0.7704) (-1.4629) (-3.2750)*** (0.1926) 
LNLIQ 0.3479 0.1489 4.4515 -0.7249 
(1.5132) (0.3085) (1.2029) (-0.7547) 
LNAA -0.1061 -0.2869 0.6064 -0.0090 
(-3.6014 )*** (-2.3036)** (5 .6627)*** (-0.0811) 
Constant 3.4871 4.0339 -3.7800 2.1271 
(16.4992)*** (5 .9148)*** (-4.4494 )*** (2.6139)*** 
Adj. R-sq. 0.1060 0.0446 0.1138 0.0520 
Note: Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample in this table consists of 499 PLCs. The 
sample is a combination of 146 chaebol firms and 353 other PLCs. The sample of the second 
column regressions consists of 499 PLCs, the sample of the third column regressions consists of 
180 PLCs, the sample of the fourth column regressions consists of 296 PLCs and the sample of the 
last column regressions consists of 106 PLCs. The chaebol firms are subsidiaries of the 30 largest 
chaebols, and the other PLCs are randomly selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE and 
KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's 
correction. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
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The fourth column reports the foreigners' share regression results. An interesting 
result is that foreigners hold more shares when firms perform well, which is 
different from the results of the two ownership composition variables, LNLS and 
LNPDS, as discussed just before. Foreigners also hold more shares of larger 
manufacturing companies rather than smaller finance and information technology 
companies. 
The last column indicate that there is no reversal effect of corporate value on 
financial institutions' share, suggesting that the share of financial institutions are 
not determined by firm performance, but by exogenous determinants. 
Robustness of the results 
Variations on the models are also examined although not reported here. To 
provide some variety by analysis, other firm value variables such as return of 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), economic value added (EV A) and 
< 
economic value added to average assets (EV AA) are used as the measures of firm 
value, in place of market to book ratio of assets (LNMBA). The results from those 
variations are generally consistent with the main findings discussed earlier in this 
chapter, or insignificant, suggesting that the variations on corporate value 
measures do not provide significantly different results. 
Next, more and more studies prefer to use the two stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression and three stage least squares regression (3SLS) rather than ordinary 
least squares regression (OLS).7 Because 2SLS and 3SLS regressions provide 
qualitatively similar results, the results from the 2SLS regressions are reported 
here (Griffiths, Hill, and Judge, 1993). The ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, however, are also estimated, although not reported here in this thesis. · 
The OLS results are generally consistent with the central findings presented in the 
previous sections. Results obtained, therefore, give no reason to alter the 
conclusions found about the relation between ownership structure and corporate 
value. 
7 See Demsetz and Villalonga (2000), Cho (1998), and Boyle, Carter, and Stover (1998) 
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Finally, Chow-tests were estimated and results show that there might be a 
difference between the regression results of chaebol firms and other PLCs, so that 
the next chapter discusses the comparative analysis between two-sample groups. 
Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, the relationships between corporate performance and ownership 
structure were analysed for the Korean PLCs. The dimensions of ownership 
structure examined here were the extent of insider ownership, the degree of 
ownership concentration, and the features of the composition of ownership. It has 
been suggested that there is a significant non-monotonous relation between the 
level of insider ownership and corporate value. Ignoring the endogeneity issue, 
the results here show that insider ownership affects corporate value, but not vice 
versa, which is generally consistent with Morck et al ( 1988a), Stulz ( 1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
The level of corporate value declines as insider ownership increases up to 15 per 
cent. It rises as insider ownership increases up to 35 per cent and then declines 
again after 35 per cent. The relation between insider ownership and corporate 
value is significant ownership level between O per cent and 35 per cent, but is 
insignificant for levels above 35 per cent. In the case of Korean PLCs, insider 
ownership of around 35 per cent might be recommended to add to corporate 
value, so that the current shares of insider ownership of around 50 per cent should 
be diminished. 
In the results of insider ownership regression, corporate value is not statistically 
significant. These results suggest that firm value does not affect significantly 
insider ownership. Therefore, the findings also suggest that there is no reverse 
effect from corporate value to insider ownership for the Korean PLCs. 
Ownership concentration is not a determinant of corporate value, suggesting that 
the level of ownership concentration do not affect significantly firm value for the 
Korean PLCs, which is consistent with Demsetz and Lehn ( 1985). No reversal 
effect of firm value on ownership concentration was found. 
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On the question of the relationship between ownership composition and corporate 
value, president direct share and the largest shareholders' share positively affects 
corporate value, while foreigners' share has a negative relationship with firm 
value. Top managers having a smaller share could lead to irresponsible 
management and, consequently, cause the value of the firm to decrease. This 
result supports the view of Berle and Means (1932). The largest shareholders' 
share is highly correlated with insiders' share, suggesting that the shares held by 
insiders and management positively affect corporate value, while shares held by 
outsiders of firm such as foreigners' share are negative on firm value. On the 
other hand, there are no reciprocal effects between corporate value and the largest 
shareholders' share, president direct share and financial institutions' share. 
Foreigners hold more shares of firms that perform well, and hold shares of larger 
manufacturing companies rather than smaller finance and information technology 
compan1es. 
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6 
Comparative analysis of the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate value for the Korean 
chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms 
This chapter elucidates the similarities and differences of the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate value between the Korean chaebol firms and . 
' ' 
non-chaebol firms. The Chow-test results show that there is a statistical difference 
between the regression results of the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms, so 
,. 
that in this chapter the results for the two groups are compared. It presents the 
results of the regressions and discusses the main findings of the models 
established in the last chapter. The first section presents comparatively the 
piecewise ordinary least squares regression results for the both chaebol firms and 
the non-chaebol firms with the alternative break points method used in the last 
chapter. The second section discusses the regression results on the significance of 
the reversal effects of insider ownership on corporate value for the both chaebol 
firms and the non-chaebol firms. The regression results which test the relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate value for the both sample groups 
are presented in the third section. The fourth section examines the relationships 
between ownership composition variables and corporate value for the both 
groups. The robustness of the results is investigated in the fifth section. The final 
section summarises the results found in the earlier sections and provides a 
conclusion. 
Piecewise linear regression results 
Morck et al. (1988a) and Cho (1998) found a non-linear relation between insider 
ownership and corporate value for the U.S. Fortune 500 firms as discussed in the 
last chapter. In this section, their methods are replicated to explore the relation 
between two variables for the both chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms. Morck 
et al.' s piecewise linear regression results with the break points are reported in the 
previous chapter. Morck et al. found that firm performance rises as ownership 
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increases from O per cent to 5 per cent, falls as ownership rises further to 25 per 
cent, and then continues to rise, although much more slowly, as ownership rises 
beyond 25 per cent. Although not statistically significant above 25 per cent, their 
results suggest a significant non-monotonous relation between the level of insider 
ownership and firm performance. 1 
Cho ( 1998) also found a significant non-linear relation between insider ownership 
and corporate value, consistent with Morck et al. ( 1988). This non-monotonous 
relation between insider ownership and corporate value, however, proposed other 
break points of 7 per cent and 38 per cent using the grid search technique. 2 The 
piecewise regression results provide that the relation between insider ownership 
and Tobin's Q is significantly positive for ownership levels below 7 per cent, 
significantly negative for levels between 7 per cent and 38 per cent, and positive, 
but insignificant, for levels above 38 per cent.3 
Following Morck et al. (1988a) and Cho (1998), the piecewise linear regression of 
corporate value on insider ownership are replicated as shown in Equation ( 6-1) for 
the both chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms. 4 
LNMBA =f (INSl, INS2, INS3, LNNINVTA, LNDA, LNLIQ, MFG, IT, FIN) 
(6-1) 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the piecewise regressions of corporate value on 
insider ownership and other control variables, which replicate Morck et al 
(1988a). The figures for the chaebol firms are shown in the second and third 
columns, and the figures for the non-chaebol firms are shown in the fourth and 
fifth columns. The results suggest that all of the three-ownership levels are 
generally not significant. Only the ownership level below 5 per cent for the non-
1 See Equation (5-1) in chapter 5. 
2 To find two break points, starting with O %, firstly seeking the insider ownership level that produces the 
most significant slope coefficient on the first insider ownership variable. Then search for the second level that 
yields the most significant slope coefficients on the second and the third variables in the regression. Finally 
seeking the two levels that provide the most significant slope coefficients on the three insider ownership 
variables simultaneously. 
3 See Equation (5-2) in chapter 5. 
4 For the model specification and diagnostic tests , see chapter 4. 
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chaebol firms is significant, the sign of coefficient is reversed from that of Morck 
et al.. 
Table 6.1 Comparative analysis of the piecewise linear ordinary least squares 
. 
regressions. 
Chaebol firms Non-chaebol firms 
INSl 
INS2 
INS3 
MFG 
IT 
FIN 
LNDA 
LNLIQ 
LNNINVTA 
0.0316 
(0.3074) 
-0.0088 
(-1.3324) 
0.0004 
(0.1323) 
LNMBA 
0.0161 
(0.3044) 
-0.0050 
(-0.9243) 
-0.0009 
(-0.2952) 
-0.1793 
(-3.1688)*** 
0.4640 
(3.8335)*** 
0.1628 
(1.8817)* 
-0.1534 
(-1.7320)* 
-1.2226 
(-2.2214)** 
-1.1075 
-0.2743 
(-1.6560)* 
0.0133 
(1.3119) 
-0.0035 
(-1.0389) 
LNMBA 
-0.1703 
(-2.8026)*** 
0.0076 
(0.9893) 
-0.0020 
(-0.7767) 
-0.1350 
(-1.1832) 
0.8621 
(4.8008)*** 
-0.0573 
(-0.4871) 
-0.1113 
(-1.0082) 
0.9489 
(2.6607)*** 
-1.4257 
(-4.7464)*** (-4.7717)*** 
Constant 0.0393 -0.0317 1.6020 0.8923 
(0.0816) (-0.1474) (2.0088)** (3.1270)*** 
Adj. R-sq. -0.0060 0.4268 0.0026 0.3846 
Note: The regressions of corporate value on inside ownership share fraction with the break points 
of Morck et al. (1988a), control variables, and industrial variables. Variable definitions are in 
Table 4.1. The sample is a combination of 146 chaebol firms and 353 non-chaebol firms randomly 
selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's correction. 
INS 1 = insider ownership if insider ownership < 5%, 
= 5% if insider ownership~ 5%; 
INS2 = 0 if insider ownership< 5%, 
= insider ownership - 5% if 5% ~ insider ownership< 25%, 
= 20% if insider ownership~ 25%; 
INS3 = 0 if insider ownership< 25%, 
= insider ownership - 25% if insider ownership ~ 25%. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
Replicating Cho (1998), the piecewise linear ordinary least squares regression 
results for the both chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms are also reported in 
Table 6.2. The regressions including only insider ownership variables are shown 
in the second and fourth column. Both the results for the chaebol firms in the 
second and third columns are similar, but they are insignificant and different from 
the results of Cho ( 1998). Both the results for the non-chaebol firms in the fourth 
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and fifth columns are generally insignificant, which is also different from the 
results of Cho ( 1998). Therefore, neither the break points of Morck et al.( 1988a) 
nor those of Cho (1998) apply to the Korean data set. 
Table 6.2 Comparative analysis of the piecewise linear ordinary least squares 
INSl 
INS2 
INS3 
MFG 
IT 
FIN 
LNDA 
LNLIQ 
LNNINVTA 
Constant 
Adj. R-sq 
. 
regressions. 
Chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNMBA 
-2.0672 -1.8851 
(-0.4043) (-0.6870) 
-0.5632 -0.0792 
(-1.3980) (-0.2555) 
0.4245 -0.3402 
(0.7808) (-0.6375) 
0.2936 
(0.8805) 
-0.0006 
-0.1879 
(-3.3065)*** 
0.4653 
(3.9014)*** 
0.1658 
(1.8800)* 
-0.1615 
(-1.8102)* 
-1.2839 
(-2.3553)** 
-1.1030 
(-4.7630)*** 
0.1188 
(0.6876) 
0.4263 
Non-chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNMBA 
-18.1431 -10.3789 
(-1.8371)* (-2.4756)** 
0.5395 0.4456 
(1.0058) (1.2251) 
-0.4258 -0.3571 
(-0.9177) (-1.1799) 
1.5821 
(2.3902)** 
0.0029 
-0.1453 
(-1.2730) 
0.8543 
( 4.7678)*** 
-0.0697 
(-0.5941) 
-0.1108 
(-1.0065) 
0.9331 
(2.6448)*** 
-1.4332 
(-4.8252)*** 
0.7977 
(2.6833)*** 
0.3853 
Note: The regressions of corporate value on insider ownership share fraction with the break points 
of Cho (1998), control variables, and industrial variables for the both chaebol firms and non-
chaebol firms. Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample is a combination of 146 chaebol 
firms and 353 non-chaebol firms randomly selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE and 
KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's 
correction. 
INS 1 = insider ownership if insider ownership < 7% 
= 7% if insider ownership~ 7%; 
INS2 = 0 if insider ownership< 7% 
= insider ownership - 7% if 7%~ insider ownership< 38 %; 
= 31 % if insider ownership~ 38 %; 
INS3 = 0 if insider ownership< 38% 
= insider ownership- 38% if insider ownership~ 38%. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level" 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
To examine whether the use of the alternative break points found in the last 
chapter is effective for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms, the piecewise 
regression using these break points are estimated in Table 6.3. The regression 
results suggest that there are significant similarities and differences between the 
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results for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms. One of the similarities 
between the results for the both sample groups is that the level of corporate value 
declines as insider ownership increases up to 15 per cent, and rises ·as insider 
ownership increases up to 35 per cent and then declines again after 35 -per cent. 
One of the differences is that the relationship between insider ownership and 
corporate value for the non-chaebol firms is much more significant at ownership 
levels between O per cent and 35 per cent than that for the chaebol firms. In the 
studies of Morck et al.(1988a) and Cho (1998), respectively 5 per cent and 7 per 
cent would be optimal levels of insider ownership for higher firm value. 
According to the results here, however, particularly for the non-chaebol firms, 
around 35 per cent of insider ownership might be recommended for their higher 
corporate value. 
The results here in this analysis are also broadly consistent with Stulz (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990). At insider ownership levels below 15 per cent and 
above 35 per cent, the results are consistent with the arguments of Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), Slovin and Sushka (1993), and Boyle, Carter and Stover (1998) 
who support entrenchment theory. The results here are also consistent with Berle 
and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Lewellen, Loderer and 
Rosenfeld ( 1985), who warned about the problems of highly dispersed ownership 
in modern corporations, especially at insider ownership level between 15 per cent 
and 35 per cent. 
The remaining findings in Table 6.3 are discussed here. The manufacturing 
industry variable MFG is generally negative, but the IT coefficient is statistically 
significant and positively related to firm value. These results are consistent with a 
situation in which the IT industry in Korea in 1999 was becoming more profitable 
while the manufacturing industry was less profitable. The financial firms among 
the chaebols have higher corporate value, while the non-chaebol financial firms 
do not perform well. Perhaps the chaebol financial firms have much more clients 
and transaction opportunities due to their business backgrounds. LNDA is 
negatively related with firm value. LNLIQ affects positively firm value for the 
non-chaebol firms, while its effect is negative for the chaebol firms. There is a 
negative relationship between the investment variable LNNINVT A and firm value 
1 1 1 
for the both sample groups. Perhaps this reflects the financial instability around 
1999. In fact, most firms in Korea were affected by the 1997 crisis and their level 
of investment shrank. 
Table 6.3 Comparative analysis of the piecewise linear ordinary least squares 
INSl 
INS2 
INS3 
MFG 
IT 
FIN 
LNDA 
LNLIQ 
LNNINVTA 
. 
regressions. 
Chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNMBA 
-0.5626 -0.0095 
(-0.3990) (-0.8893) 
-0.6477 0.0009 
(-1.0375) (0.1764) 
0.3025 -0.0033 
(0.5869) (-0.6608) 
-0.1864 
(-3.3153)* ** 
0.4686 
(3.9516)*** 
0.1712 
( 1.9484 )* 
-0. 1614 
(-1.8280)* 
-1 .2909 
(-2.3878)** 
-1.0980 
Non-chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNMBA 
-3 .2153 -0.0316 
(-1.2714) (-1.7118)* 
1.1468 0.0118 
(1.4419) (2.0508)** 
-0.5190 -0.0048 
(-1.1837) (-1.5751) 
-0.1672 
(-1.4537) 
0.8452 
( 4. 7 84 3) * * * 
-0.0881 
(-0.7445) 
-0.1187 
(-1.0747) 
0.9082 
(2.5948)*** 
-1.4401 
(-4.7910)*** (-4.8680)*** 
Constant 0.2936 0.0986 0.7617 0.4962 
(0.8805) (0.7154) (2.3538)** (1.9414 )* 
Adj. R-sq -0.0006 0.4275 -0.0003 0.3887 
Note: The regressions of corporate value on insider ownership share fraction with the alternative 
break points, control variables , and industrial variables for the both chaebol firms and non-chaebol 
firms. Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample is a combination of 146 chaebol firms and 
353 non-chaebol firms randomly selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ in 
1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's correction. 
INS l = insider ownership if insider ownership< 15 %, 
= 15 % if insider ownership~ 15%; 
INS2 = 0 if insider ownership< 15%, 
= insider ownership - 15% if 15% :s; insider ownership< 35 %, 
= 20% if insider ownership~ 35 %; 
INS3 = 0 if insider ownership< 35%, 
= insider ownership - 35% if insider ownership~ 35%. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level . 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
Insider ownership regression 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Murphy (1985) , Kole (1994 ), Cho ( 1998) argue that 
I 
insider ownership structure is endogenously determined and provide evidence of a 
reversal of causality in the ownership-corporate value relation, suggesting that 
corporate value could be a determinant of the insider ownership structure rather 
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than being determined by insider ownership. Particularly Murphy ( 1985), Kole 
(1994) and Cho (1998) found that corporate value positively affects insider 
ownership, suggesting that insider ownership can represent an endogenous 
outcome of the compensation contracting process. Taken together, this possibility 
leads to the hypothesis that insider ownership and corporate value might be 
interdependent. That is, insider ownership affects corporate value, and corporate 
value, again, affects insider ownership and so forth. 
To find out whether insider ownership is affected by firm value and is 
endogenously determined, the insider ownership regression equation is specified 
as in Equation (6-2). 
LNINS =J (LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNAA, LNDA, LNLIQ) (6-2) 
In Table 6.4, the insider ownership regression results are first reported in the 
second and fourth columns including only the corporate value variable. Then the 
regression results with the control variables and industrial dummy variables are 
presented in the third and fifth columns. The log-transformed market to book ratio 
of assets (LNMBA) is not statistically significant in the regression for the chaebol 
firms in the second and third columns. However, the results for the non-chaebol 
firms are somewhat different from those for the chaebol firms. Both the signs of 
the coefficients of LNMBA in the fourth and fifth columns are positive in the 
estimations, which is consistent with Murphy (1985), Kole (1994) and Cho 
( 1998). These results suggest that firm value does not affect significantly insider 
ownership for the chaebol firms , but there is a positive relation of firm value on 
insider ownership for the non-chaebol firms. These perhaps reflect that firm 
performance for the smaller non-chaebol firms is much more sensitive to insider 
ownership than for the larger chaebol firms. 
For other findings with control variables from the third and fifth columns, insiders 
hold less shares of equity in larger firm for the non-chaebol firms, which is 
consistent with Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) (see LNAA parameter), while 
insignificant for the chaebol firms. The signs of the coefficients of the log-
transformed liquidity (LNLIQ) are positive for the both chaebol and non-chaebol 
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firms, but insignificant. The log-transformed debt to assets ratio (LNDA) is 
negative to insider ownership for the both sample groups, supporting the notion 
that higher debt levels lead insiders to hold fewer shares if creditors are important 
to the monitoring of management behaviour. This is consistent with Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001). Finally, Insiders' shares are significantly lower for the non-
chaebol firms in the information technology industry, while not significant for the 
chaebol firms. For the non-chaebol finance firms, insiders' shares are 
significantly higher than for the chaebol finance firms. In the manufacturing 
industry, insiders still hold many shares for chaebol firms, while insignificant for 
the non-chaebol firms. Most chaebols are initially established in the form of the 
traditional manufacturing firms such as electronics, motors, heavy and chemical 
industries, so that insiders seem to still rely on their mother companies with many 
shares. 
Table 6.4 Comparative analysis of adjusted two-stage least square 
LNMBA 
MFG 
IT 
FIN 
LNDA 
LNLIQ 
LNAA 
Constant 
. 
regressions. 
Chaebol firms 
LNINS LNINS 
-0.0177 0.2717 
(-0.0827) (0.8524) 
3.1477 
0.1466 
(0.8931 )*** 
-0.4463 
(-1.2198) 
0.0775 
(0.3029) 
-0.8615 
(-3.0936)*** 
0.6908 
(0.4126) 
-0.0133 
(-0.1732) 
2.6156 
Non-chaebol firms 
LNINS LNINS 
0.1091 0.0448 
(1.9322)* (0.4303) 
3.3623 
0.0260 
(0.2751) 
-0.4131 
(-2.9610)*** 
0.4009 
(2.8524 )*** 
-0.2109 
(-1.7269)* 
0.4542 
(1.5906) 
-0.1047 
( -4. 1614) * * * 
3.6264 
(53.2481 )*** ( 4.0183)*** (78.5949)*** (15.9024 )*** 
Adj. R-sq. -0.0072 0.1334 0.0080 0.0963 
Note: The analysis of adjusted two-stage least square regressions of insider ownership structure on 
corporate value variable, control variables , and industrial variables. Variable definitions are in 
Table 4.1. The sample in this table consists of 146 chaebol firms and 353 non-chaebol firms. The 
chaebol firms are subsidiaries of the 30 largest chaebols , and the non-chaebol firms are randomly 
selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White 's correction. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
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In conclusion, there are conflicting results for the chaebol and non-chaebol firms. 
For the chaebol firms, ignoring the endogeneity issue, corporate value does not 
affect insider ownership. However, firm value affects positively insider ownership 
for the non-chaebol firms. Taken
1 
together, these findings and the results, from the 
corporate value regression suggest that insider ownership affects non-
monotonously corporate value for the non-chaebol firms but is insignificant for 
the chaebol firms, while corporate value affects insider ownership for the non-
chaebol firms but is insignificant for the chaebol firms. In other words, there are 
mutually significant relationships between firm value and insider ownership for 
the relatively smaller non-chaebol firms, however, firm value does not affect 
insider ownership in the relatively larger chaebol firms. 
Ownership concentration and corporate value 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) empirically suggest that there 1s no significant 
relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profit rates as a 
proxy for firm performance for the U.S. firms in their study, which brings into 
question the theory of Berle and Means ( 1932). There are, however, many studies 
that found conflicting results of the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance. Wruck (1989) and Xu and Wang (1997) found that there is 
a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
On the contrary, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) suggest that there is a negative 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. 
In this section, the regressions to test the relationship between firm value and 
ownership concentration for the both Korean chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms 
are reported here in Table 6.5. The equations estimated are shown in Equations 
(6-3) and (6-4). 
LNMBA=f(LNL3S, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNNINVTA) (6-3) 
LNL3S =f(LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNAA) (6-4) 
The regression results in the second and fourth columns indicate that ownership 
concentration is not a determinant of corporate value, suggesting that the level of 
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ownership concentration does not affect significantly firm value for the both 
chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms, which is consistent with Demsetz and Lehn 
( 1985). Despite, however, a difference between the results for two sample groups 
in the second and fourth columns is that the signs of the coefficients of LNL3S are 
conflict: negative for the chaebol firms; but positive for the non-chaebol firms. 
This difference might suggest that higher ownership concentration would affect 
positively corporate value for the relatively smaller non-chaebol firms, while 
ownership concentration would affect negatively for the relatively larger chaebol 
firms. Investment and debt ratio show negative relations to firm value for the both 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms. IT and MFG are respectively positive and 
negative on firm value for the both sample groups. However, chaebol finance 
firms have higher firm value, while non-chaebol finance firms have relatively 
lower firm value compare to other industries. Perhaps the chaebol finance firms 
have much more clients and trading opportunities because of their better 
reputations with more reliable business backgrounds. 
From the third and fifth columns, the results show that there is no reverse effect of 
firm value on ownership concentration for the both chaebol and non-chaebol 
firms without any differences. Log-transformed average assets (LNAA) are 
negatively related to ownership concentration for the both sample groups, 
suggesting that ownership is not concentrated in larger firms. Log-transformed 
liquidity (LNLIQ) is positively related with ownership concentration for the both 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms, suggesting that firms with higher liquidity may 
lead to higher ownership concentration. Finally, ownership concentration is higher 
for the both chaebol and non-chaebol finance and manufacturing firms, while 
lower for the non-chaebol information technology firms. 
Overall, despite of some differences of the signs and degrees of the relationship, 
the results above suggest that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the regression results for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms in 
the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate value. 
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Table 6.5 Comparative adjusted two-stage least squares regressions between 
corporate value and ownership concentration with control variables, and 
industrial variables 
Chaebol firms Non-chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNL3S LNMBA LNL3S 
LNL3S -0.4336 1.0378 
(-0.9137) (1.3058) 
LNMBA -0.1571 
-0.0640 
(-1.4097) (-0.6140) 
MFG -0.1675 0.0615 -0.2259 0.0294 
(-2.4971)** (0.6195) (-1.8655)* (0.3576) 
IT 0.3679 0.0983 1.0081 -0.2578 
(3.1368)*** (0.4939) ( 4.9512)*** (-2.0552)** 
FIN 0.2832 0.1739 -0.2927 0.4997 
(1.8707)* (1.4331) (-1.4302) (4.6526)*** 
LNDA -0.0552 
-0.1281 -0.0522 -0.0537 
(-0.5932) (-0.8143) (-0.4239) (-0.7047) 
LNLIQ -0.8925 0.8568 0.4930 0.3709 
(-0.9019) ·, (0.7150) (0.9848) (1.5797) 
LNNINVTA -1.1813 -1.3282 
(-5.7710)*** (-4. 7249)*** 
LNAA -0.0886 -0.1087 
(-3.1914)*** (-4.5837)*** 
Constant 1.5777 4.1425 -3.5207 4.0615 
(0.9527) (16.3232)*** (-1.2549) (19.5115)*** 
Adj. R-sg. 0.3845 0.0546 0.4012 0.1014 
Note: Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample in this table consists of 146 chaebol firms 
and 353 non-chaebol firms. The chaebol firms are subsidiaries of the 30 largest chaebols, and the 
non-chaebol firms are randomly selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ in 
1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's correction. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
Ownership composition and corporate value 
To go one step further in this section, the relations between ownership 
composition variables: the largest shareholders' share fraction (LNLS), the 
foreigners' share fraction (LNFS), and the financial institutions' share fraction 
(LNFIS), and corporate value for the both chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms 
are comparatively examined. The relationship between corporate value and the 
extent of the presidents direct shares is not estimated, because the numbers of 
available observations for the presidents direct share fraction (LNPDS) are only 
six, which are not enough to estimate.5 That is why the regression of the 
relationship between firm value and president direct shares for the chaebol and 
non-chaebol firms is not included in this analysis. 
5 In an econometric regression package, the minimum number of observations to estimate is ten. 
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First, Equations (5-5) and (5-6) are estimated comparatively for both the chaebol 
and non-chaebol firms to find out whether there is a relationship between the log-
transformed largest shareholders' share fraction (LNLS) and corporate value 
(LNMBA). 
LNMBA=f(LNLS, MFG, IT, FIN, LNLIQ, LNNINVTA, LNDA) (5-5) 
LNLS= f (LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNAA) (5-6) 
The regression results are presented in Table 6.6. The results reported in the 
second and fourth columns indicate that LNLS positively affects corporate value · 
for the both chaebol and non-chaebol firms. One difference is that the degree of 
the relationship for non-chaebol firms is greater than that for the chaebol firms. 
Perhaps the largest shareholders in the non-chaebol firms are more responsible in 
management than those in the chaebol firms. These results also suggest that when 
the largest shareholders have a larger share they would have more responsibility 
in management and consequently, cause the value of the firm to increase, which 
supports the theory of Berle and Means ( 1932). The other results are shown in the 
second and fourth columns with other variables, but there are no statistical 
differences between the results for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms. 
The third and fifth columns of Table 6.6 provide the regression estimates of 
Equation (5-6). The results show that corporate value does not affect significantly 
the largest shareholders' share for the both chaebol and non-chaebol firms, 
suggesting that there is no reversal effect of corporate value on the largest 
shareholders' share. However, one difference is found that the signs of the 
coefficients of the firm value are conflict for two sample groups: negative for the 
chaebol firms, positive for the non-chaebol firms. The largest shareholders in the 
chaebol firms maybe sell their shares at higher price when firm performs well, 
while those in the non-chaebol firms are maybe compensated with shares when 
firm performs well. 
The other significant similarities of the results for both the sample groups indicate 
the negative effects of LNAA and LNDA on the largest shareholders' share, 
suggesting that the largest shareholders hold fewer shares in larger firms with 
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higher debt. One difference of the results for the chaebol firms and the non-
chaebol firms is the negative effect of membership of the IT industry on LNLS for 
the non-chaebol firms, while insignificantly positive for the chaebol firms, 
suggesting that the largest shareholders in the non-chaebol IT firms hold fewer 
shares than those in the chaebol IT firms. 
Table 6.6 Adjusted two-stage least square regressions between corporate 
value and the largest shareholders' share fraction with control variables, and 
industrial variables. 
LNLS 
LNMBA 
MFG 
IT 
FIN 
LNLIQ 
LNNINVT 
A 
LNDA 
LNAA 
Constant 
Adj. R-sq 
Chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNLS 
0.3550 
(2.3590)** 
-0.1993 
(-3.7705)*** 
0.5131 
( 4.2535)*** 
0.1553 
(1.8561)* 
-1.8146 
(-3.3141)*** 
-1.1994 
(-5.2942)*** 
-0.0212 
(-0.2190) 
-0.9875 
(-2.3521)** 
0.4501 
-0.2956 
(-0.7959) 
0.0416 
(0.3212) 
0.0731 
(0.2630) 
0.0774 
(0.4168) 
-1.5134 
(-0.7170) 
-0.1691 
(-0.9318) 
-0.1479 
(-3.1130)*** 
3.8240 
(10.0855)*** 
0.0661 
Non-chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNLS 
1.9096 
(10.7647)*** 
-0.3331 
(-3 .4917)*** 
1.3338 
(8.9454 )*** 
-1.0299 
(-6.5277)*** 
-0.5463 
(-1.3544) 
-0.8880 
(-3.8042)*** 
0.2180 
(2.3128)** 
-5.2392 
(-10.2845)*** 
0.5612 
0.1417 
(0.9438) 
0.1064 
(1.0426) 
-0.4304 
(-2.5129)** 
0.6297 
( 4.0067)*** 
0.2401 
(0.8172) 
-0.0799 
(-0.9640) 
-0.1089 
(-2.0690)** 
3.3716 
(10.7255)*** 
0.1362 
Note: Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample of the second and third column regressions 
consists of 139 chaebol firms, and the sample of the fourth and fifth column regressions consists of 
342 non-chaebol firms. The firms are randomly selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE 
and KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity using 
White's correction. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
Second, Equations (5-7) and (5-8) are estimated comparatively for both the 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms to find out whether there are reciprocal relations 
between the foreigners' share fraction (LNFS) and corporate value. 
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LNMBA=f(LNFS, MFG, IT, FIN, LNLIQ, LNNINVTA, LNDA) 
LNFS=f(LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNAA) 
(5-7) 
(5-8) 
Table 6.7 provides the regression results of the relationships between foreigners' 
share and corporate value. The results in the second and fourth columns show that 
foreigners' shares affect negatively corporate value for both the chaebol and non-
chaebol firms. It is an interesting result that when foreigners have more shares 
firms do not perform effectively, then firm value would decrease. One significant 
difference of the results between the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms is · 
that corporate value in the non-chaebol manufacturing firms is high, while 
corporate value is low in the chaebol manufacturing firms. 
Table 6. 7 Adjusted two-stage least square regressions between corporate 
value and the foreigners' share fraction with control variables, and industrial 
variables. 
LNFS 
LNMBA 
MFG 
IT 
FIN 
LNLIQ 
LNNINVT 
A 
LNDA 
LNAA 
Constant 
Adj. R-sq 
Chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNFS 
-0.0675 
(-2.4380)** 
-0.1614 
(-2.7537)*** 
0.4513 
(3.5142)*** 
0.2177 
(2.0777)** 
-1.6183 
(-1.7309)* 
-1.2136 
(-5.7180)*** 
-0.2697 
(-2.0777)** 
-0.0294 
(-0.3970) 
0.4684 
1.6379 
(1.6330)* 
0.0432 
(0.1405) 
-0.7752 
(-1.0002) 
0.0221 
(0.0366) 
30.0830 
( 4.2857)*** 
-1.3895 
(-2.0023)** 
0.9588 
(7 .2175)*** 
-6.5982 
(-6.0123)*** 
0.2897 
Non-chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNFS 
-1.2816 
(-6.9038)*** 
0.7144 
(3.5370)*** 
1.0879 
(5.3220)*** 
1.1608 
( 4.3751)*** 
-0.1858 
(-0.0938) 
-2.8346 
(-7.8015)*** 
0.0284 
(0.2161) 
0.2745 
( 1.9624 )* 
0.6096 
0.8718 
(1.6525)* 
0.8400 
(1.8965)* 
-0.1110 
(-0.1859) 
0.4442 
(0.6946) 
1.0457 
(0.2650) 
-0.4240 
(-1.2692) 
0.6088 
(2.5638)** 
-3.6545 
(-2.354 7)** 
0.0297 
Note: Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample of the second and third column regressions 
consists of 119 chaebol firms, and the sample of the fourth and fifth column regressions consists of 
161 non-chaebol firms. The firms are randomly selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE 
and KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity using 
White's correction. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
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Next, the regressions reported in the third and fifth columns of Table 6.7 show an 
interesting result that foreigners hold many shares when firms perform well, 
which is different from the results of the LNLS equation as discussed earlier. 
Foreigners also prefer to hold shares of larger manufacturing companies rather 
than smaller information technology companies. One difference between the 
results for two sample groups is that foreigners are highly concerned about the 
liquidity and debt of firms when they choose to hold shares of the chaebol firms 
compared to the non-chaebol firms. They perhaps consider the chaebols' over-
investment that follows from the mutual debt guarantee activity, which is 
prevalent among subsidiaries of most chaebols.6 There is no other statistical 
difference between the results for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms in 
these two columns. 
Lastly, Equations (5-9) and (5-10) are estimated comparatively for both the 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms to find out whether the reciprocal relations 
between the financial institutions' shares (LNFIS) and corporate value (LNMBA) 
are existed. 
LNMBA=f(LNFIS, MFG, IT, FIN, LNLIQ, LNNINVTA, LNDA) 
LNFIS=f(LNMBA, MFG, IT, FIN, LNDA, LNLIQ, LNAA) 
(5-9) 
(5-10) 
The regression results of the relations between financial institutions' shares and 
corporate value are presented in Table 6.8. The results in the second and fourth 
columns show that financial institutions' shares affect positively corporate value 
for the non-chaebol firms, while insignificant for the chaebol firms. Monitoring 
by financial institutions with many shares could lead firms to perform well. When 
financial institutions hold · shares of the smaller non-chaebol firms, firms to be 
performed well. However, in the case of larger chaebol firms, a large financial 
institution share does not affect firm value. Another significant difference of the 
results between the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms is that corporate 
value for the non-chaebol finance firms is low. 
6 See chapter 3. 
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The regressions reported in the third and fifth columns of Table 6.8 show an 
interesting result that financial institutions hold many shares in the chaebol firms 
when firms do not perform well, while their holding is insignificant for the non-
chaebol firms. When chaebol firms do not perform well, financial institutions' 
generally choose to hold shares of the chaebol firms to support them or for the 
redemption of their money borrowed. Financial institutions also prefer to hold 
shares of larger chaebol IT and finance firms and non-chaebol finance firms, 
while avoiding manufacturing companies. Another difference between the results 
for two sample groups is that the debt of the chaebol firms affects financial 
institutions' shareholdings, while it is insignificant for the non-chaebol firms. 
Financial institutions might be concerned about the high debt from over-
investment of most chaebols, as foreigners do. 
Table 6.8 Adjusted two-stage least square regressions between corporate 
value and the financial institutions' share fraction with control variables, and 
industrial variables. 
LNFIS 
LNMBA 
MFG 
IT 
FIN 
LNLIQ 
LNNINVT 
A 
LNDA 
LNAA 
Constant 
Chaebol firms Non-chaebol firms 
LNMBA LNFIS LNMBA LNFIS 
0.0104 
(0.0617) 
-0.1624 
(-1.4119) 
0.4545 
(2.3398)** 
0.0702 
(0.4185) 
-4.1829 
(-1.0533) 
-0.8176 
(-1.6949)* 
-0.1097 
(-0.5718) 
-2.3036 
(-2.3669)** 
-0.1286 
(-0.5034) 
1.4022 
(2.3216)** 
0.9082 
(2.6100)** 
5.9163 
(1.0698) 
1.5290 
( 4.5432)*** 
0.0540 
(0.3153) 
1.6848 
(8.0095)*** 
-1.2571 
(-4.0466)*** 
2.0503 
(5.4731)*** 
0.2379 
(0.4741) 
0.8239 
(1.2459) 
-0.0318 
(-0.1303) 
-1.2622 
(-1.5532) 
0.7902 
(2.3136)** 
-1.4978 
(-2.0139)** 
-1.2657 -0.3495 0.2057 
(-2.3723)** (-2.24 78)** (0.8036) 
0.2480 0.0403 
( 1.9870)* (0.2299) 
-0.0151 -0.4402 -3.5196 2.0585 
(-0.0522) (-0.4065) (-4.2604 )*** (2.0313)** 
Adj. R-sq 0.2491 0.1171 0.7141 0.1700 
Note: Variable definitions are in Table 4.1. The sample of the second and third column regressions 
consists of 50 chaebol firms, and the sample of the fourth and fifth column regressions consists of 
56 non-chaebol firms. The firms are randomly selected from the 1,116 firms listed on the KSE and 
KOSDAQ in 1999. t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's 
correction. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
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Robustness of the results 
As the robustness tests have been done for the whole sample in the previous 
chapter, the similar tests are examined respectively for the two sample groups. 
Variations on the models are examined although not reported in detail here. Other 
firm value variables: return of assets (ROA); return on equity (ROE); economic 
value added (EV A) and economic value added to average assets (EV AA) are used 
as the measures of firm value to provide some variety by analysis, in place of 
market to book ratio of assets (LNMBA). The results from those variations are 
generally consistent with the main findings discussed earlier, suggesting that the 
variations on corporate value measures do not provide significantly different 
results. 
In terms of regression methodology, the two stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
and three stage least squares regression (3SLS) are popularly used in current 
research rather than using the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) because 
2SLS and 3SLS regressions provide qualitatively similar results as noted earlier.
7 
Hence the results from the 2SLS regressions are reported here in this thesis. The 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, however, are also estimated to find out 
whether or not the results are different from the 2SLS regression results, although 
not reported in detail here. The OLS results are generally consistent with the main 
findings presented in this chapter. 
Results obtained, therefore, give no reason to alter the conclusions found about 
the relationship between ownership structure and corporate value for both the 
chaebols and non-chaebols. 
Summary and conclusion 
The comparative analyses of the relationship between corporate performance and 
ownership structure for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms are 
examined. There are significant similarities and differences between the chaebol 
7 See Demsetz and Villalonga (2000), Cho (1998), and Boyle , Carter, and Stover (1998) 
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firms and the non-chaebol firms in the relationship between the level of insider 
ownership and corporate value. 
One of the similarities is that the level of corporate value declines as. insider 
ownership increases up to 15 per cent, and rises as insider ownership increases up 
to 35 per cent and then declines again after 35 per cent. One of the differences is 
that the relation between insider ownership and corporate value for the non-
chaebol firms is much more significant at ownership levels between O per cent 
and 35 per cent than that for the chaebol firms. For the non-chaebol firms in 
Korea, around 35 per cent of insider ownership might be recommended for higher 
corporate value. 
In the insider ownership regression results, there are conflicting results for the 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms. For the chaebol firms, ignoring the endogeneity 
issue, corporate value does not affect insider ownership. However, firm value 
affects positively insider ownership for the non-chaebol firms. Taken together, 
these findings and the results from the corporate value regression suggest that 
insider ownership affects non-monotonously corporate value for the non-chaebol 
firms but is insignificant for the chaebol firms, while in the reverse direction 
corporate value does affect insider ownership for the non-chaebol firms but is 
insignificant for the chaebol firms. 
Ownership concentration is not a determinant of corporate value, suggesting that 
the level of ownership concentration does not affect significantly firm value for 
either the chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms, which is consistent with Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985). However, a difference is that the signs of the coefficients of 
ownership concentration variables are in conflict. Higher ownership concentration 
would affect positively corporate value for the relatively smaller non-chaebol 
firms, while it is negative for the relatively larger chaebol firms. 
In terms of the relationship between ownership composition and corporate value, 
the largest shareholders' share positively affects corporate value for both the 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms. One difference is that the degree to which this 
occurs in the non-chaebol firms is greater than that in the chaebol firms. 
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Corporate value does not affect significant! y the largest shareholders' share in 
either the chaebol and non-chaebol firms, suggesting that there is no reverse 
effect of corporate value on the largest shareholders' share. However, one 
difference is found that the signs of the coefficients of the firm value are conflict 
for two sample groups: negative for the chaebol firms, positive for the non-
chaebol firms. Foreigners' shares affect negatively corporate value for both the 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms. More foreigners' shares cause firm value to 
decrease. Foreigners also hold many shares in both the chaebol and non-chaebol 
firms when firms perform well. Financial institutions' shares affect positively 
corporate value for the non-chaebol firms. Financial institutions also hold many 
shares in the chaebol firms when firms do not perform well. 
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7 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter reviews the discussion and main findings of previous chapters and 
provides suggestions that follow from testing of the hypotheses about the specific 
relation.ship between ownership structure and firm performance of the Korean 
PLCs. This thesis set out to examine whether there is a specific correlation 
between ownership structure and firm performance and, if so, in what ways the 
model asserted by Morck et al. ( 1988a) can be applied to the Korean case. 
Summary 
In summary, chapter 1 introduces the background and motivation of the study. 
Over the last four decades the Korean corporate sector led and contributed 
substantially to the high economic growth in Korea under the economic 
development policy of the government. This successful development model, 
however, brought about an economic concentration problem among the few big 
business groups and insolvent management. Thus the big business groups, the so-
called chaebol, and the government's corporate sector policy became the main 
areas in need of reform. Among the debates about reform, the failure in corporate 
governance is most often cited as the cause of the crisis. In particular, many critics 
noted that the ownership structure of the Korean corporate organisations could 
induce inadequate monitoring and lack of checking as . a result of failures in 
accounting transparency and monitoring mechanisms. In this regard, the question 
of whether the ownership structure of the Korean corporate organisations affects 
their firm value is the main motivation for thi s study. 
The analytical issues together with the research questions and hypotheses are 
presented. The main issue is the relationship between ownership structure, which 
is one of the most important yet imperfect institutions in firms , and firm 
performance. The thesis also focuses on finding out if there are significant 
correlations between ownership structure and firm performance, and in what ways 
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they are manifest. There are five hypotheses established to answer the main 
question (See chapter 1 ). These examinations are based on the assertion as argued 
by Berle and Means (1932) that specific relations between ownership structure 
and corporate performance exist in modern corporations. 
Since Berle and Means ( 1932) first raised the question and warned of dispersed 
ownership and separation of ownership and control in modern corporations, many 
analysts have argued the issue theoretically and empirically. The methodology of 
Morck, Vishny and Schleifer (1988a) is applied in this study. 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical issues regarding the ownership structure of 
modern corporations. There ,are conflicting arguments. Berle and Means ( 1932) 
proposed three characteristics of modern firms as evidence of their entering the 
new era as economic organisations. First, big corporations are owned by a 
number of anonymous investors who hold only a few shares; second, most 
managers hold negligible (insignificant) quantities of shares; third, there are big 
differences between the interests of shareholders and managers. Berle and Means 
also pointed out that if corporate ownerships are widely dispersed, then conflicts 
between the shareholders and managers are inevitable. If the shareholders cannot 
exercise their voting rights, and the directors shirk supervising the managers on 
behalf of the shareholders , managers might laxly operate the firms , and pursue 
their own agendas for their own benefit. Berle and Means also raised the owner-
agency problem: the conflict of interest between managers and owners affects 
corporate performance. Jensen and Meckling ( 1976) also presented an agency 
theory relating to corporate ownership. They argued that if ownership is 
transferred to outside investors , the opportunity cost of pursuing the non-
pecuniary benefit is decreased, and the demand for transferring shares is 
increased. If an efficient stock market correctly assesses this situation, the 
corporate value will decrease. The decreased corporate value will become the 
agency cost for any change in the ownership structure. Jensen and Meckling, 
therefore, also support the proposition that a dispersed ownership structure 
induces an increase in agency cost and a decrease in corporate value. 
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Chandler ( 1990), on the other hand, advocates that separation of ownership and 
control is necessary in order to facilitate professional managers who have the 
required unique knowledge and excellence in 111anagement. Second, he argues 
that large-scale investment in production facilities is necessary to · achieve 
economies of scale and scope. Fama and Jensen (1983) also argue that increased 
ownership concentration (any kind of owner) decreases corporate performance 
because it raises the firm's cost of capital as a result of decreased market liquidity 
or decreased diversification opportunities on behalf of the investor. 
The agency problem is caused by separation of ownership and management, and 
wide dispersion of ownership in modern corporations. Since the presentation, 
about 70 years ago, by Berle and Means of ways to rectify the agency problem, 
the issue of improving and solving agency problems relating to corporate 
ownership has been a matter of wide discussion. There were two proposed 
approaches: the market disciplinary approach, which centred on Jensen's 
proposal, and the organisational behavioural approach, which centred on Porter. 
Jensen (1989) pointed out that open corporations have been the generative power 
of economic development over the last 100 years in the U.S.; however, they have 
now not only lost their utility in many areas, but they are also no longer effective 
corporate organisations in a modern competitive economy. He pointed out the 
new type of corporate organisations are characterised by high debt ratio, an 
incentive reward system, high shareholdings by managers and directors, and 
contracts between owners and creditors for concrete corporate activities including 
surplus cash flows. These characteristics are due, in part, to shareholder activism. 
Porter (1992) noted that the lower level of competitiveness of U.S. corporations, 
compared with Japanese and German corporations, was caused by the capital 
distribution mechanism. He presented a solution to strengthen the U.S. 
corporations' competitiveness by focusing on construction of legal and 
institutional mechanisms to promote the shareholder activism of institutional 
investors. Hence, the issue regarding ·ownership structure is not concluded, but 
remains a matter for argument. 
The analytical issues about the Korean corporate organisations are addressed in 
chapter 3. This chapter outlines the historical overview and political economy in 
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Korea, the characteristics of the Korean corporate organisations focusing on the 
chaebols, and the nature of the chaebol issues: the economic concentration, 
corporate governance, the overcapitalisation, and the issues relating to the 
ownership structures of the Korean corporate organisations. Finally, a challenge 
for the Korean corporate sector including three major changes is proposed at the 
end of chapter 3. 
The Korean big corporate groups, the so-called 'chaebol', led the remarkable 
economic growth over the last four decades in Korea. Chaebols dominated the 
national economy under the state's 'stick and carrot' policy. Chaebols have 
unique characteristics compared with other nations' conglomerates. First, they are 
among the fas test growing business conglomerates in the world, and their 
economic concentration is substantial in the national economy. Second, they have 
close relationships with government, so-called 'crony capitalism'. Third, most of 
them are owned and controlled by founders and their f amili-es, with cross-
shareholding and cross-debt guaranteeing by their subsidiaries in a group. Fourth, 
they widely diversified the scope of their businesses in related and unrelated areas 
except banking. Finally, they are exposed to high financial leverage. 
The nature of the chaebol problem is focused in economic concentration and 
corporate governance. On the economic concentration issue, there are two notable 
points: first, the phenomenon of economic concentration does not occur only in 
Korea; second, economic concentration is an outcome of chaebol problems, not 
the cause of chaebol problems. On the corporate governance issue, the first point 
to note is that most Korean corporations are controlled by their founders and their 
families in a pattern of owner-managerialism. Second, the controlling 
shareholders possess the power to control firms in a group by using a pyramid 
control system. But this does not happen only in Korea. Third, there is no perfect 
management disciplinary mechanism to check and monitor managers 1n 
corporations. Such a mechanism should consist of an interaction among forces 
providing market discipline (including the capital market, financial market, 
product market, and labour market), as \Vell as internal discipline in the form of 
corporate organisation, board committees and so on. Fourth, the lack of a 
corporate governance mechanism has induced overcapitalisation . 
129 
Ownership structure used to be considered as the most important factor in shaping 
the corporate governance system of any country. The two aspects of ownership 
structure are ownership concentration and composition. The degree of ownership 
concentration in a company determines the distribution of power between its 
managers and shareholders, or controlling shareholders and outside shareholders. 
Many Korean corporations, including chaebols, have highly concentrated 
structures of ownership and control. In terms of composition, family ownership in 
a chaebol is usually achieved through controlling shareholdings and cross-
shareholdings among subsidiaries. 
Finally, for the Korean economy and corporate sector, changes to institutional, 
managerial, and structural frameworks are suggested to enable stronger 
competition with their global competitors in the new economic era. 
The next chapter describes the data sample, data source, statistics, correlations, 
variables and model specification to identify the empirical results, which are to be 
analysed in the following chapters. The variables in the models, which are based 
on empirical models used in previous studies, are defined and selected as 
particular empirical proxies for dependent and independent variables in the 
specific equations. The models consist of 12 equations to estimate the relationship 
between corporate value and ownership structure, including insider ownership, 
ownership concentration and other ownership composition variables. The 
diagnostic tests require that certain assumptions regarding the distribution of input 
data, functional form , and heteroscedasticity be satisfied. The methods employed 
to overcome these problems are discussed in detail. The data and models are now 
appropriate to apply in the regression analysis in the following chapters. 
Chapter 5 presents , as a core chapter, the empirical results for hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between ownership structure and corporate value for the 
Korean PLCs. As well as considering the results of this study, the relevance of 
these findings is considered in the context of existing research. It strongly 
suggested that there is a significant non-monotonous relation between the level of 
insider ownership and corporate value for the Korean PLCs. Ignoring the 
endogeneity issue, insider ownership affects corporate value, but not vice versa, 
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which is generally consistent with Morck et al ( 1988a), Stulz ( 1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990). The level of corporate value declines as insider 
ownership increases up to 15 per cent. It rises as insider ownership increases up to 
35 per cent and then declines again after 35 per cent. The relation between insider 
ownership and corporate value is significant at an ownership level between O per 
cent and 35 per cent. In the case of Korean PLCs, around 35 per cent of insider 
ownership might be recommended for higher corporate value, so that around 50 
per cent of the average insider ownership of the 30 largest chaebols should be 
reduced to a level of around 35 per cent. 
Corporate value is not statistically significant in the insider ownership regression, 
which is consistent with Murphy ( 1985), Kole ( 1994) and Cho ( 1998). Therefore, 
the findings also suggest that there is no reversal effect from corporate value to 
insider ownership for the Korean PLCs. Ownership concentration is not a 
determinant of corporate value, suggesting that the levels of ownership 
concentration do not affect significantly firm value for the Korean PLCs, which is 
consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn ( 1985). There is no reversal 
effect of firm value on ownership concentration. The president direct share 
(LNPDS), the largest shareholders' share (LNLS), and the financial institutions' 
share (LNFIS) positively affect corporate value, while foreigners' share (LNFS) 
has a negative relation, suggesting that top management with a smaller share 
could be irresponsible in management and, consequently, cause the value of the 
firm to decrease, as argued by Berle and Means ( 1932). The level of shares held 
by insiders and management positively affects corporate value, while shares held 
by outsiders of firms such as foreigners' share have a negative effect on firm 
value. On the other hand, there are no reciprocal effects between corporate value 
and the largest shareholders ' share, president direct share and financial 
institutions' share. Foreigners choose to hold 111any shares when firms perform 
well, and also prefer to hold shares in larger 1nanufacturing companies rather than 
smaller finance and information technology c0111panies. 
In chapter 6 the comparative analysis of the chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms 
suggests that there are significant similarities and differences between the results 
for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol finns with a non-monotonous relation 
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between the level of insider ownership and corporate value. This 1s consistent 
with the findings of Morck et al ( 1988a) and Cho ( 1998). 
One of the similarities between the results for the two sample groups is , that the 
level of corporate value declines as insider ownership increases up to 15 per cent, 
and rises as insider ownership increases up to 35 per cent and then declines again 
after 35 per cent. One of the differences is that the relation between insider 
ownership and corporate value for the non-chaebol firms is much more significant 
at an ownership level between O per cent and 35 per cent than that for the chaebol 
firms. Preferably for the non-chaebol firms in Korea, around 35 per cent of insider 
ownership would be recommended for higher corporate value. 
There are conflicting results for the chaebol and non-chaebol firms in the insider 
ownership regression results. In the case of the chaebol firms, ignoring the 
endogeneity issue, corporate value does not affect insider ownership. However, 
firm value affects positively insider ownership in the case of the non-chaebol 
firms. Taken together, these findings and the results from the corporate value 
regression suggest that insider ownership affects non-monotonously corporate 
value for the non-chaebol firms, but is insignificant for the chaebol firms, while 
corporate value has a reverse effect on insider ownership for the non-chaebol 
firms, but is insignificant for the chaebol finns. 
Ownership concentration is not a determinant of corporate value, suggesting that 
the level of ownership concentration does not affect significantly firm value for 
both the chaebol firms and non-chaebol finns. This is consistent with that of 
Demsetz and Lehn ( 1985). However, a difference between the results for the two 
sample groups is that the signs of the coefficients of ownership concentration 
variables are in conflict: negative for the chaebol firms, but positive for the non-
chaebol firms. Higher ownership concentration could affect positively corporate 
value for the relatively smaller non-chaebol firms, and negatively for the 
relatively larger chaebol firms. 
The largest shareholders' shares (LNLS) positively affect corporate value for both 
the chaebol and non-chaebol firms. One difference is that in the graph of the 
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relationship between LNMBA and LNLS the slope of the relationship for the non-
chaebol firms is steeper than that of the chaebol firms. Corporate value does not 
affect significantly the largest shareholders' share for either the chaebol or non-
chaebol firms, suggesting that there is no reverse effect of corporate value on the 
largest shareholders' share. However, one difference is found in that the signs of 
the coefficients of the firm value are in conflict for the two sample groups: 
negative for the chaebol firms, positive for the non-chaebol firms. Foreigners' 
shares (LNFS) affect negatively corporate value for both the chaebol and non-
chaebol firms. It is an interesting result that greater shareholding by foreigners 
may bring about irresponsible management, and then causes firm values to 
decrease. When firms perform well, foreigners choose to hold many shares in both 
the chaebol and non-chaebol firms. Financial institutions' shares (LNFIS) affect 
positively corporate value for the non-chaebol finns, but remain insignificant for 
the chaebol firms. When firms do not perform well, financial institutions also 
choose to hold many shares in chaebol finns, but their shareholding in non-
chaebol firms remains insignificant. 
Concluding remarks 
From the major findings in this study, the five hypotheses, which are raised in 
chapter 1, are tested to answer the main research questions also raised in chapter 
1. Table 7 .1 shows that the hypotheses 1, 4 , and 5 can be adopted, but hypotheses 
2 and 3 must be rejected. The results imply that the research has provided an 
effective empirical examination to address the relation between ownership 
structure and corporate value for the Korean corporate sector, because there are 
remarkable and reportable significant relationships in the variations of ownership 
structure and corporate value. Based on these results, the main research questions 
are addressed. 
The main research questions are as follows. 
1. Does the ownership structure of the Korean PLCs affect their corporate 
performance? If so, how? 
2. Are there significant correlations between corporate performance and 
ownership structure in the Korean corporate sector? If so, in what ways? 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 5 
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Table 7.1 Verification of the hypotheses 
Results 
There is a significant non-1nonotonous relation between the level of 
insider ownership and corporate value for the Korean PLCs. , 
Corporate value of the Korean PLCs does not significantly affect their 
insider ownership. 
Ownership concentration is not a determinant of corporate value, 
suggesting that the levels of ownership concentration do not affect 
• significantly firm value for the Korean PLCs, and there 1s no 
reciprocal effect of firm value on ownership concentration. 
The president direct share, the largest shareholders' share and the 
financial institutions' share positively affect corporate value, while 
foreigners' share has a negative relation. There are no reciprocal 
effects between corporate value and the largest shareholders' share, 
president direct share and financial institutions' share. But foreigners 
choose to hold many shares when firms perform well. 
There are significant similarities and differences between the results 
for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms with a non-
monotonous relation between the level of insider ownership and 
corporate value. The difference is that the relation between insider 
ownership and corporate value for the non-chaebol firms is much 
more significant at an ownership level between O per cent and 35 per 
cent than for the chaebol firms . For the chaebol firms, corporate value 
does not affect insider ownership. However, firm value affects 
positively insider ownership for the non-chaebol firms. The signs of 
the coefficients of ownership concentration variables are in conflict: 
negative for the chaebol firms; but positive for the non-chaebol firms. 
Financial institutions ' shares (LNFIS) affect positively corporate 
value for the non-chaebol firms, but are insignificant for the chaebol 
firms. When firms do not perform well , financial institutions also 
choose to hold many shares in the chaebol firms, but their holdings in 
the non-chaebol firms is insignificant. 
In answer to the first question, 
-Yes, the ownership structure of the Korean PLCs affects their corporate 
performance. 
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-How? The level of corporate value declines as insider ownership increases up to 
15 per cent. It rises as insider ownership increases up to 35 per cent and then 
declines again after 35 per cent. The relation between insider ownership and 
corporate value is significant at an ownership level between O per cent and 35 per 
cent, but is insignificant for levels above 35 per cent. In the case of Korean PLCs, 
around 35 per cent of insider ownership might be recommended for their higher 
corporate value. 
In answer to the second question, 
-Yes, there are significant correlations between ownership structure and corporate 
performance in the Korean corporate sector. 
-In what ways? Insider ownership of the Korean PLCs significantly affects 
corporate performance, but not vice versa. There is no significant correlation 
between ownership concentration and corporate value. There are significant 
relations between various ownership composition variables and corporate value. 1 
Corporate reform policy implications 
Since the financial crisis in Korea in 1997, economic reform including 
restructuring the corporate governance syste1n of the Korean corporate sector has 
been advanced under IMF guidelines and government reform policy. Many 
commentators, however, are still concerned about the ownership structure of the 
Korean PLCs. Ownership structure is often asserted to be one of the most 
important factors influencing the highly indebted financial structure, excessive 
diversifications, inadequate 1nonitoring and lack of checking as a result of a 
failure in accounting transparency and monitoring mechanisms. In this regard, the 
question of whether or not ownership structure of the Korean PLCs still affects 
their firm value was of main interest to this thesis. 
As discussed earlier, it has been suggested that insider ownership of the Korean 
PLCs non-monotonously affects their corporate performance, but not vice versa. 
In the case of Korean PLCs, around 35 per cent of insider ownership would be 
recommended for their higher corporate value. These results reveal that relatively 
1 See chapter 5. 
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higher insider ownership of the Korean PLCs has negatively affected corporate 
performance, and consequently influenced the crisis in 1997. The results, 
however, suggest that the level of insider ownership should remain at the 
appropriate level. Therefore the current government corporate reform policy, 
which is focusing on diminishing the insider ownership even the level lower than 
35 per cent, needs to be reconsidered in the light of higher performance of the 
PLCs. This study also suggests that the regulations and advice on appropriate 
insider ownership levels should be formed and updated. 2 
Those, however, most likely depend on the economic development stages, 
because, as discussed the empirical findings for the other nations in chapter 5, 
according to their economic and political environment in each nation. There may 
be different levels of appropriate insider ownership as in highly developed, low 
· developed, developing, and transitional economies rather than having a fixed level 
of insider ownership for all economies. 
The results also suggest that there are significant similarities and differences 
between the results for the chaebol firms and the non-chaebol firms with a non-
monotonous relation between the level of insider ownership and corporate value. 
The difference is that the relation between insider ownership and corporate value 
for the non-chaebol firms is much more significant at an ownership level between 
0 per cent and 35 per cent than for the chaebol finns. Preferably for the non-
chaebol firms, around 35 per cent of insider ownership is strongly recommended 
for their higher corporate value compare to the chaebol firms. Higher ownership 
concentration could affect positively corporate value in the case of the relatively 
smaller non-chaebol firms, while negative for the relatively larger chaebol firms. 
Financial institutions' shares affect posi ti vel y corporate value in the case of the 
non-chaebol firms, but have an insignificant effect on the chaebol firms. When 
firms do not perform well, financial institutions also choose to hold many shares 
in chaebol firms, while their holding in non-chaebol firms is insignificant. These 
results suggest that financial institutions perhaps take stock redemption for their 
2 The level of around 50 per cent of the current average in sider ownership is formed by top 30 largest 
chaebols under the limitation on the cross-shareholdings up to 25 per cent of their assets imposed after the 
financial crisis in 1997. The appropriate level of insider ownership should be suggested focused on the 
improvement of firm performance rather deciding the certain level without any empirical estim~tions. 
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loans when chaebols do not perform well and cannot afford to redeem. The high 
proportion of shares of financial institutions in non-chaebol firms, however, 
makes them perform well. 
Reviewing these results, there are significantly different aspects between chaebol 
and non-chaebol firms. The government, therefore, should differentiate between 
the corporate reform policies that could be applied respectively to the chaebol and 
non-chaebol firms. The current regulation of the categorisation for the 30 largest 
chaebols should be retained in order to improve differential policies for both 
groups of firms. 
Suggestions for further research 
This thesis provides an effective analysis of the relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate value in an emerging market, Korea. Despite the 
effectiveness of the analysis, some additional analyses are required as part of 
further research. 
First, collecting additional time-series, firm specific panel data would be another 
useful challenge for the next analysis. Even though this study has examined 
effectively the issues with a cross-sectional data set, it does not capture the long 
run economic aspects of factor accumulation and the differential values of 
corporate performance over the time path. To reflect a changing economic 
environment and corporate efficiency more realistically, it would also be more 
appropriate to approach the comparative analysis for the period before and after 
the crisis. 
Second, variations on the variables in the 1nodels, such as stock market liquidity 
and volatility, and more specific ownership variables, such as the relationship 
with the founders, could provide variability in the explanation of the results. To 
find more realistic results to reflect actual market environment, including more 
variables to explain corporate performance and ownership structure in the 
regressions would be a valuable contribution to the analysis. It would be 
worthwhile also trying different settings of the 111odel closures assumed. 
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Finally, an international comparative analysis using other nations' results, such as 
those for Japan and European nations would provide a broader range of aspects 
and more sensitive insights into the issues. Since the ownership structure issue is 
so sensitive and so highly debated these days a further extension of this kind 
would help to explain the features of particular corporate governance systems in 
major developed nations in terms of an optimal ownership structure. 
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Appendix Tables 
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Table A3.1 National accounts. 1963-1995 
-~ 
1963 1970 1980 1990 1995 
- ..,._...__.. 
Population (million) 27 32 38 43 45 
GNP per {]pita($) 100 252 1,589~ 5,659 10,0i6 
GNP ($bi1Uon) 2.3 8 61 . 242 +52-
Gross saving rate(%) 8.7 18.0 23.1 36.0 362 . 
Gross investment rate(%) 13.5 24.3 ]2.0 37.l ...... -
-
JI :J 
Share of GNP {%) 
Agriculture 435 'J6 .. ... J 14.9 8.7 6.6 
Manufacturing and mining 11.6 224 31.0 29_8 272 
Services 44.9 51.1 54.1 61.5 661 
Share o~ employment(%) 
Agrirulture 63.1 50.4 34.0 17.5 12.5 
Manufacturing and mining 8.7 14.3 22.5 '[] .6 23.6 
Services 35.4 35.3 43.5 54.9 63.9 
Unemployment rate(%} 8.2 4.4 5.2 2.4 2.0 
Exchange rate (won/$) 130 317 660 716 --1/J 
Exports ($billion} 0.09 0.9 ]7.2 · 63.J 125 
Imports ($billion) 0.50 1.8 21.6 65.1 -135 
Trade balance ($billion) -.41 -0.9 -4.3 -2.0 -4-.7 
Experts/GNP(%) 3.9 14.1 34.0 29.8 415 
Imports/GNP(%) 16.1 23.8 41.5 30.J -t2.0 
:, -----
1963-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-95 1963,.95 
Average annual growth {%)a 9.8 9.7 8.3 7.8 8.9 
Gross saving rate (%1 · 11.7 222 30.2 35,6 24.8 
Gross investment rate(%) 18.9 27.9 30.4 37.0 31.4 
Inflation: average annual rate(%) 15.8 15.2 8.4 6.6 11.7 
Real effective exchange rate 
1985-86 = 100 (average) 78.9 88.9 93.5 104.Sb 95.0C 
Average population growth{%) 2.5 1.8 1.2 0.9 1.6 
Average growth of employment(%) 3.5 3.8 2.0 2.5 3.1 
Average unemployment rate(%] 6.6 4.0 3.8 2.4 41 
Aveu\ge growth of productivity 7Jd 2.6 4.2 4.3b 41c 
Growth of reai wages over prod u~tivi t'j 3.3e 2.6 4.2 3.3b 4.(i( 
--
.... __ ··---- -
. - - --- ----·--
._ 
"Average annu~_growth rJtes are arithmetic averages over U,e period. 
b 19W-1994; \' 1964-94: J 1964-69: and I' 1966-69 
Sources:NSO l<R6; Nam and Kim 1995:J?S. 
Cited from Kwon (1997) 
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Table A3.2 National accounts, 1996-1999 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ql Q2 Q3 Annual 
GDP Growth (%) 6.8 5.0 ., 8 -:). 4.6 9.8 12.3 9.01 
Final consumption (%) 7.2 3.2 -8.2 5.0 7.2 BA n.a. 
Gross fixed capital formation ( % ) 7.3 -2.2 -21.1 -4.3 4.9 6.9 n.a. 
Exports of goo<ls and services ( % ) 11.2 21.4 13.3 11.9 16.0 22.2 n.a. 
Imports of goods and services ( %) 14.2 3.2 -22.0 27.4 27.4 32.0 n.a. 
Inflation ( % ) 4.9 4.5 7.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 l.P 
Unemployment Rate ( % ) 2.0 2.6 6.8 8.4 6.6 5.8 6.92 
Interest rate (%) (3--yr corp bond) 12.6 24.3 8.3 8.3 8.0 9.6 3.42 
Reserve money growth (%) 2.1 -15.0 -7.2 LO 12.1 16.2 n.a. 
MCT growth(%) 2L7 15.3 7.5 5.0 6.4 7.7 n.a. 
Government deficit/GDP (%) +0.3 +0.03 --4.2 -0.2 n.a. n.a. -5.23 
Current a/ c deficit (U$ biU) -23.0 -8.2 40.6 7.2 6.5 6.6 18.22 
Foreign ex. rate (W /US$) 805 951 1399 1198 1192 1194 11822 
Foreign reserves {US$ billion) 33.2 20.4 52.0 "7 -a .!J 62.0 65.5 n.a. 
FDI inflow (US-i~ billion) 3.2 7.0 8.9 2.0 9 r, .... !) 4.0 15.02 
Stock price index 833 6,..-' ~j 406 572 769 952 n.a. 
vVage rate increase (%) 12.2 .. 2 :). -3.l 8.9 13.6 n.a. n.a. 
Foreign investment in Korean 3074 424 5723 1786 151 -4645 n.a. 
stock (net) (billion ·won)4 
Source: Bank of Korea 1999. Jvfanth.ly Bull.etin1 September. 
1Korea Development Institute 1999. (Korea Herald I 22 October 1999) 
~SERI 1999. Korean Economic Trends, IO July. 
·'Choi, Kwang 1999. 
4Korea Institute of Finance 1999. 
Cited from Kwon (1999) 
141 
Table A3.3 Regulations on economic concentration as of 1990 
-t Contem 
·~ 
J\farket Suppression 
,, 1 Iolding (.:Ompanie::; arc prohibited or 
Scrncture e:conom1c Restrictions on total investment in subsidiaries 
concenlrntion Restrictions on cross-debt guarantees 
... 
Rcstriction5 on voting rhrhts of financial and in~urancc companies 
.... .... 
; having, shares of aniliates 
Restrictions on i Anti~competitive ?vf&A~ prohibited ! 
~{&As I~ Unfair M&A.s are prohibited ... 
. 
~ - . 
C:onJOra{e Restrictions on Reslnctions on unjust price determination and change 
Belrnvior exere:1srng Restricti()n5' on entry barriers 
market pt~wcr Restrictions on hindering other firms ' operaLions . 
Restriction~ on Restrictions on coiILL~i vc determination of price:,; and sale conditions. 
collusion Restrictions on regional demarcation and exdu~ive dealing; 
··~ ---
. . . 
' l\:faintaining resale prices is prohlbitcd i. Restrictions ! on 
' Rcstricrions on unfair international contracts ~ Unfair ., i 
l Transactions 1 .. ,_ 
Source: Korea Economic Research Institute (1995) 
Table A3.4 Changes in the shares of insider ownership of the 
chaebol (%) 
1983 1987 1~9 1m 1991 1992 1993 1m [995 l~ 
Top30 5i.2 56.2 46.2 45.4 46.9 46.l 4J.4 42.7 43.3 44.l 
Fami!y 17.2 l5.8 14.7 117 tl9 12.6 10.3 9.7 l 0.5 [OJ 
S ubs.idiaries 40.0 40.4 .,) 5 J •. 3 l.7 33.0 '1J r J .) 33.l 33.0 J2.8 33.8 
T \ op-· - 60.3 49.4 49.6 5I.6 
..... 
5 l.9 49,0 47.5 48.1 45,2 
Family - 15.6 117 I" " J . .1 13.2 [3J 11.8 12.5 9.4 8,6 
Subsidiaries - 44.7 3" 7 }, 36.3 38.4 38.6 .., . ., i J .I ... 35 ,0 38.i · 36,6 
Hvunda1 81.4 79.9 - 60 .2 67.8 6),i J7.E 6[.3 60.4 56.2 ~ 
Samsung 59.5 56.5 . 5l.4 53.2 58J r'} 9 J.L. , 48.9 49.3 46.7 
Daewoo 70.6 56.2 - 49. l 50.4 48.8 46.9 42.4 4 l.4 40.1 
. LG "O ') j .L 41.5 . 35.2 38J 39J 38.8 37.7 "9 7 j • I 38.3 
Note : The figures for the top 30 and the top 5 chaebol are tl1e \Veighted 
average of individual chaebol (according to the size of their capi-
tal base) in the respective grouping. 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
Table A3.5 Internal and cross-shareholdings of the 30 largest 
chaebols, 1999 (Unit: Million Won) 
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(1999.4.1 .7I~) 
~ ~ (~,:}~ ) ~*:,"~~(%) 
::i 1~~8 :.qg~ 
~ii 'rJ ~ '11 
~~ At/I 
~Jil 'rJ ~).~ ~6t b/a c/a (b+c) d/a e/a (d+e) 
{a) (b) (c} (d) (e ) /a la 
1~QJ 12 257 323 138,390 520 497 6 188 225 64 204 1 . 1 4.2 5.4 50.5 0.5 ~'1 :0 
2C11.Y. 6 771 964 263 .989 - 116 409 3219184 63 226 3 .9 1.7 5.6 47.5 0.9 48 .5 
3M~ 5 837 ,986 41 009 73, 273 2 287,911 79 209 0 .7 1.3 2.0 39.2 1.d 40.5 
4~:i:1 6 229 708 15 ,980 212,837 2,992 ,117 40 357 0.3 3 .4 3.7 48.0 0.6 48.7 
50!! ~;,JJOI 2446313 103 197 51,135 1 445 306 33 633 4.2 2.1 6.3 59 . 1 1 . 4 60.5 
6tl'~ 1 083 307 4 7 .963 131 033 238 415 24, 317 4.4 12 .1 16.5 22.0 2.2 24.3 
t 
?~% 1 063 413 36 914 22 240 469 017 13 196 3.5 2. 1 5.6 44 . ~ 1.2 45.3 
8~~ 1 004 840 41 208 11 ,659 271 139 22 858 4 .1 1.2 5 .3 27 0 2.3 29.3 
9~~ 1 14 7 .292 4 010 19 180 530 732 30 721 0 .3 1. 7 2.0 46 .3 2.7 48.9 
10~1::il 1 557 ,685 13 ,667 76 053 358 486 65 0 .9 4 .9 5.8 23 .0 0.0 23.0 
1i ~Ot 483 002 8 482 6 623 241 ,937 9 099 1.8 1. 4 3 .1 50 .1 1.9 52.0 
12~~ 1 588,839 7,958 27 148 360 761 3 377 0.5 1. 7 2.2 22.7 0 .2 22.9 
;3 5ftl 379 ,01 5 3 3 t6 46 659 148 462 18 509 0 .9 12.3 13 .2 39 .2 4.9 44 . 1 
14Q! ~ 548 055 10 ,690 23 789 158 091 0 2.0 4.3 6.3 28.8 0. 0 28.8 
15~~kjJY 543 425 21 1 78 44 392 137 423 787 3.9 8.2 12. 1 25 .3 0.1 25.4 
16%-¥ 606 823 20 1 71 27 .571 334 926 5 390 3 .3 4.5 7, 9 55 .2 0 .9 56 .1 
11~2.r 338 24 2 i .3 55 54 712 55 899 11 90 1 0 .4 16.2 16.6 16. 5 3.5 £'.'O .v 
18.:2 ~ 270 ,0 76 4 397 2.4 74 39 559 20 ,052 1. 6 0 .9 2.5 14 .6 7.4 22 .1 
19~~ 174 843 15 ,060 5 706 43 235 37 987 8.G 3 .3 11 . 9 24 . 7 21. 7 46.5 
203.2.! 404 931 7 002 ~ 9,413 122 .20 4 4 491 1. 7 4.8 6 .5 30 .2 1 . 1 3 1. 3 
21 %~ 957 492 10 .9\ 7 2'7 ,466 460. i 74 4 268 1 . 1 2 .9 4.0 48. 1 0 .4 48 .5 
, 
~-
22~ £ 631 197 35 500 E.63 3 455 073 0 5.6 i _ 1 6 .7 72 .1 0.0 72. 1 
2JO~ E' 353.185 9 669 21 830 70 226 825 2.7 6.2 8. 8 19. 9 0, 2 20 .1 
24t.H Q1 120 877 4 792 3 670 54 239 355 4.0 3.C 7.0 44 .9 0.3 45.2 
25~ -eJ \ 71 427 10 234 13 373 63,911 0 6 .0 7.8 13.8 37.3 0 .0 37. 3 
2 6 ?:H'::l {'J ~ 132 398 90 1 1 J 11 4 71,027 0 0 , 7 9.9 10.6 53.6 0. 0 53.6 
27c,y ~ \ i6,546 22 865 l 1 640 50,958 12 .293 i9.6 10.0 29.6 43.7 10. 5 54 .3 
I 
28kl!<5J~i~ ! 436,133 41 977 2.182 189 0 46 6 173 9 .6 0.5 10.1 43.3 1. 4 44. 8 
29~~ 286 567 19.555 1 365 66 643 6.036 6 .8 0 .5 7.3 23.3 2. 1 25.4 
30,g~t I \ 78,888 1 .525 21,321 75 ,957 4.218 0 .9 1Ul 12.8 42 .5 2.4 44.8 
e.t )11 48,12 1 ,792 963,871 h ,615 ,397 21,200 ,283 ~17,547 2.0 3 .4 5.4 44 . 1 1 . , ~5. 1 
Note: (a)capital stock, (b)founder, (c)family or relatives, (d)affiliated firms, (e)own 
stock 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
(b+c+ 
d+e) 
/a 
56 .4 
54 .1 
42.5 
52.4 
66.8 
40 .8 
50.9 
34 .5 
51 .0 
,. 
28 .8 
55.1 
25 .1 
57 .2 
35 . 1 
37 .5 
63.9 
36 .6 
24 .6 
58 .3 
37 .8 
52 .S 
78.8 
29.0 
52.2 
51. 1 
64.2 
83 .9 
54.9 
32.7 
57 .6 
50. 5 
Table A3.6 Cross-debt guarantees of the 30 largest chaebols, 1999 
(Unit: l00million won, % ) 
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~- 3·- . . 9,538 ; -.::5 ~ ! "-i ; ·,? 91'7( 
, I - -.. -i 
1,7011 1.223 ' ·) c::.•-;,.:11 - .. .._/l-J· -'. 
2 --, l 265i ·-;, '.~ l -.:- l ,JO_ ....,s • - t.::>1 
I 
4,590! 10~3061 1 .... ~ - > Cj(j i - -:,C>..... \ 
I ' 
343[ -1 343!; 
l 
664 •:;>r') ' ..__.,:;.,., 686 
I 
3,509 29lj 3 8Qf'i , ·t.. .,• 
l,728l zs : l~~! I , f....., j 
2,3851 
I 
3301 2,' ( 15j 
3,8561 239 · 4,095] 
I 
2.733 254 2,9871 
2,563 108 l 2,671
1 
3,142 
' 
3,142 
451! 
1 
75 1 5261 
1.108 1.1 osl 
l 
2,103 5,252[ 
27 
28 
29 
30 
~I 
I -;J- 0 J: j 7 ,881 
I 1 -5 ~-1] r 754_~4-l-+--
1 G-30 c}J 1 249,:-::>71 I ~ 5-~} 1.co.3.812 
----- - --- - - -···. 
3,14:1 
1,601 
2? .875! 26,.562 
74.949 997626 
97,824 126,188 
1,605 
49,437 
174..575 
224.012 
Note: (A) shareholders ' equity, (B) cross-debt guarantees 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
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Table A3. 7 The number of businesses of the 30 largest chaebols, 
1998-99 
I 3 
! 4 
I 
I s 
I 6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
112 
j 13 
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.:,~ :-r :: .. r 
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011 .,.__ 711 o I 
oP-:1 
L... L..'. 
~~ 
~t~ 
.::J..-"-i:.:::i..2. 
~C1i 
£QI 
o r 
i;-~~ 
'-' 2 
C,A,l T~ 
l 
I 
l 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
cij <ed 114 I 1,s ~~Xilf}I 
1, 7 p~2~ I 
1s2gJ- I 
19.a.~ I 
i 20 .:i:l.2. ! I 
\21 ~~ I . 
J22 ti£ 
123 o~~ 
124 o~Eij 
\2s "H~ \ 
126 g~H~ I 
\27 c~~ i 
12s x,1 ~ Xii g I 
129 Al-=- I 1-.C _2. I 
\3o ~~ I 
1998 (A) 
37 
31 l 
30 I 
29 I 
28 I 
25 I 
24 
26 
21 I 
0 I 
17 I 
15 I 
0 I 
15 I 
14 
14 
11 
19 
22 
18 
8 I 
15 I 
13 I 
17 I 
17 I 
16 I 
0 I 
21 I 
0 I 
17.34 I 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
1999 (BJ 
32 
31 
27 
31 
28 
25 
25 
24 
20 
21 
16 
15 
24 
13 
12 
15 
9 
13 
21 
17 
10 
15 
13 
18 
18 
14 
12 
20 
14 
19.07 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I . 
I 
I 
~ ?J (B-A) t:il ~ 
-5 
0 
-3 
2 I 
0 
0 
1 
-2 
-1 I 
21 
-1 
0 
24 
-2 I 
-2 
A 
I 
-2 
-6 
-1 
-1 
2 
0 , 
0 I 
1 I 
1 i I 
-2 I 
12 I 
-1 I 
14 I 
L 7a I 
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I 
I 
I 
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Table A3.8 Diversification of the 30 largest chaebols in the mining 
and manufacturing sectors 
(Entropy ~iversification index) 
19g4 1987 1994 
ET ER EB EBiET ET I ER EB EH/ET ET ER · EB EB/ET I 
l-5 [l.6!6 ' l 0_668 l.455 0.839 0.568 1.463 0_816 1 0.647 0-421 l.967 0.652 1.315 
6-10 1.263 0.444 0.819 0-578 1.152 0-448 I 0.704 Q_637 1.510 0.470 1.040 0.6&8 
11-15 0.981 0.325 0.656 0-727 1.196 0J29 0.867 0.759 1.683 0588 l .095 0.650 
16-20 0.825 0 "30 0.495 • 0. 710 I 0.945 0.432 0 .;y 1 0 ~'78 ! 1.413 0.703 0 7'J'T 0.5[4 . .J . ,~ t _ •~ I . ,;_,/ 
') 1 1 - 0.836 0-2.3 l . 0.605 0.636 0.896 G.225 ,!_ -,::_:) ! 
' 
0.671 . 0.80 l I 1.268 0.549 0.7!8 I 0.566 
"6 "O i _ .. .. 0.486 CU05 0.381 0.715 0.867 0.183 0.684 0.812 1.134 0.510 0.624 0.550 
Av0 l 0.974 0.342 0.632 0.65] 1.087 0.406 0.681 0.66~ l.498 0.579 0.919 0.613 .... ~· t 
Notes : ET=Tc)tal diversification entropy index. 
ER=Related diversification entropy index. 
EB=Unrelated diversification entropy index. 
ET=EB+ISuER; ER=I>S1jiogSi.i; EB=rSJogSj (i=l, 2, .... ~ n; 
K_SIC t\vo-digit industry; j= 1, 2~ .... ~ 111~ KSIC three-digit industry). 
Si denotes the share of industry i in a chaebors total sales; Sj denotes 
the share of sub-industry j in a chaebol's total sales; Sij denotes 
the share of sub-industry j in a chaebots total sales in industry i. 
Source: Lee and Lee ( 1990, p39) 
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Table A3.9 Diversification in chaebols and ratio of listed firms to 
total affiliates 
' Total Unrelate-d Listed Affiliah.:s N,1n1c Rank I )i v<.---n;i ficati on Divcrsificmion (A} (.!3} Ratio f A -'B) 
H y l•n<lai I 43 J.2 :n .._~ 
~ I 37%, 
S.un1sung 2 41 27 13 80 t 16% 
LG f J 23 1.6- I l 49 22¾ 
' [}8C\V(10 
\ 
4 23 17 5 9 30 30% 
SK 5 10 9 6 46 13'% 
Ssangyong 6 21 18 10 25 40'-',;, 
Han_iin 7 2] ]6 9 24 38% 
Kia !< l) 8 •t ' 28 14% 
Hanwha 9 
' 
'.!l [6 3! 23~ ... o 
Lotte 10 9 6 4 30 l J~,() 
Kumho l l 6 6 3 26 l2" .. -',:.~ 
Halla ~ 12 R ,, ~ 4 18 22~---
Dong Ah 13 7 6 I 4 19 21 ~,,. l 
Doo San 14 (',l 14 :8 25 32'?--o 
Da,:;lim 15 9 9 ' 5 21 24% 
Hansnl 16 l[ l(J ti } 23 26~·~., 
Hyosung t7 4 4 2 18 l l "/(, 
Dong Kuk S11.--cl Mill f8. i 10 7 5 l? 2 9~,~ 
Jinrn 19 9 9 4 24- 17% 
Kolon 20 (, 4 4 24 1 7~--;, 
Knhap 2f 7 j -~ 2 13 15~-;; 
' Dong.bu 22 ]~ 14. (j 34 lK'Vi, 
f-iaiLai 23 7 7 3 l .'.' 20'Vi, 
Hani.l .24 I I i 1 7 14'7<> 
Keo Pyung: 25 ') 9 5 I, 22 23%, 
:\1 i \von ( D:ac,;l1.ng) 2(, 8 8 4 ~.'> 16';-~ 
Shinho j 27 j 9 I 
9 (, 25 ~4'% 
Kang \Von Ind. 28 .., 2 2 12 l 7"✓-tt . ... 
Saehan 
' 
29- 4 
'I J I 2 11 1 8°,1) 
Dong Yang ! :w 4 l 4 I 4 24 1 '?"/~ (. "hei l J edang 31 ' ., 2 1 ::< I 3u_;u 
; Sl.insL:ga.c.:: ,..., l i I ! l 8 13% ::JL. 
: 0-ricntlil Chc.::m«;1.d ind. 33 (, 4 J !2 25%, ! 
\\,\10,;ung 34 2 2 ! . .., ..:. 2 100% 
Byuck San 35 8 8 4 [l .36'!,;, 
Shin \',-'on 
< 
J6 15 9 4 10 40%, 
Tongil 37 8 7 5 l l 45'~,i':, 
Taiflan Elect1;ic Wire 3~ i 1 l l 4 25°;--C) 
-
continued 
l !, I 
i 
' 
Total lJnrdatcd Lisred AffUiates 
"Karne Ra11k 
,, 
i I Ratio (Ai B) 
I )i vt..--rsification Di vc,,-r.;i ficati on (A) (B} 
T(mgko<1-k 39 4 4 2 9 ~2~.•b 
Chong Gu 40 l I l ·' 14<::-·o 
Kc::umkang 4 1 _-i. 2 " 4 50"/o "-
Sam Y,ing :1 "1- l l 1 7 14°,o -,--4- i 
Hankook Tirr.: ?-..ffg. 43 ! 1 1 
.. 3:!-"-!-·-:.a ., 
, Pum Y,mg t 44 1 l l 7 14'!-'u 
Tae K-...v~ng ind. 45 ::l· ~ 4 ; 2 5 40'!-·u l 
l)uinong 46 4 4 2 3 67%,-
1.· ong Poong 47 
'{ s 5 3 14 21% 
Kukd.ong 4 8 3 2 l ; 4 25%, 
Su.ngshin Cemem !\-1fg , 49 4 3 1 4 25% 
Sarn \\'ban 50 4 4 3 4 75% I 
.. 
I l-20 l 5 .5 12. l 7.0 31.R 22,6'%, ! 1\v-:;n1 5TC ~ l -"0 9 _--, 7. 4 4.3 18 .R 2.2 _9~·•i1 ·; 
I 
i 
Note The top 30 chaebol are ranked according to the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission and the rest according to a database from Korea In-
vestors Services., l.nc. 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission, Korea Investors Services, Inc. 
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Table A3.10 The number of subsidiaries of the 30 largest chaebols 
Rank Group 87 RR 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 ' 98 99.4 99.12 
l •Hyundai 32 34 ,.,. 39 42 43 45 48 4R 46 57 62 62 40 .. 1 ,1 i 
' 
2 Dae\VOO ' 29 13 28 27 24 22 1~ 24 22 25 30 37 34 20 ,I. 1 1-.:. 
.., Samsung 35 "~ 42 45 48 52 55 50 55 55 80 61 49 44 J j/ 
t 
4 LG 57 62 59 58 62 58 54 53 5{} 48 49 52 48 37 
i 
, ' 
..,,.,, 45 4l 36 5 SK 16 18 20 24 26 ' 31 " •'} '.);'' 46 ( ,,.:... _j .) I. 
' 
J..2. l 
" 
Hanjin 13 l6 16 18 22 23 ' 24 21 .., ... 24 24 25 21 ]9 6 .L.J 
7 Ssangy{)ng 22 21 21 21 22 22 22 23 22 23 'l - 22 
,.,, 21 ~ "":, 
,._,..., 
,: 
' l 21 21 8 Han\-vha 21 23 26 ")"'1 ')7 17 ') "'1 29 ')0 3 l 31 3l ~ I _, ... , ·- I ... . ,
9 KcumHo 19 19 12 ]8 22 ·r 24 ')1 I 14 
., .... 26 32 29 20 ... ) _.., .f-} 
) 
' 
•, 
I I 10 Lotte i 31 32 .,.., 31 32 '1'J 32 30 29 28 30 28 28 28 ~ ,1 !., .-,_ 
' 
11 Donga 16 !6 16 16 16 16 13 14 14 16 i 19 
'1) 
i.- 15 18 
I 12 Hansol 1 19 23 19 19 19 ' 
. 
continued 
T 
Rank Group 8'7 88 89 90 91 92 ! 93 94 95 96 9·, 98 i 99.4 99.12 ~ ) - I • i 
13 Doosan 21 22 21 23 23 24 25 24 27 26 "'1- 23 ! 14 14 1 .,:,..) ( 
'i 
14 Daelim 14 13 t 13 13 14 13 1,-:i 1~ 17 18 2] 2[ 17 [4 t ,:,,.. i 
t5 Dongguk [3 13 ! I" l3 [4 14 14 16 16 t6 17 17 16 14 I _") 
t6 DongBu 12 I 13 13 13 l I 1 l 12 13 j 13 24 34 l j ! 34 32 22 
' 
17 Halla I 6 9 l 10 i j 5 ' 5 7 IO 12 [5 17 18 l 8 17 15 } f: 1 j 
' 
18 Kohap s 5 7 7 7 7 7 I 8 1.0 11 13 13 8 i 7 ' :, ~ ! 
19 Hvosunr:r 15 15 13 14 I 14 14 14 ~ 14 15 16 18 21 17 15 ! ~ ::, ! \ / 
· -
I 
16 l \ i 20 Kolon 17 18 19 I 21 21 21 19 20 19 24 25 19 18 r !1 ~, 
~ ' ~ 21 . Dongyang '7 >' 9 11 14 16 16 19 ') '1 1: 24 23 21 23 f ! .. i .,.,,_ 
' 
,. 
., ., ]Jinro 23 20 20 19 !7 12 j 14 "},i 25 17 17 .L.L 1 i "-..,.. 
1 1 l 23 fAnam 12 9 9 9 ' 21 15 15 I4 j 
24 Ua~Tae 13 12 10 9 9 10 I 10 9 13 14 !5 15 I 15 14 ' 
' f. 
25 Sachan 16 15 14 
. 
i 
26 Kang\von 9 1 14 14 14 14 27 13 6 i 
I 1 ) ''"' DaeSang 14 I 15 
t 19 20 20 'Y) 24 22 14 25 20 14 15 _ J ,c._. ; 
28 Jeil_jedang I ; l 15 16 ! i 
' r 
' I 29 Shi.nho [ ! 25 28 21 I 16 , 
I ' 30 Samyang .,. 6 6 7 i 10 10 J ! 
l 1 ' :t TotRI i I 1 686 589 i \ 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
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Table A3.ll Major activities of the top 10 chaebols, ranked by 
sales.1983 
Sales Name Nu mber or \1embcr hnns i\,fajor M:inufacturing ActiviLies Major Non-Manufacturing Activities Rank 
Total Manu- Non-rnanu-
facturing facturing 
1. Hyundai 32 18 14 Shipbuilding and repair. motor Construction, commerce and trade, 
vehicles. steel, machinery transport and storage, insurance 2. Samsung 29 14 15 Electronics, sugar refining, textile Commerce and trade, insurance, 
weaving. shipbuilding and repair construction, broadcasting 3. Lucky /Go I dstar 24 15 9 Petroleum refi 11ing, electronics, Commerce and trade, construction 
chemicals, non-ferrous metals finance, insurance 
4. Sunkyung 14 7 7 Petroleum refining, textile fibers, Commerce and trade, construction, 
ofiice equipment transport and storage 
5. Daewoo 24 l5 9 Shipbuilding and repair, motor Commerce and trade, finance, 
vehicles, industrial machinery, transport and storage 
electrical appliances 
6. Ssangyong 14 7 "1 Petroleum refining, cement, paper Commerce and Trade, construction, ' 
transport and storage, insurance 
7. Kukje 18 8 10 Steel , agricultural machinery, Commerce and trade, construction, 
chemicals, paper insurance. Lransport and storage 8. Hanguk Hwayak 18 9 9 Petroleum refining, chemicals, dairy Commerce and trade, construction, 
products insurance 
0 Hanjin 12 11 Cement Transport and storage. constmction, .,,, 
:finance, insurance 
l 0. Hyosung 20 l6 4 Textile fibers, rubber tires and tubes, Commerce and trade, construction 
electrical machinery, leather 
Source: Zeile (1996) 
lndustry 
Until 1968 
Trading 
Food and 
beverage 
Textiles 
Finance 
and 
insurance 
Distribution 
and 
advertisement 
Other 
services 
Other 
manufacturing 
Table A3.12 Change in Samsung subsidiaries 
1938-59 
S. General Store 
(1938)* 
S. Tading Co. (1951) 
Keunyoung (1958) 
Chosun Bre,very 
(1939)" 
Chosun Yeast 
(1948t 
Cheil Sugar Refinery 
(1953) 
Pungkuk Liquor 
(1953)* 
Taehan Sugar (1955t 
Hyosung Trading 
(1957Y 
Tongyang Sugar 
(1957)* 
1960-68 1969-75 
d1eil Sugar Sale Donglip Industry 
(1969)* (1978t 
Sunil Dextrose (1972)* 
Cheil Wool (1954) Hanil Nilon (1963)" Chell Synthetics 
Tongil Textile (1958)* Samyoung Inc. (1968)* (1972) 
Cheil Costume (1958)* Samri Textile (1973t 
Heungup Bank Dongbang Life 
(1957)' Insurance (1963) 
Chunil Securities Dongnam Securities 
(1957)" (1963 )" 
1976-80 
Hankuk Coking 
(1982) 
Cheil Frozen Food 
(1987) 
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1981-93 
Hicreation (1988) 
S. Winners Card 
(1988) 
Dongsung 
Investment 
Consulting (1988) 
. Gf) XYC l . 5'£ . . . b'\'ft':C w::·1 • l'S 'J;;S·½ ·: •' ii. · ' · •. . .. . , 1·' .. GCCC:"X'" .,.. .. ... • ··, c CC)) 'CO) ..... , :~:"'•/¼-;:!'..;.:. T ::;:;::~- .J_._ . · · ·· ..... · ,..._ -~~-... .. w .. _ ,._ . .... , "-4_. , ._,. .• -•··- · ...•. 
Commercial Bank Dongyang Fire & 
(1958)* Marine Insurance 
Anguk Fire Insurance (1963yt" 
(1958) 
Choheung Bank (1959)* 
Shinsegae Dept. Store Shinsegae Store (1974) 
(1963) Cheil Communications 
Joon-Ang Develop-
ment Co. (1963) 
Dongyang Broadcast 
(1963)* 
Joong-Ang TV Broad-
cast (1963)* 
Joong-Ang Daily 
News (1965) 
Seoul FM Broadcast 
(1966)* 
Korea Hungjin (1966) 
Samchuck Cement Ulsan Fertilizer (1961)* 
(1956)* Taehan Oil (1963)' 
(1973) 
Hotel Shilla (1973) 
Honam Fertilizer Hankook Fertilizer (1964:t 
(1958)* Junju Paper (1965) 
Hankook Tier (1958)* 
Kyungju Hotel Shilla 
(1977) 
Yunpo Leisure 
Development (1979) 
Cheil Bozel (1989) 
Shinsegae Taejun 
Station Store (1990) 
S. Lions (1982) 
Hankuk Safety 
System (1981) 
Chosun Hotel (1983) 
Dongbang Building 
Maintenance (1988) 
Daekyung Building 
(1989) 
S. Economic 
Research Institute 
(1986) 
From 1969 top-resent 
Electric and 
electronics 
S. Electronics (1969) 
S. Sanyo Electric 
(1969) 
Joong-Ang SVP SS Watch (1983) 
(1 979)* 
S. GTE Communica- SS H.-P. (1984) 
ti.on (1977)• 
continued 
1%U---68 
from 1969 to preseni 
Heavv 
' industry 
Petrochemical~ 
Construction 
Noles: 5. represents Samsung. Firms marked • are now defunct. 
Sources: Samsung Economic Institution (1986); Kim (1993). 
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1~b9·-/.J 
S. Display Devices 
(19i0) 
S. Electric Parts 
(1973) 
Hankuk Computer 
(1971) 
Electro-Mechanics 
(1973) 
S. Coming (1973) 
S. Heavy Industry 
(1974) 
S. Petrochemicals 
(1974) 
Joong-Ang 
Engineering (1975) 
S. Semi-conductor 
(1977)* 
Hankuk-Electro 
19Kl-93 
SS Medical 
Systems (1984) 
SS Data Systems 
Communication . (1985) 
(1980) Hankuk Shinvets ) 
Silicon (1986) 
SS Emerson Electrics 
(1988) 
Kwangju Electronics 
(1989) 
Samtech (1990) 
S. Precision (1977) SS United Aerospace 
(1985) 
S. Shipbuilding (1977) SS Clark (1987) 
S. Aerospace (1977) SS Kloekner (1989) 
Taisung Heavy 
Industries (1977)" 
Korea Engineering 
(1978) 
S. Engineering & 
Construction (1977) 
Taehan Precision 
Chemicals (1988) 
SS General 
Chemicals (1988) 
Cheil Sibagaigi 
(1988) 
BP-Chemicals (1989) 
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Table A3.13 Capital structure of firms in selected countries, 1980-1991 
Long- Short- Deprecia- Dividend Earnings Dehl term debt tem1 debt tion to Countries. to total to toUil 
ratw to total to total 10ml 
e4uily equity asseL:.; assets as.sets 
Australia I ,248 U.563 0.653 0.033 001 "' ' , .,__ 0.064 
Austda 2.696 1.121 1.495 0.05 ! 0.017 ! 0.075 
MU., 
--
Belgium 2.023 0.764 1.259 0.039 oo-:n i 0.092 - -L. l 
Brazit 0 .560 0, 1]9 0-421 - 0.014 ! 0.057 
' 
Canada l.600 0.990 0.539 U.045 0.007 
1 0,064 ; j 
- I Finland 4.920 3.094 1.856 0 04') 0.014 0,077 ' .... I 
France 3.613 l.417 2. 108 (l.043 0.013 0,094 
.. ~•. 
Gerrnanv 1.731 1.479 1.188 (J.070 0.057 0.087 
Hem~ Kong 1.322 0.309 
.,,..., 
0.967 CJ.Ot 7 0.019 0.121 
India 2.700 0. 763 1.937 0.038 j 0.014 I 0 1 ~1 . j_ 
ltaly 3.068 Ll 14 1.954 0.041 0.070 0.080 
,.,.,._,. . ... -~ 
Japan 3.688 0.938 1 "716 "'- · j L.,. 
. 
0.026 0.007 0.067 
~ Jordan I. JR l 0.266 0.9 [5 - 0.033 0.073 ~ 
Korea 3.662 l .057 2 . .390 o C -1 . , 1:-:,_ 0.00:fs 0.100 i 
V 
Ma~aysia 0.935 0,284 0.639 0.021 0.026 0.087 
, • ;...w.;.;c,x 
l\'fexicn 0 ;' 17 ,(') . (' ,, 1:: J' :> ' .) 0.442 - ~ (L076 
Netherlands 7 1 r 6 L., J 0.710 1.297 0.043 0.020 0.094 
............ 
-
----·· I N·e\V Zealand l -,.., () .., ~."I ' (}_ 776 0.030 0.025 0.106 .).,:,./ .. /).;. i l 
. -. . 
. 
. 
Nonvay ~ "I "7 ~ 3.495 
:: 
1.880 0.049 0.009 t 0.092 ' ~ ,.) ,' J ~ t 
..,..,,..,.,,.. .. v , 
-- ~ Pa.kista.n 2.953 0.595 ~ 2.358 0.038 0.028 0.115 f l 
. ,., ... ; Singapore 1.2]2 0.491 i 0.718 0.022 0.018 ! 0.077 
---
.. . ,., 
--
South Africa 1 .115 0.597 i 0.518 0.013 fl062 0.206 
--.. --
Spain 1 746 _.. ~· l.086 I l.649 OJJ40 fJ.016 0.095 
S\vedcn 5.552 2.879 2.32 ! 0.fJ36 0.011 0.100 
. "" :,.. 
-·· 
,_ 
Swtuerhmd I --o . / ) ) :;!.-8 l .1. ,i\ U.872 0.043 1 0,016 '"J C "'f"' ( . _) ,' _) 
Thailc1nd l 1 Jr_ L , , ,:_, J 0.518 l 769 l ,, . 0.030 l 0.029 0.129 
Turkcv 1.996 1.511 I.Sil 
' 
- 0,068 0.239 ,.,. _  ,... __ 
--UK (.480 I 1.065 l.065 I 0.032 0 0"' - OJ>-25 j . L) I 
' 
••• )fl; 
} 
L.JSA l. 79 l l () ') ··l. 0.679 ~ 0.045 0 n l( 0.016 ' -~ '-1 . ,. ) 
...... , ..... 
Zimbabwe 0.80 1 0 I R7 0.6f5 ; 0,031 0 0"'8 .0.028 , c. I ~ - ,L. ,. 
"""" .. 
- - . . -
Source: Calculated from the International Finance Corporation ' s Corporate Finance Data 
by Demigruc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, p354) 
l 
' 
j 
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Table A3.14 Capital shortage in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (1960-73) 
(Unit: Billions of Korean Won, billions of Japanese Yen, and 
millions of Taiwanese New Taiwan dollar) 
Korea Japan Tai,van 
Year GDI GDS BiA GDI l GDS 13/A GDl GDS (A) fB} (%) (A) (B) f '}·o) (A} (B) 
1960 ".J6.8 ! J,5 13.1 5,233.0 1 5,.294.0 . 101.2 l2.6 7_9 
1965 "l , ... - -..'.....:. .) . ) 122.5 54.3 . l0 ,543.0 
i. 
10,910.0 · 103 .5 26,J 22.1 
1970 704.7 41~ ') . .:.-,. _.,_ 'I 60.l 28,055.0 28,839.0 102.8 57.4 56.9 
f 97] 805.4 458.2 56.9 28.71 ~.0 i 30,813.0 107.3 l 65.2 71.6 
' 
1972 ~ R05.5 l l';,7'7 1 71 ~ 7 32,712.0 34,581.0 l05.7 72~2 92.1 - I•••- .. 
! 
1973 1.292.3 1,089.7 84.3 44,582.0 45,099.0 I 1 D ( .2 90.0 86.9 I 
1960- ' 10) ,,. 
-
~ I 63.9 - - ~.{) . - -19'"1" .' .J 
ll/A 
(%,) 
62,7 
84.7 
99.1 
109.8 
127.6 
96.6 
98.7 
. 
Notes : GDl=Gross domestic investments; GDS=Gross national sa-v1ngs 
Source: World Bank, World Trade (1986) 
Table A3.15 Comparative analysis of institutional contexts 
Ins ti turional U.S.A. l ~fa{Xln l Korea Implicadom for Korill c--xmtexl ~ ~ 
• Inefficiency of valuation in 
1 financial 
Stock Bank-c..4ltefed Jndfir.,iem .. ) ' of stc.;:;k 1narkeis 
nwh:t -ccntcm:i ma1t...e-t and !mv ~ High ro::-1 fur rnising capitrrl i JVlaikct (debt hxll~) 
' (DqLoty flX'.'.U')t;(~ autonomy ofbanks 0 Requn~ncnt of intern~ l 
! 
i 
capital market ; 
~ i\.'1any protcs~ 11- Fmn--speci fie 
io Lackof ~· f nternal laoor 111.'llKCt 
:-.ionm institutes r:mirung. bml.ll)g, l prof essionru schools l "' Finn-:spe:;ific training and Labor amJ hU8in,ess and dcvclor}mcnt 
\fa.1.t--ct ~hc-Jis ( certified 0 L'"'nk of and itistitutcs develupment i:.<it\.~-
• Low dcvclor-,mcnt • Low development of 
'.':ikil!s enhance professional schools 
of manager mark.cl muni.U!ernent skills l mobility) and institutes . ...., . ;i 
I 
Eilicie1.1t infumiatiGn 0 Less cfficicm I Nec.essi.Ly of common Ptooucl l F ffa:ient rrrromm- diifosion in Rmnation diffosion \ brand pa\vcr (businC$" gn)LqJ 's Tvfarrket ric,n cllifusion (y~ f ~s devdopei:.l 0 Lm:v recognition of 
than USA) innovations total image cfio::t) 
.t 
Government 
0 Low· j " idoder&e tt l-!(ci1 
PnlicycnvimnmenL<.:ausing 1 0 Relmivdy free • Reh-irivdy fr~ ' " Conuption is Regulations high t:rm,saction co-st5 or comm ti on uf comrption common 
~ O:mu,icrs Rclativclv 
0 Lmv trus1 is nnrm 
Predir.:t1ble P11.,"'dicrablc Q Lfu:k of mediation "'.-hen -~ 
w1predir.:wbf e cmorccmcm { 
contracts arc vi.olatcd l. 
Source: adapted from Khanna and Palepu ( 1997, p44) 
I 
I 
' 
l 
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Table A3.16 A comparison of corporate governance systems of 
the U.S., Japan, and Korea 
U .S . Japan S. Korea 
_.,,..N. 
Po\:ver of the Board 1vfinor ·very "\-:\reak \ lerv Weak 
., 
Board Men1bers 
Alrnost frorn Outside of the lv1any Almost Non-existent Non-existent Cornpany (Insufficient) ( Little) (Little) ([ ndependencc) 
--Participation of Banks Small Average S1nall 
on the Board 
Salary Level of 
Lasge (High) Small (Lo \V) Small (Lo"v) lvlanagers (Incentive) 
1vioni toring Function \Vcak Strong \\/. k 
of Banks ea . 
Primary 1vfethod of Securities Bank Loans Bank Loans Financing Issuing 
_ ...................... ,,., .-
Dispersed Concentrated Concentrated Type of O,vnership (Individuals/ (Banks/Group (Fami l·y/Group (Primary Shareholders) T nstitutional Firms) fjrms·) Investors) / .. ___ 
Capital Iviarket Very Fluid A Little Fluid A Little Fluid 
..... •~··· 
Banking System Dispersed rvfain Bank Main Bank Transactions Svsten1 Svstem 
-· 
Role of Sn1all Shareholders .\Veak \'1/eak \Veak 
Function of the Corporate Strono Ahnost Ahnost Control lvtarket c Non-existent Non-existent 
Transparency in Transparent Sen1i- Serni-
Jv1anagernent Transparent Transparent 
-
The Separation of Perfect Incon1plete O\vn ership from Separation Separation Separation 
Ivlanag en1ent , i 
Keiretsu 
l 
! 
The ]\,Jain Characted stic I\·farket Relationship Strong Power o~ 
of Corporate Governance 1v1echan ism /Unofficial 0\\1ner-Managerl 
Practices [ ~ 
Source: Korea Economic Research Institute, 1999. 
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Figure A3.l Market shares of the big 10 chaebols in selected industries 
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Figure A3.2 Debt-Equity ratio of the largest 30 chaebols and 
manufacturing firms 
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Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
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Figure A3.3 Debt-Equity ratio by country 
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Source: International Finance Corporation's Corporate Finance Data by Demigruc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic ( 1996). 
Figure A3.4 Economic value-added of the largest 30 chaebols and 
non-chaebol firms 
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Figure A3.5 Debt ratio in the manufacturing industry in Korea 
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Figure A3.6 Debt ratio of Japanese firms (1955-73) 
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Figure A3. 7 Change in debt-guarantees of the 30 largest chaebols 
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Figure A3.8 Ownership structure of Samsung Electronics 
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Figure A3.9 Comparison of the ownership composition of the listed 
firms 
% 
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Note: The bars in each group of bars indicate respectively Korea, 
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Figure A3.10 The number of spin-offs from the 30 largest 
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Figure A3.11 Business type of spun-off companies 
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Figure A3.12 The number of registered venture businesses 
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Figure A3.13 Foreign Investment in Korea 
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Appendix 1 
OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The OECD Council, meeting at Ministerial level on 27r28 April I 998, called 
upon the OECD to develop, in conjunction with national governments, other 
relevant international organisations and the private sector, a set of corporate 
governance standards and guidelines. In order to fulfil this objective, the OECD 
established the Ad-Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance to develop non-
binding principles that embody the views of Member countries on this issue. 
The Principles contained in this document build upon experiences from 
national initiatives in Member countries and previous work carried out within the 
OECD, including that of the OECD Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate 
Governance. During their preparation, a number of OECD committees also were 
involved: the Committee on Financial Markets, the Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterp.rises, the Industry Committee, and the Envi-
ronment Policy Committee . They also benefited from broad exposure to input 
from non-OECD countries, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 
business sector, investors, trade unions, and other interested parties. 
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Part One 
OECD PRINCfiPLE-S OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
L THE RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS 
The corporate governance fra111ework should protect shareholders' rights. 
A. Basic shareholder rights include the right to : I) secure methods of O\Vner-
ship registration; 2) convey or transfer shares; 3) obtain relevant information 
on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; 4) participate and vote in 
general shareholder meetings; 5} elect members of the board; and 6) share 
in the profits of the corporation. 
B. Shareholders have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently in-
formed on1 decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: 
1) amendments to the statutes, or articles of jncorporation or similar gov-
erning documents of the company; 2} the authorisation of additional shares; 
and 3) extraordinary transactions that in effect result in the sale of the com-
pany. 
C. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and 
vote in general shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, 
including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder meetings: 
I. Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely information 
concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well as 
full and timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the 
meeting. 
2. Opportunity should be provided for shareholders to ask questions of the 
board and to place items on the agenda at general meetings, subject to 
reasonable limitations. 
3. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal 
effect should be given to votes whether cast in person or in absentia . 
D. Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to 
obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership 
should be disclosed. 
E. Markets for corporate control should be allo-i;ved to function in an efficient 
and transparent manner. 
1. The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control 
in the capital markets, and extraordinary transactions such as mergers, 
and sales of substantial portions of corporate assets, should be clearly 
articulated and disclosed so that investors understand their rights and 
recourse. Transactions should occur at transparent prices and under fair 
conditions that protect the rights of al I shareholders according to their 
class. 
2. Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management from 
accoun tab ii ity. 
F. Shareholders, including institutional investors, should consider the costs 
and benefits of exercising their voting rights. 
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IL THE EQUITABLE TREATMENT· OF SHAREHOLDE.RS 
The corporate governance framework should ensure tfze equitable treat ... 
nient of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. 
A. All shareholders of the same class should be treated equally. 
1. Within any class, all shareholders should have the same voting rights. All 
investors should be able to obtain information about the voting rights 
attached to all classes of shares before they purchase. Any changes in 
voting rights should be subject to shareholder vote. 
2. Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed 
upon with the beneficial owner of the shares. 
3. Processes and procedures for general shareholder meetings should 
allow for equitable treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures 
should not make it unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes. 
' 
B. Insider trading and abusive self"deaJing should be prohibited. 
C. Members of the board and managers should be required to disclose any 
material interests in transactions or matters affecting the corporation. 
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III. THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS 
lN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rig fr.ts of stake-
holders as esta6lisfted 6y law and encourage active co--operation between 
corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, ;ohs, and the sustain--
ability of financially sound en.terprlses. 
A. The corporate governance framework should assure that the rights of stake-
holders that are protected by law are respected. 
B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
C. The corporate governance framework should permit performance~enhancing 
mechanisms for stakeholder participation. 
D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they 
should have access to relevant information. 
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IV. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY · 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and 
accurate disclosure is 1nade on all material ,natters regarding tfze torpo..-
ration, including the financial situation, perfonnance, ownership, and 
governance of the company. 
A. Disclosure should include) but not be limited to, material information on: 
I. The financial and operating results of the company. 
2. Company objectives. 
3. Major share ownership and voting rights. 
4. Members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration . 
5. Material foreseeable risk factors . 
6. Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
7. Governance structures and policies. 
B. Information should be prepared, audited, and disclosed in accordance with 
high quality standards of accounting, financial and non-financial disclosure, 
and audit. 
C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent auditor in order 
to provide an external and objective assurance on the way in which financial 
statements have been prepared and presented. 
D. Channels for disseminating information should provide for fair, timely and 
cost~efficient access to relevant information by users. 
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V. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD 
Tfze corporate governance framewor{i should ensure the strategic guidance 
of tne conipany, the effective monitoting of managenient hy the hoard, and 
the hoard's accountability to the co,npany and the s(iareholders. 
A. Board members should act on a ful1y informed basis, in good faith, with due 
diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the share-
holders. 
B. \Vhere board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, 
the board should treat all shareholders fairly. 
C. The board should ensure compliance with applicable law and take into 
account the interests of stakeholders. 
D. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
I. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk pol-
icy, annual budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; 
monitoring implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing 
major capital expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures. 
2. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key 
executives and overseeing succession planning. 
3. Reviewjng key executive and board remuneration, and ensuring a fonnal 
and transparent board nomination process. 
4. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of managementi 
board members and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets 
and abuse in related party transactions. 
5. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial 
reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropri ... 
ate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for monitoring 
risk, financial control, and compliance with the law. 
6. Monitoring the effectiveness of the governance practices under which it 
operates and making changes as needed. 
7. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
E. The board should be able to exercise objective judgement on corporate 
affairs independent, in particular, from management. 
I. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive 
board members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks 
where there is a potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key 
responsibilities are financial reporting, nomination and executive and 
board remuneration . 
2. Board members should devote sufficient time to the ir responsibilities . 
F. In order to fulfil the ir responsibilities, board members should have access 
to accurate , relevant and timely information . 
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Part Two 
ANNOTATIONS TO 
THE OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-
I . THE R[GHTS OF SHAREHOlLDE-RS 
The corporate governance franiework sfiould protect shareholders' rigftts. 
Equity investors have certain property rights . For example, an equity share can 
be bought, sold, or transferred. An equity share also entitles the investor to partic-
ipate in the profits of the corporation, with liability limited to the amount of the 
investment. In addition, ownership of an equity share provides a right to informa~ 
tion about the corporation and a right to influence the corporation, primarily by par~ 
ticipation in general. shareholder meetings and by voting. 
As a practical matter, however, the corporation cannot be managed by share~ 
holder referendum. The shareholding body is made up of individuals and instituw 
tions whose interests, goals, investment horizons and capabilities vary. Moreover, 
the corporation 's management must be able to take busjness decisions rapidly. In 
light of these realities and the complexity of managing the corporation's affairs in 
fast moving and ever changing markets, shareholders are not expected to assume 
responsibility for managing corporate activities . The responsibility for corporate 
strategy and operations is typically placed in the hands of the board and a manage~ 
' 
rnent team that is selected, motivated and, when necessary, replaced by the boa.rd. 
Shareholders' rights to influence the corporation centre on certajn fundamen-
tal issuesr such as the election of board members, or other means of influencing the 
composition of the board, amendments to the company's organic documents , 
approval of extraordinary transactions, and other basic issues as specified in com~ 
pany law and internal company statutes. This Section can be seen as a statement of 
the n1ost basic rights of shareholders, which are recognised by law in virtua!Jy all 
OECD countries. Additional rights such as the approval or election of auditors, 
direct norrdnation of board members, the ability to pledge shares, the approval of 
distributions of profits, etc., can be found in various jurisdictions. 
A. Basic shareholder rights include the right to: J) secure methods of own-
ership registration; 2) convey o:r transfer shares; 3) obtain relevant infor-
mation on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; 4) partidpate 
and vote in general shareholder raeetings; 5) elect members of the 
board; and 6) share in the profits of the corporation . 
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B. Shareholders have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently 
informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes such 
as: I) amendments to the statutes, or articles of incorporation or similar 
governing documents of the company; 2) the authorisation of additional 
shares; and 3) extraordinary transactions that in effect result in the sale 
of the company. 
C. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and 
vote in general shareholder meetings and should be informed of the 
rules, including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder 
meetings: 
l. Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely informa• 
tion concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as 
well as full and timely information regarding the issues to be decided 
at the meeting. 
2. Opportunity should be provided for shareholders to ask questions of 
the board and to place items on the agenda at general meetings 1 sub--
ject to reasonable limitations. 
In order to enlarge the ability of investors to participate in general meet-
ings, some companies have increased the ability of shareholders to 
place items on the agenda by simplifying the process of filing amend~ 
ments and resolutions. The ability of shareholders to submit questions 
in advance and to obtain replies from management and board members 
has also been increased. Companies are justified in assuring that frivo~ 
lous or disruptive attempts to place items on the agenda do not occur. It 
is reasonable, for example, to require that in order for shareholder-
proposed resolutions to be placed on the agenda, they need to be sup-
ported by those holding a specified number of shares. 
3. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and 
equal effect should be given to votes whether cast in person or in 
absentia. 
The Principles recommend that voting by proxy be generally accepted. 
Moreover, the objective of broadening shareholder participation sug-
gests that companies consider favourably the enlarged use of technology 
in voting, including telephone and electronic voting. The increased 
importance of foreign shareholders suggests that on balance companies 
ought to make every effort to enabJe shareholders to participate through 
means which make use of modern technology. Effective participation of 
shareholders in general meetings can be enhanced by developing 
secure electronic means of communication and allowing shareholders to 
communicate with each other without having to comply \Nith the formali~ 
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ties of proxy solicitation . As a matter of transparency, meeting proce-
dures should ensure that votes are properly counted and recorded, and 
that a timely announcement of the outcome be made . 
D. Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to 
obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership 
should be disclosed. 
Some capital structures allow a shareholder to exercise a degree of control 
over the corporation disproportionate to the shareholders' equity owner-
ship in the company. Pyramid structures and cross shareholdings can be 
used to diminish the capability of non~controlling shareholders to influence 
corporate policy. 
In addition to ownership relations, other devices can affect control over the 
corporation. Shareholder agreements are a common means for groups of 
shareholders, who individually may hold relatively small shares of total 
equity, to act in concert so as to constitute an effective majority, or at least 
the largest single block of shareholders. Shareholder agreements usually 
give those participating in the agreements preferential rights to purchase 
shares if other parties to the agreement wish to sell. These agreements can 
also contain provisions that require those acceptjng the agreement not to 
sell their shares for a specified time. Shareholder agreements can cover 
issues such as how the board or the Chairman will be selected. The agree-
ments can also oblige those in the agreement to vote as a block. 
Voting caps limit the number of votes that a shareholder may cast, regard-
less of then umber of shares the shareholder may actually possess. Voting 
caps therefore redistribute control and may affect the incentives for share~ 
holder participation in shareholder meetings. 
Given the capacity of these mechanisms to redistribute the influence of 
shareholders on company policy, shareholders can reasonably expect that 
all such capital structures and arrangements be disclosed. 
E. Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an effi-
cient and transparent manner. 
1. The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate con~ 
trot in the capital markets, and extraordinary transactions such as 
mergersr and sales of substantial portions of corporate assets, should 
be clearly articulated and disclosed so that investors understand their 
tights and recourse. Transactions should occur at transparent prices 
and under fair conditions that protect the rights of all shareholders 
according to their class. 
174 
2. Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management from 
accountability. 
In some countries , companies employ anti-take-over devices. However, 
both investors and stock exchanges have expressed concern over the 
possibility that widespread use of anti-take-over devices may be a seriM 
ous impediment to the functioning of the market for corporate control. ln 
some instances, take-over defences can simply be devices to shield the 
management from shareholder monitoring . 
F. Shareholders, including institutional investors, should consider the costs 
and benefits of exercising their voting rights. 
The Principles do not advocate any particular investment strategy for inves-
tors and do not seek to prescribe the optimal degree of investor activism. 
Nevertheless1 many investors have concluded that positive financial 
returns can be obtained by undertaking a reasonable amount of analysis 
and by exercising their voting rights. Some institutional investors also dis~ 
close their own policies with respect to the companies in which they invest. 
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IL THE EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 
The corporate governance frarnework should ensure the equitable treat,.. 
1nent of all shareholders, including 1ninority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders sftould have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. 
Investors' confidence that the capital they provide will be protected from mis-
use or misappropriation by corporate managers, board members or controlling 
shareholders is an important factor in the capital markets. Corporate boards, man-
agers and controlling shareholders may have the opportunity to engage in activities 
that may advance their own interests at the expense of non-controlling sharehold-
ers . The Principles support equal treatment for foreign and domestic shareholders 
in corporate governance. They do not address government policies to regulate for-
eign direct investment. 
One of the ways in which shareholders can en force their rights is to be able to 
initiate legal and administrative proceedings against management and board mem-
bers. Experience has shown that an important determinant of the degree to which 
shareho]der rights are protected is whether effective methods exist to obtain 
redress for grievances at a reasonable cost and without excessive delay. The confi~ 
dence of minority investors is enhanced when the legal system provides mecha~ 
nisms for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have reasonable 
grounds to believe that their rights have been violated. 
There is some risk that a legal system, which enables any investor to challenge 
corporate activity in the courts, can become prone to excessive litigation. Thus, 
many legal systems have introduced provisions to protect management and board 
members against litigation abuse in the form of tests for the sufficiency of share~ 
holder complaints, so~called safe harbours for management and board member 
actions (such as the business judgement rule) as well as safe harbours for the dis~ 
closure of information. In the end, a balance must be struck between allowing 
investors to seek remedies for infringement of ownership rights and avoiding exces-
sive litigation . Many countries have found that alternative adjudication procedures, 
such as administrative hearings or arbitration procedures organised by the .securi-
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ties regulators or other regulatory bodies, are an efficient method for dispute set-
tlement. at least at the first instance !eve[ . 
A. AH shareholders of the same class should be treated equally. 
1. Within any dass, all shareholders should have tne same votlng r:ights. 
AH investors shou1d be able to obtain information about the voting 
rights attached to all classes of shares before they purchase. Any 
changes in voting rights should be subject to shareholder vote. 
The optimal capital structure of the firm is best decided by the manage~ 
ment and the board, subject to the approval of the shareholders. Some 
companies issue preferred (or preference) shares which have a prefer-
ence in respect of receipt of the profits of the firm but which normally 
have no voting ri.ghts. Companies may also issue participation certifi-
cates or shares "lvvithout voting rights, which v..-ould presumably trade at 
different prices than shares \vith voting rights . All of these structures may 
be effective in distributing risk and re\vard in ways that are thought to be 
in the best interest of the company and to cost-efficient financing. The 
Principles do not take a position on the concept of "one share one vote". 
However1 many iqstitutional investors and shareholder associations sup-
port this concept. 
Investors can expect to be informed regarding their voting rights before 
they invest. Once they have invested. their rights should not be changed 
unless those holding voting shares have had the opportunity to partici-
pate in the decision . Proposals to change the voting rights of different 
c1asses of shares are normally submitted for approval at general share~ 
holders meetings by a specified majority of voting shares in the affected 
categories. 
2. Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed 
upon with the benefldal owner of the shares. 
ln some OECD countries it \Vas customary for financial institutions which 
held shares in custody for investors to cast the votes of those shares. Cus-
todians such as banks and brokerage firms holding securities as nomi~ 
nees for customers \Vere sometimes required to vote in support of 
management unless specifically instructed by the shareholder to do oth-
cn.v1se. 
The trend in OECD countries is to remove provisions that automatically 
enable custodian institutions to cast the votes of shareholders. Rules in 
some countries have recently been revised to require custodian institu-
tions to provide shareholders with information concerning their options 
in the use of their voting rights. Shareholders may elect to delegate all 
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voting rights to custodians. Alternatively, shareholders may choose to be 
informed of all upcoming shareholder votes and may decide to cast 
some votes ,,.rhile delegating some voting rights to the custodian. lt is 
necessary to draw a reasonable balance betv\1een assuring that share-
holder votes are not cast by custodians without regard for the wishes of 
shareholders and not imposing excessive burdens on custodians to 
secure s hareho]der approval before casting votes. It ls sufficient to dis-
close to the shareholders that, if no instruction to the contrary is 
received, the custodian will vote the shares fn the v11ay he deems consis-
tent v,tith shareholder interest. 
It should be noted that this item does not apply to the exercise of voting 
rights by trustees or other persons acting under a special legal mandate 
(such as, for example 1 bankruptcy receivers and estate executors}. 
3. Processes and procedures for general shareho]der meetings should 
allow for equitable treatment of ail shareholders. Company ptoce-
dt1res should not make it unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes. 
In Section 1 of the Principles, the right to participate in general sharehold-
er meetings i..,vas identified as a shareholder right. iv1anagement and con-
trolling investors have at times sought to discourage non-controlling or 
foreign investors from trying to influence the direction of the company. 
Some companies charged fees for voting. Other impediments included 
prohibitions on proxy voting and the requirement of personal atten-
dance at general shareholder meetings to vote. Still other procedures 
may make it practically impossible to exercise ownership rights. Proxy 
materials may be sent too close to the time of general shareholder meet-
ings to allovv investors adequate time for reflection and consultation. 
Many companies in OECD countries are seeking to develop better chan-
nels of communication and decision-making with shareholders. Efforts 
by companies to remove artificial barriers to participation in .general 
meetjngs are encouraged. 
B. Insider tradrng and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited. 
Abusive self~dealing occurs when persons having close relationships to the 
company exploit those relationships to the detriment of the company and 
investors . Since insider trading entails manipulation of the capital markets, 
it is prohibited by securities regulations, company law and/or criminal law 
in most OECD countries . Hov,1ever, not all jurisdictions prohibit such prac-
tices , and in some cases enforcement is not vigorous . These practices can 
be seen as constituting a breach of good corporate governance inasmuch as 
they violate the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders . 
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The Principles reaffirm that it is reasonable for investors to expect that the 
abuse of insider power be prohibited. ln cases where such abuses are not 
specifically forbidden by legislation or where enforcement is not effective, 
it will be important for governments to take measures to remove any such 
gaps. 
C. Members of the board and managers should be required to disclose any 
material interests in transactions or matters affecting the corporation. 
This item refers to situations where members of the board and managers 
have a business, family or other special relationship to the company that 
could affect their judgement with respect to a transaction . 
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HH. THE ROLE OF STAK(EHOlDERS 
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Ine corpotate governance framework should recognise the rights of stake-
holders as established hy law and encourage active co ... operation between 
corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth) f ohs, and the sustain-
avility of financially sound enterp1~ises. 
A key aspect of corporate governance is concerned with ensuring the flow of 
external capital to firms. Corporate governance is also concerned with finding ways 
to encourage the various stakeholders in the firm to undertake socially efficient lev-
els of investment in firm~specific human and physical capital. The competitiveness 
and ultimate success of a corporation is the result of teannvork that embodies con-
tributions from a range of different resource providers including investors, employ-
ees, creditors , and suppliers. Corporations should recognise that the contributions 
of stakeholders constitute a valuable resource for building competitive and profit~ 
able companies . Tt is, therefore , in the long-term interest of corporations to foster 
v./ealth~creating co-operation among stakeholders . The governance framework should 
recognise that the interests of the corporation are served by recognising the interests 
of stakeholders and their contribution to the long~term success of the corporation . 
A. The corporate governance frame\vork should assure that the rights of 
stakeholders that are protected by law are respected. 
Jn all OECD countries stakeholder rights are established by law, such as 
labour law, business law, contract [aw, and insolvency law. Even in areas 
where stakeholder interests are not legislated, many firms make add1tional 
commitments to stakeholders, and concern over corporate reputation and 
corporate performance often require the recognition of broader interests. 
B. \Vhere stakeholder in terests are protected by law, stakeholders should 
have the opportunity to obtatn effective redress for violation of the1r rights. 
The legal framework and process should be transparent and not impede 
the abHity o f stakeho lders to communicate and to obta in redress for the 
vio lation of rights . 
180 
C. The corporate governance framework should permit performance-en~ 
handng mechanisms for stakeholder participation. 
Corporate governance frameworks will provide for different roles for stake-
holders. The degree to \vhich stakeholders participate in corporate gover-
nance depends on national laws and practices, and may vary from company 
to company as well. Examples of mechanisms for stakeholder participation 
include: employee representation on boards; employee stock ownership 
plans or other profit sharing mechanisms or governance processes that con-
sider stakeholder viewpoints in certain key decisions . They may, in addi-
tion, include creditor involvement in .governance in the context of 
insolvency proceedings. 
D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, 
they should have access to relevant information. 
Where laws and practice of corporate governance systems provide for par~ 
ticipation by stakeholders, it is important that stakeholders have access to 
information necessary to fulfil their responsibilities. 
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IV. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that titnely and 
accurate disclosure is made on all ,naterial ,natters regarding the corpo--
ration) including the financial situation, perfottnance, ownership, and 
goi,ernance of the con1pan.y. 
In most OECD countries a large amount of information, both mandatory and 
vo[untary, is compiled on publicly traded and l.arge unlisted enterprises, and sub-
sequently disseminated to a broad range of users . Public disclosure is typkally 
required, at a minimum , on an annual basis though some countries require periodic 
disclosure on a semi~annual or quarterly basis, or even more frequently in the case 
of material developments affecting the company. Companies often make voluntary 
disdosure that goes beyond minimum disclosure r~quirements in response to mar-
ket demand. 
A strong disclosure regime is a pivotal feature of market~based monitoring of 
companies and is central t,o shareholders' ability to exercise their voting rights. 
Experience in countries with large and active equity markets shows that disclosure 
can also be a powerful tool for influencing the behaviour of companies and for pro-
tecting investors. A strong disclosure regime can help to attract capital and maintain 
confidence in the capital markets. Shareholders and potential investors require 
access to regular. reliable and comparable information in sufficient detail for them 
to assess the stewardship of management, and make informed decisions about the 
valuation, ownership and voting of shares. Insufficient or unclear information may 
hamper the ability of the markets to function, may increase the cost of capital and 
result in a poor allocation of resources . 
Disclosure also helps improve public understanding of the structure and activ-
ities of enterprises, corporate policies and performance with respect to environ~ 
mental and ethical standards, and companies) relationships with the communities 
in \>Vhich they operate. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are re]~ 
evant in this context. 
Disclosure requirements are not expected to place unreasonable administra~ 
tive or cost burdens on enterprises . Nor are companies expected to disclose 
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information that may endanger their competitive position unless disclosure is nee~ 
essary to fully inform the investment decision and to avoid misleading the investor. 
In order to determ 1ne \.Vhat information shou Id be disclosed at a minim um, many 
countries apply the concept of materiality. Material information can be defined as 
information whose omission or misstatement cou]d influence the economic deci-
sions taken by users of information . 
The Principles support timely disclosure of all material developments that 
arise between regular reports. They also support simultaneous reporting of infor-
mation to all shareholders in order to ensure their equitable treatment. 
A. Disclosure should rndude, but not be Hmited to, material information on: 
I. The flnandaf and operating resuHs of the company. 
Audited financial statements showing the financial performance and the 
financial situation of the company (most typically including the balance 
sheet, the profit and loss statement1 the cash flow statement and notes 
to the financial statements) are the iriost widely used source of informa-
tion on companies. In their cun-ent form, the t\VO principal goals of fin an~ 
cia] statements are to enable appropriate monitoring to take place and 
to provide the basis to value securities. Management's discussion and 
analysis of operations is typically included in annual reports. This discus~ 
sion is most useful when read in conjunction with the accompanying 
financial statements. lnvestors are particularly interested in information 
that may shed light on the future performance of the enterprise. 
It is important that transactions relating to an entire group be disclosed. 
Arguably, failures of governance can often be linked to the failure to dis-
close the ''whole picture'', particularly where off-balance sheet items are 
used to provide guarantees or similar commitments betv .. ,een related 
companies. 
2. Company objectives. 
In addition to their commercial objectives, companies are encouraged to 
disclose policies relating to business ethics, the environment and other 
public policy commitments. Such information may be important for 
investors and other users of information to better evaluate the relation-
ship bet\veen companies and the communities in which they operate 
and the steps that companies have taken to implement their objectives. 
3. Niajor share ownership and voting rights. 
One of the basic rights of investors is to be informed about the ov,1nershtp 
structure of the enterprise and their rights vis-a-vis the rights of other O\vn-
ers . Countries often require disclosure of ownership data once certain 
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thresholds of ownership are passed. Such disclosure might include 
data on major shareholders and others that control or may contra[ the 
company, including information on special voting rights, shareholder 
agreements, the ownership of controlling or large blocks of shares, signif-
icant cross shareholding relationships and cross guarantees. (See Sec-
tion l.D.) Companies are also expected to provide information on related 
party transactions. 
4. Members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration. 
Investors require information on individual board members and key 
executives in order to evaluate their experience and qualifications and 
assess any potential conflicts of interest that might affect their judgement. 
Board and executive remuneration are also of concern to shareholders. 
Companies are generally expected to disclose sufficient information on 
the remuneration of board members and key executives (either jndivid-
ually or in the aggregate) for investors to properly assess the costs and 
benefits of remuneration plans and the contribution of incentive 
schemes, such as stock option schemes, to performance. 
5. Material foreseeable risk factors. 
Users of financial information and market participants need information 
on reasonably foreseeable material risks that may include: risks that are 
specific to the industry or geographical areas; dependence on commod-
ities: financial market risk including interest rate or currency risk; risk 
related to derivatives and off-balance sheet transactions: and risks relat-
ed to environmental liabilities. 
The Principles do not envision the disclosure of information in greater 
detail than is necessary to fully inform investors of the material and fore-
seeable risks of the enterprise. Disclosure of risk is most effective 'llrhen 
it is tailored to the particular industry in question . Disclosure of whether 
or not companies have put systems for monitoring tisk in place is also 
useful. 
6. Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
Companies are encouraged to provide information on key issues rele-
vant to employees and other stakeholders that may materially affect 
the performance of the company. Disclosure may include management1 
employee relations, and relations with other stakeholders such as credi-
to rs, suppliers, and local communities . 
Some countries require extensive disclosure of information on human 
resources . Human resou rce policies , such as programmes for human 
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resource development or employee share ownership plans, can commu-
nicate important information on the competitive strengths of companies 
to market participants. 
7. Governance structures and policies. 
Companies are encouraged to report on how they apply relevant corpo-
rate governance princip !es in practice. Disclosure of the governance 
structures and policies of the company, in particular the division of 
authority between shareholders, management and board members is 
important for the assessment of a company's governance 
B. Information should be prepared, audited 1 and disclosed in accordance 
with high quality standards of accounting, financial and non-financial dis-
closure, and audit. 
The application of high quality standards is expected to significantly 
improve the ability of investors to monitor the company by providing 
increased reliability and comparability of reporting , and improved insight 
into company performance. The quality of information depends on the 
standards under which it is compiled and disclosed. The Principles support 
the development of high quality internationally recognised standards, which 
can serve to improve the comparability of infotmation between countries. 
C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent auditor in order 
to provide an external and objective assurance on the way in which finan-
cial statements have been prepared and presented. 
Many countries have considered measures to improve the independence 
of auditors and their accountability to shareholders. !tis widely felt that the 
appUcation of high quality audit standards and codes of ethics is one of the 
best methods for increasing independence and strengthening the standing 
of the professjon. Further measures include strengthening of board audit 
committees and increasing the board's responsibility in the auditor selec-
tion process. 
Other proposals have been considered by OECD countries. Some countries 
apply limitations on the percentage of non-audit income that the auditor 
can receive from a particular client. Other countries require companies to 
disclose the level of fees paid to auditors for non~audJt services . In addition 
there may be limitations on the total percentage of auditor income that can 
come from one client. Examples of other proposals include quality reviews 
of auditors by another auditor, prohibjtions on the provision of non-audit 
services, mandatory rotation of auditors and the direct appointment of 
auditors by shareholders . 
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D . Channels for disseminating information should provide for fair, timely 
and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users. 
Channels for the dissemination of information can be as important as the 
content of the information itself. \Vhile the disclosure of 1n formation is often 
provided for by legislation, filing and access to information can be cumber-
some and costly. Filing of statutory reports has been greatly enhanced in 
some countries by electronic filing and data retrieval systems. The Internet 
and other information technologies also provide the opportunity for 
improving information dissemination . 
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V. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD 
The corporate governance fra,neworft should ensure tf.te strategic guidance 
of the co1npany, the effective nionitoring of 1nanagen1ent 6y the hoard, and 
the hoard1s accounta6ility to the contpany and the shareholders. 
Board structures and procedures vary both 'Nithin and among OECD countries. 
Some countries have two-tier boards that separate the supervisory function and the 
management function into different bodies. Such systems typtcally have a "super-
visory board" composed of non-executive board members and a "management 
board" composed entirely of executives. Other countries have "unitary" boards, 
vvhich bring together executive and non-executive board members. The Principles 
are intended to be sufficiently general to apply to whatever board structure is 
charged with the functions of governing the enterprise and monitoring manage-
ment. 
Together \Vith guiding corporate strategy, the board is chiefly responsible for 
monitoring managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for share-
holders, \Vhile preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands 
on the corporation. In order for boards to effectively fulfil their responsibilities they 
must have some degree of independence from management. Another important 
board responsibility is to implement systems designed to ensure that the corpora-
tion obeys applicable laws, lnduding tax. competition1 labour, environmental, · 
equal opportunity, health and safety lav..-s. In addition, boards are expected to take 
due regard of, and deal fairly \Vith, other stakeholder interests including those of 
employees 1 creditors, customers, suppliers and local communities . Observance of 
environmental and social standards is relevant in this context 
A. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with 
due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the 
shareholders. 
In some countries, the board is legally required to act in the interest of the 
company, taking into account the interests of shareholders, employees, and 
the public good. Acting in the best interest of the company should not per-
mit management to becorne entrenched . 
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B. Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differ-
ently, the board should treat ail shareholders fairly. 
C. The board should ensure compliance with applicable 1aw and take Into 
account the interests of stakeholders. 
D. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
I. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk 
policy, annual budgets and business plans; setting performance objec-
tives; monitoring implementation and corporate performance; and 
overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures. 
2. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing 
key executives and overseeing succession planning. 
3. Reviewing key executive and board remuneration, and ensuring a for~ 
mal and transparent board nomination process. 
4. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of manage~ 
ment, board members and shareholders, including misuse of corpo-
rate assets and abuse in related party transactions. 
5. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and flnanda1 
reporting systems, indudlng the independent audit, and that appro-
priate systems of control are in piac:e, in particular, systems for moni-
toring risk. financial contro], and compHance with the law. 
6. Monitoring the effectiveness of the governance practices under which 
it operates and making changes as needed. 
7. Overseeing the process of disdosure and communications. 
The specific functions of board members may differ according to the articles 
of company Jaw in each jurisdiction and according to the statutes of each 
company. The above~noted elements are. however, considered essential 
for purposes of corporate governance . 
E. The board should be able to exercise objective judgement on corporate 
affairs independent, in particular, from management. 
The variety of board structures and practices in different countries \Nill 
require different approaches to the issue of independent board members. 
Board independence usually requires that a sufficient number of board 
members not be employed b)/ the company and not be closely related to 
the company or its management through significant economic, family or 
other ties. This does not prevent shareholders from being board members . 
lndependent board members can contribute significantly to the decision-
making of the board. They can bring an objective viev,1 to rhe evaluation of 
the performance of the board and management. In addition. they can play 
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an important role in areas where the interests of management, the company 
and shareholders may diverge such as executive remuneration, succession 
planning, chan.ges of corporate control, take-over defences, large acquisi-
tions and the audit function. 
The Chairman as the head of the board can play a central role in ensuring 
the effective governance of the enterprise and is responsible for the 
board's effective function. The Chairman may in some countries, be sup-
ported by the company secretary. In unitary board systems, the separatjon 
of the roles of the Chief Executive and Chairman is often proposed as a 
method of ensuring an appropriate balance of power. increasing account~ 
ability and increasing the capacity of the board for independent decision 
making. 
l. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive 
board members capable of exercising independent judgement to 
tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest Examples of 
such key responsibilities are financial reporting, nomination and exec-
utive and board remuneration. 
While the responsibility for financial reporting! remuneration and nom i-
nation are those of the board as a v.rhole, independent non~executive 
board members can provide additional assurance to market participants 
(hat their interests are defended. Boards may also consider establishing 
specific committees to consider questions where there is a potential for 
conflkt of interest. These committees may require a minimum number or 
be composed entirely of non-executive members. 
2. Board members should devote sufficient time to their responsibilities. 
It is widely held that service o.n too many boards can interfere with the 
performance of board members. Companies may wjsh to consider 
whether excessive board service interferes ·with board performance. 
Some countries have limited the number of board positions that can be 
held. Specific limitations may be less important than ensuring that mem~ 
bers of the board enjoy legitimacy and confidence in the eyes of share-
holders. 
In order to improve board practices and the performance of its members, 
some companjes have found it usefu 1 to engage in training and voluntary 
self-evaluation that meets the needs of the individual company. This 
might include that board members acquire appropriate skills upon 
appointment, and thereafter remain abreast of relevant ne\-v laws, regu-
lations, and changing commercial risks. 
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f. In order to fulfil their respons1biHties, board members should have 
access to accurate, relevant cind tlmely information. 
Board membe!'s require relevant information on a timely basls in order to 
support their decision-making. Non-executive board mern bers do not typ -
ically have the same acc2ss to information as key managers within the cpn1-
pany. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company 
can be enhanced by providing access to cet-tain key managers within the 
company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal 
auditor. and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the 
company. In order to fulfi ! their responsibilities, board rnem be rs shou id 
ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely inforrnatlon. 
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Appendix 2 
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Corporate Governance 
Definitions of corporate governance 
Corporate governance has succeeded in attracting a good deal of public interest 
because of its apparent importance to the economic health of corporations and 
society in general. However, the concept of corporate governance is broad 
because it covers a large number of distinct economic phenomena. As a result, 
different people have produced different definitions that basically reflect their 
own special interests in the field. It is hard to see that this 'disorder' will be any 
different in the future, so the best way to explore the concept is to list several · 
different definitions: 
' 
"The definition of corporate governance is involved with the distribution of wealth, position and 
information. It refers to power, shareholder value, performance and structures. Corporate 
governance is the exertion of influence over managerial decision making by various stakeholders -
shareholders, employees, banks, and the impact upon managerial decision making"(Lorsch, 1989). 
"Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment"(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
"Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness, transparency and 
accountability"(Wolfensohn, 1999). 
"It [corporate governance] is the relationship among various part1c1pants m determining the 
direction and performance of corporations"(Monks and Minow, 1995). 
"Some commentators take too narrow a view, and say it (corporate governance) is the fancy term 
for the way in which directors and auditors handle their responsibilities towards shareholders. 
Others use the expression as if it were synonymous with shareholder democracy. Corporate 
governance is a topic recently conceived, as yet ill-defined, and consequently blurred at the 
edges .. . corporate governance as a subject, as an objective, or as a regime to be followed for the 
good of shareholders, employees, customers, bankers and indeed for the reputation and standing of 
our nation and its economy" (Maw, 1994). 
"Corporate governance is a field in economics that investigates how corporations can be made 
more efficient by the use of institutional structures such as contracts, organisational designs and 
legislation. This is often limited to the question of shareholder value i.e. how the corporate owners 
can motivate and/or secure that the corporate managers will deliver a competitive rate of 
return."(Mathiesen, 1999). 
"Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. 
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation, such as , the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By 
doing this , it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance"(OECD, 1999) 1• 
1 The OECD definition is consistent with the one presented by Cadbury ( 1992) 
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These definitions are all reasonable in their respective contexts. However, the 
OECD definition (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1999) is broadly 
accepted. This definition explains accurately contemporary corporate governance 
systems throughout the world, even though particular countries still have their 
endogenous governance systems due to their particular corporate environments. 
Essentially, the origin of the issue of defining corporate governance starts with the 
question of who has the authority to obtain more profits in modern corporations, 
ownership of which is shared by and related to many stakeholders. This issue 
raises various problems. 
Corporate governance problems 
Corporate governance refers to the ways institutions help principals to obtain 
profit on their exchanges with management. In other words, corporate governance 
refers to institutional actions that may help to minimise the transaction costs of the 
corporate agency. Figure A2. l shows the correlation between corporate 
performance and influential variables of production and transaction costs, and 
between imperfect institutions of ownership structures, decision systems, etc. with 
principals and agents. Corporate performance can be estimated by some measures 
as a proxy of how well a firm is using its resources, for instance, return on assets, 
return on equity, economic profit, book-to-market ratio, Tobin's Q ratio, 
economic value added or adjusted market returns, etc. The ownership structure is 
defined by the distribution of equity with regard to votes and capital and also by 
the identity of the equity owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to Figure A2.2, the correlations between corporate performance and 
imperfect institutions are complicated. The respective variables of imperfect 
institutions are influenced mutually by themselves, and all of them have 
influential correlations with corporate performance as well. That is, various 
hypotheses can be raised about the correlation between corporate performance and 
various influential imperfect institutions, including ownership structure. 
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Figure A2.1 Corporate governance problem 
~ Corporate Performance .___ 
Production costs e.g. sharef older value Transaction costs 
Imperfect exchanges or managerial transaction cost 
Principals: Imperfect institutions 
The people who control the management: 
• Typically the equity owners. 
Imperfect conditions 
Imperfect Institutions: Ownership structures 
Decision systems 
Incentive pay systems 
Bankruptcy systems 
Creditor structures 
Capital structure 
Source: Mathiesen, 1997 
Market for corporate control 
Market for management service 
Product market competition 
• 
Agents: 
The people who administer 
The corporate resources: 
The management 
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Figure A2.2 Corporate performance and imperfect institutions 
Corporate performance 
Decision systems 
Performance monitor systems 
Incentive based compensatio 
Bankruptcy systems 
Capital structure 
The market for corporate control 
The market for management 
services 
Ownership structure ... •----------- Competition in the product markets 
Source: Mathiesen, 1997 
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